Pro-U.S. Regimes in Lebanon & Iraq Provoke Opponents

In both Iraq and Lebanon over the past two months the following has occurred:

1. A top U.S. official visited;
2. A few days later, the pro-U.S. regime launched a military challenge to opposition groups that were maintaining a peaceful stance and participating in politics but who disagreed with U.S. policy toward their respective countries;
3. The opposition groups, when provoked, responded with force;
4. Civilian deaths occurred and many more were feared, generating widespread calls for compromise;
5. As of this weekend, compromises are in place that seem on the surface to be defeats for the pro-U.S. regimes but that also leave the opposition groups with tarnished images.

Will either side learn to be less prone to violence?
Will the regimes become less willing to follow the advice of Washington?
Will Washington itself learn anything at all?
Are the facts I have listed even the key facts, or was my selection biased?
Is the apparent pattern of recent events in Iraq and Lebanon just coincidence?

Hmm…

Forecast: More Chickens Coming Home to Roost

Based on the State Department’s own annual report on terrorism, it seems that the long-anticipated spread of terrorism from Iraq into the rest of the Middle East has begun. According to analysis by Joel Brinkley of the San Francisco Chronicle (thanks to Juan Cole for noting this), the State Department report noted terrorism in Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, and Yemen provoked by the U.S. occupation of Iraq!

I argued at the beginning of April that:

as long as American troops and bases remain in Iraq, they serve as a convenient target for al Qua’ida and represent an incredibly powerful motivational issue to aid in the recruitment of new members. For this reason, the termination of U.S. military operations in Iraq would constitute an immediate and very significant loss for al Qua’ida. The U.S. invasion of Iraq was a gift to al Qua’ida, eliminating an Arab Sunni enemy, creating a convenient battleground, enhancing al Qua’ida’s reputation, and distracting attention from the shattered al Qua’ida headquarters organization. Five years later, al Qua’ida itself has gained time to reorganize, and the chaos flowing out of the U.S. occupation of Iraq has given the al Qua’ida message of global Sunni jihad a huge boost. That the U.S. succeeds in eliminating al Qua’ida from Iraq should come to Americans as little solace: such a victory would only return the situation to what it was after 9/11; Washington invites them into Iraq and then kicks them out. Iraq has been a sideshow for al Qua’ida, but one that brought al Qua’ida much profit.

Now the State Department itself has provided shocking evidence of just how “powerful” Iraq has been as a “motivational issue to aid in the recruitment of new members.” Admittedly, from a certain perspective, that might not be considered bad news: the more al Qua’ida recruits, the easier it will be for the neo-cons to justify a war policy and the greater the profits of the military-industrial complex.

Whatever the actual motivations of current Washington decision makers, the candidates for the White House should be thinking long and hard about what is happening. There has been some public discussion in the U.S. recently about foreign policy chickens coming home to roost. The next administration in Washington will need to construct roosts quickly, for some very nasty, new Bush-breed chickens are going to be coming home.

Foreign Policy For the New American Administration

It would be naive, I suppose, to anticipate that the candidates for the U.S. presidency might put aside their immoral bluster about innocent populations they would "obliterate" to give some intelligent thought to the type of world the winner will inherit next January. So, perhaps we should do it for them. All with the foresight to estimate where current global political dynamics are carrying us are cordially invited to share their visions. The world can use your help.

One of the clearest trends I can see is the intensification of determination in official Washington to solve problems with military force. Closely allied with the use of force is the desire to ostracize and totally defeat those who disagree rather than trying to find areas of potential agreement think creatively about possible compromises. The May 8 editorial in Pakistan's Frontier Post quoted in my previous post neatly dismissed that approach to foreign policy, though its argument could have been even stronger if it had referred to the endless Colombian civil war, the endless Palestinian-Israeli conflict, or the coming tragedy in Lebanon.

Whoever enters the White House next January is going to be boxed in by a whole series of conflicts from which it will be extremely difficult to disengage. The failure of the candidates today to reject publicly and clearly this path of confrontation will only further limit their own freedom of action once elected...digging the ground out from under their own feet.

Learning From Afghan Policy Failure

The following Pakistani perspective on Bush Administration policy toward Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan in a recent editorial in the blunt-talking Pakistani newspaper, The Frontier Post, addresses the long-term implications of fundamental foreign policy choices made by Washington after 9/11 and being implemented to this day across the Islamic world. This editorial gets to the heart of why the irresistable military force of a superpower seems, despite smashing so much and killing so many, to be accomplishing so little in the confrontation with Islam.

Bunk talk of desperation

Indisputably, the American occupiers are in despair as abysmally, if not more, in Afghanistan as are they in Iraq. Yet, if one were to listen to their bunk talk of desperation, they would have it believed that their occupied Afghanistan is still in the throes of the insurgency because the Taliban and the al-Qaeda have regrouped in our tribal region. But when was it that Afghanistan was at peace since they invaded it, ousted the Taliban and demolished their al-Qaeda allies some seven years ago? Visibly, at peace it never has been, in trouble it perpetually has been; for which the Bush administration and its international coalition allies in Afghanistan are squarely to blame. They all have contemptibly betrayed the Afghan people and served only a clutch of their proxies in the occupied state. The UN had undertaken to disarm the warlords who had staged a comeback after the invasion and to demobilise their lethally-armed militias. It has left the job undone forgetfully, leaving these warlords to keep their fiefdoms under their thumb with their private armies all intact. The Germans took upon them the task of raising, training and equipping a powerful police force. They have long forgotten if they had ever made any such commitment. The Italians had promised a massive help to Kabul to build a viable judicial system in the country. Apart from building a few court rooms, they have nothing else to show for this assistance. The British had assumed the responsibility to rid the country of poppy cultivation and drugs trafficking. Instead, Afghanistan on their watch has become the world’s biggest poppy grower and drugs supplier. And that huge corps of NGOs in the country, which has uniquely formed up into a trade union to be the first-ever of its kind in the world, has gobbled up the bulk of the donor money but has not any respectable showing on the ground to proffer for its performance. For their own part, the Americans have no ground whatsoever to flaunt even a slight posture of one-upmanship and have every cause to be ashamed of their Afghanistan adventure, gone so awry as has it been for their lackadaisicalness, perfidy and even cowardice. They had all the military prowess, which if combined with imaginative and creative political initiatives, could have pacified the war-ravaged and civil strife-torn country. But that was not to be. In the first place, for fear of accumulating body bags of their own they did not put enough boots on the ground to corral the fleeing Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants, and latterly to tame and discipline the resurgent warlords. Instead, they resorted to blind aerial bombings, killing innocent civilians by droves, which earned them enemies than friends, particularly among the country’s Pakhtun majority community that bore all the brunt of their deadly air actions. As the Taliban were predominantly Pakhtuns, the American commanders singled out the Pakhtun-populated areas for their brutal military campaign. Worse, instead of securing the border with Pakistan to plug off the flight of the Taliban and al-Qaeda rumps into the Pakistani territory, the Americans left it unsecured on the Afghanistan side, no lesser for keeping their military assets preserved for their intended aggression on a sovereign Iraq on the basis of lewd lies as part of their grand geopolitical design for the Middle East. And if at all our tribal region has become the haven for the Taliban or al-Qaeda, as they claim, who else is to blame if they not themselves. For its part, Pakistan kept deployed at any time no less than 80,000 troops to plug the border on its side. And even as not even fractionally as well equipped and well served as were their American counterparts, these soldiers gave a good account of themselves despite operating in the most inhospitable terrain and in very dire conditions. Hundreds of them have died in action, appallingly without an acknowledgement of the sacrifices of their precious lives from the American commanders who for the most part have kept their own troops ensconced in fortified bases to murder and maim more civilians than the militants with their savage artillery barrages and with bombardments of their helicopter gunships and fighter planes. Still worse, with their military incursions in our tribal areas, they have murdered our innocent compatriots in scores, horrifically including children and women, leaving a populace angry as much with them as with our own state. And if anti-American sentiment is sweeping this tribal region of ours stormily, it is also being rocked with anger against the Islamabad establishment, making a military campaign increasingly infeasible there, in spite of all the blackmail, bullying and arm-twisting of the American commanders and their political bosses. Indeed, the time has come for the Americans to forget all about a legacy of President Bush to be remembered by his compatriots and to concede defeat of their war in Afghanistan. They must let President Hamid Karzai to seek out political resolutions to his country’s troubles and let also the new Pakistan leadership to pacify our restive tribal and adjoining settled areas politically. For many a time has President Karzai extended his hand of peace to the Taliban, including their top brass, but had to pull it back every time under the pressure of the Americans and their allies. And now that after the British, who struck a peace deal with the Taliban in Musa Qila, the Kandhar-based Canadian force is venturing out for similar deals at the local levels, the American lords must sit back and allow President Karzai a free hand. Nor should they create any obstructions in the way of the Pakistani leadership to pacify the restive tribal region with political means. For, our tribal people are never amenable to force or coercion but are always very forthcoming to peaceful settlements. If they think that a military campaign will succeed in Afghanistan or in our tribal region, they are just deluding themselves. It will never. This tells history.

Bush's Intensifying Confrontation with Islam: Pakistan's Turn

On May 5, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte gave a short address at the semi-official National Endowment for Democracy (NED) on Pakistan. The money quotes were:

...let me be clear: we will not be satisfied until all the violent extremism emanating from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas is brought
under control. It is unacceptable for extremists to use those areas to plan, train for, or execute attacks against Afghanistan, Pakistan, or the wider world. Their ongoing ability to do so is a barrier to lasting security, both regionally and internationally. Pakistan’s Government must bring the frontier area under its control as quickly as possible and we are certainly prepared to provide appropriate assistance to the Government of Pakistan in order to achieve that objective.

And, in response to a question from the audience:

we want to be supportive of the Government of Pakistan’s efforts to
enhance the standard of living, the level of development of that region, and we’re very supportive of those efforts. In fact, we have a five-year, $150 million a year program to support the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. But when it comes to the issue of international terrorism, we don’t think that area should be a platform from which attacks can be conducted against other parts of Pakistan, nor do we think it should be a platform for the conduct of attacks into Afghanistan across the border, where we have, of course, great interests in the stability of that country and we have our own troops and other NATO troops
stationed there who end up being the victims of some of these attacks. And of course, we don’t want to see the tribal area being used as a platform for plotting and executing international terrorist activity against the West. So any kind of agreement or understanding which might be negotiated, we would have to look at in the light of those imperatives for United States policies.

Pakistan, you have been warned!

Background on both Negroponte and the NED.

Beyond the specifics of U.S.-Pakistani relations, it is instructive to place this speech in the broader context of Bush Administration policy during his final year in office. As I wrote in mid-March:

"To understand the dynamics underlying contemporary global political strife, it is essential to comprehend that choices exist. Bush could try to leave office on high note by leading the world away from the law of the jungle toward mutual understanding. Annapolis was the wave of a hand in this direction, though it was clear from the start, given Bush’s refusal to invite two of the key players – Hamas and Iran, that it did not constitute a sincere effort at a new direction.

Alternatively, Bush could pull back and allow others freedom to maneuver. Since the neo-con policy of force is not working, perhaps others have better ideas. Intentionally or not, the effect of the NIE was to put Europe in the driver’s seat in terms of leading the charge against Iranian nuclear program. Beyond this, for every Islamic problem facing Bush, local initiatives to resolve the situation peacefully exist but are being blocked by U.S. policy....

There is little indication, however, that Bush will consider these alternatives. Rather, if various disparate pieces of recent evidence are put together, the resulting pattern suggests that in the waning months of his administration, Bush means to intensify American pressure on the Islamic world, further promoting the emergence of an Islamic political fault line that will split Moslem societies even as it leads to more severe confrontation with the West. If the policy of force has not worked after six and a half years, then apply more force!"

Those comments preceeded the decision of U.S. proxy al-Maliki to attack al Sadr, the decision of the U.S. to send its troops into Sadr City, the recent U.S. missile attack on Somalia, the intensified U.S. rhetoric of recent weeks blaming Iran for its self-inflicted problems in Iraq, and the decision of the pro-U.S. Lebanese regime to intensify its confrontation with Hezballah this week by cutting its phone lines. Now, it's Pakistan's turn.

Immorality Turns to Farce

Not just professional policy makers and academics but anyone with even the most basic sense of decency must be rolling his or her eyes today at the antics of the cabal in charge in Washington. Only in a Monty Python skit could one imagine appointing the head of an outside-the-law prison for torturing Moslems and avoiding letting them come to trial as a representative to a Moslem country. If anything demonstrates conclusively the mindless arrogance and utter amateurishness of the Bush Administration it is the decision to send former Guantanamo prison head Jay Hoodformer to Pakistan as military envoy.

The real question is not why such an inexcusably insulting decision was taken, slapping in the face the new democratically elected Pakistani government; indeed, perhaps that is the reason. (For background on an ominous shift that may be occurring in Washington's attitude toward Pakistan, see the analysis posted by Hassan Abbas.) The real question is why this representative of a U.S. government policy so out-of-line with U.S. constitutional guarantees of right to due process--the cornerstone of democratic freedoms--has not been retired in disgrace and himself brought to trial. But, of course, we all know the answer to that question. Even in an election year, no one--not the candidates, not the American people--has the guts to examine the morality of U.S. behavior since 9/11.

Behaving Like a Superpower

The pro-Iranian U.S. colonial regime in Iraq (ironic, yes; misprint, no) is now warning its citizens to flee the "Sadr City" section of the country's capital so a free-fire zone can be created.

In Vietnam, the U.S. destroyed villages in order to save them (that was before fleeing by helicopter from the Embassy roof; the "light at the end of the tunnel" was the headlight of a rescue helicopter). In Iraq, the U.S. is destroying the colonial capital in order to save it. The U.S. is also bribing the pro-Saddam Sunnis not to attack it while it concentrates on fighting the poor Shi'a whom Saddam oppressed.

Is there any opponent too small, too weak to attract the concentrated fury of the world's last superpower?

Given the enormous amount of force Washington is employing against these urban guerrillas and their mosques and hospitals and homes, exactly what will Washington do if once again faced with a real enemy (and, no, I do not mean Iran)? If you smash mosquitoes with a sledgehammer, what do you use for elephants?

These are not cheap shots. The role of a superpower is to develop grand global strategy for long-term global security and progress, i.e., to be the CEO and provide vision. Expending huge amounts of energy to antagonize (the U.S. pressed the attack via arrests and then outright military moves against al Sadr despite his declaration of a ceasefire) a local political faction that opposes the U.S. presence in its own country but is not, aside from that, an enemy of the U.S. seems a spendthrift and ultimately untenable approach to managing a big world.

Attack Iran...Then What?

What plans do the glib and arrogant war party politicians in Washington and Tel Aviv have for dealing with the consequences of the war of aggression against Iran that they keep threatening?

In a recent post, I argued that even if total victory over Iran were guaranteed in advance, to launch a “preventive” war, i.e., a war of choice, a war of aggression, against Iran would be a questionable deal for the U.S., certainly entailing some serious costs that the politicians with their smug grins are not anticipating.

So, what about the reality in which nothing is guaranteed? In a word,

Short of total victory, would a U.S. attack on Iran be worthwhile?

Incomplete victory could occur in any number of ways – military victory but political defeat (a soberingly familiar outcome), inconclusive military advantage (also familiar), or a victory so expensive as to feel like defeat. The U.S. has been fighting continuously in Iraq for 17 years, off and on in Somalia for 15 years, and in Afghanistan for 7 years (not counting the war against the Soviet Union). Israel fought in Lebanon for 18 years (1982-2000) and re-invaded in 2006. In Iraq, a vicious secular dictator has been replaced by utter social chaos plus a terror campaign that did not exist there until we invaded. In Somalia, utter social chaos existed when we intervened on a humanitarian mission and remains now that Washington is supporting the overthrow of a government whose independence was viewed with disfavor. In Afghanistan, a vicious regime that befriended bin Laden has been replaced by a civil war. In Lebanon, civil war was supplemented by a national war of liberation, provoking the rise of Hezballah, now the most modern political party in Lebanon and a model for all Moslems trying to organize national anti-Western movements. This record suggests the possibility that an attack on Iran might also have unpleasant long-term consequences that should be considered before it is too late.


Military Victory but Political Defeat:
Unprovoked military attack would be likely to unite and outrage the Iranian population, just as 9/11 united and outraged Americans. As with 9/11, if the Iranian government continued to exist, conservatives would be likely to reap the benefit of the subsequent “rallying around the flag.” Just as after 9/11, foreign policy militancy would most likely overwhelm calls for moderation. The reservoir of goodwill toward the U.S. visible in modern Iranian society would vanish; any calls for compromise would be attacked as “treachery.” An attack on Iran would leave Iran weakened militarily but more unified and committed both to acquiring weapons sufficient to protect it and to getting revenge. Even a solid U.S. military victory would thus leave the world a more dangerous place.

Inconclusive Military Advantage:
Making war on an industry is a strange concept. Iran denies planning to acquire nuclear weapons but brags about its nuclear industry, which has been widely reported to be vast in scope and widely disseminated throughout the country. Moreover, military power today comes in many guises. Aside from the obvious question of the likelihood of total success in destroying Iran’s nuclear industry, the ability of even the U.S. to destroy all forms of Iranian military power is an open question. What about guerrilla warfare in Iraq? What plans may Iran have put in place regionally or globally to respond even after destruction of the homeland? Might nuclear-armed Pakistan or China--concerned about Iranian oil--or Russia--concerned about limitless growth in American power—provide just enough support to enable Iran to keep resisting? How long would Americans tolerate endless, one-sided, unprovoked slaughter by their own government? Might this war, in ways different from but reminiscent of the years of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, just drag on?

Victory So Expensive As to Feel Like Defeat:
“No,” the militarists will surely answer, “this will be a truly overwhelming “shock and awe” campaign that will transform one of the world’s great cultures into a desert. Iran will have no surprises for us. Iran will not manage to fire any of the Russian anti-ship missiles it has reputedly purchased at all the U.S. ships now arguably trapped in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s oil wells will sit quietly waiting for pro-American groups to start operating. Saudi oil facilities will come through unharmed; the Saudi Shi’a will remain loyal to Saudi Arabia. American troops and their families in Iraq at the end of that long supply line will continue to receive food and water. Iranian naval mines will prove to be paper tigers. There will be no ships sunk in the Straits of Hormuz, no oil stoppage, no global depression. In contrast to the war in Iraq, Al Qua’ida will find no opportunity to exploit this American adventure. This war may have fallout, but it will have no fog: all will go according to plan. It will not be like Somalia or Lebanon or Iraq or Afghanistan. The war will play so well on TV that far from turning against Washington, the American people will voluntarily, even eagerly trade in democracy for imperialism. Scientific militarism will control every detail.” That would sound good on the campaign trail, if one of the slick war party candidates were honest enough to go into such detail, but where’s the evidence?

Or will the Iranians’ brand new Russian anti-ship missiles sink a couple aircraft carriers, a Shi’ite revolt force a Vietnam-style flight from Iraq, and attacks on Israel by Lebanese Hezbollah provoke Tel Aviv into another disastrous 1982-style ground war trap? Will the American people kick out the war party and take a turn back toward isolationism? After all, why not, given that the world’s lone superpower now arguably faces both the absence of a credible threat for the first time since the beginning of WWII and a recession caused by mismanagement at home.

The U.S. attacked tiny Afghanistan, a semi-feudal society with no power projection capability, in 2001 and remains bogged down, having facilitated an explosive growth in Afghan heroin exports and provoked destabilization of the bordering region of Pakistan.

The U.S. attacked Iraq, a country whose military and economic capabilities had been severely degraded by a dozen years of U.S. military attack and economic embargo. We remain bogged down there, as well, having destroyed the country’s ability to govern itself, facilitated the rise of Iran as a regional power, and given al Qua’ida a new lease on life.

The U.S. fought two wars against such pathetically weak opponents that Washington decision makers did not consider post-war planning to be necessary. Years later, still with no light at the end of either tunnel, the war party is contemplating a third war, against a vastly larger and more unified opponent that has had years of warning time to conceive of all manner of high tech and asymmetric countermeasures. It would seem that even the most eager imperialist would have to admit that a bit of post-war planning might be in order. (Only a fundamentalist hoping for a final explosion that would end the world and bring to earth a savior to carry the souls of the chosen few to heaven could “rationally” argue against post-war planning.) Post-war planning does not begin with “assuming everything goes according to plan...” Post-war planning begins with evaluating the range of possible outcomes and preparing to deal with each of them.

1. What is the plan to deal with military victory but political defeat?
2. What is the plan to deal with inconclusive military advantage?
3. What is the plan to deal with victory so expensive as to feel like defeat?
4. And finally, what is the plan to deal even with the long-term implications of total victory?

Question of the Day: Preventive War

If the leadership of a nuclear power declares a policy of preventive war and threatens an opponent, does that give the opponent the moral right to attack first in self-defense?

More specifically,

1) Does that give the opponent the moral right to kill the leaders who made the threats?
2) Does that give the opponent the moral right to commit genocide by, e.g., launching a nuclear attack?

And finally, if human society were civilized, would the mere verbal declaration of policy of preventive war in the absence of a direct and immediate threat be considered a war crime?

_______________

Readings:

• The Bush doctrine of preventive war
• Illegal War
• The Ultimate Crime
• The Next War

Statements by Politicians:

McCain: "it depends"

Retired Israeli General Oded Tira: "As an American air strike in Iran is essential for our existence....The Americans must act. If they don't, we'll do it ourselves..."

Netanyahu: "There is still time. All ways must be considered. We can't let this thing happen,"

Attacking Iran: Would Victory Be Worth It?

I recently posed several questions that I think need to be answered by any who advocate a nuclear attack against Iran. War is like blowing up a dam; the water goes where it will. The one aspect to be said for a war of choice is that timing is up to the aggressor, so there is no excuse whatsoever for not thinking things through before it is too late.

If you are considering voting for a politician in the war camp, you may wish to take a look at what happened the first time the U.S. used nuclear weapons.

Even if no one plans actually to start a war, making threats can be dangerous. Threats repeated often and loudly enough can take on a life of their own creating an infernal reality beyond our control (because we get ourselves too angry to think clearly, because we persuade the opponent that he must strike first for self-preservation, or because a third party takes advantage of the tension to provoke a fight neither of the combatants really wants). So even without actually starting a war, just advocating it can risk the nation's future.

Beyond those two general dangers posed by an aggressive foreign policy stance come the many specific concerns related to the idea of a U.S. war of choice against Iran. The first question I posed was:

Why should we endanger our national security by provoking a war when there is no current threat to us?

War entails several areas of uncertainty: victory is uncertain; the impact of victory on one’s own society is uncertain; even if victorious, the thoroughness of the opponent’s defeat is uncertain; the implications of partial or total defeat of the opponent are uncertain. Indeed, those implications are so uncertain that it is not even clear that one should want complete victory: who cleans up the mess?

All this is by way of an introduction to what is truly as difficult to analyze as any question facing human society, so the point here is not to resolve the issue but just to push folks to replace the pathetically emotional and irresponsibly dangerous rhetoric with a little actual thinking.

In this post, then, let’s limit the discussion to the best possible outcome: total victory. The likelihood of such a scenario and possible alternative outcomes can be considered later. So the question here amounts to the following:

if total victory could be guaranteed in advance, would that be a good deal?

Even total victory entails costs. Having won a total victory, you are the only one left to clean up the mess. In the modern world, simply sneering and going home is not an option. Nuclear fallout, depression resulting from oil price rise, global terrorist campaign by those sympathetic to the loser, destablizing refugee flows, and epidemics are among the key dangers on the list of messes the victor will have to deal with. Then, there's the unwanted influences on the victor itself.

Effects on the aggressor of aggression that works:

• denial of one’s own immorality weakens ability to see and avoid future acts of immorality, pushing one further down that pathseeing the first act of aggression persuades others to defend themselves, acts that will be misinterpreted as new threats;
• these new threats could, just like the perceived “threat” of a weak but independent Iran, be dealt with in any number of ways, but force will be all the more tempting, having once been used;
• war becomes a habit;
• populace salutes the flag and supports whatever charlatan happens to be in office, believing whatever lies are told, and ends up with a government prone to exploit fearmongering in order to maintain its hold on power;
• those who see the truth tend to be steamrolled; moreover, those whose power in office is based on lies tend, logically, to feel insecure and therefore constantly to be looking under the bed for more enemies – the two conditions together rapidly undermine civil rights.
  

Victory in a war of choice can be a very dangerous thing. The way of life the aggressor claims to be defending by starting a war may be destroyed even by victory. In a future post, some of the implications of an outcome that falls short of the mythical "total" victory will be explored.

Iraq: The Actors Speak for Themselves. Pt. 4

General Petraeus:

"I think it's very important to recognise that the Sadr trend, as a political movement, has every reason to be engaged in the political
spectrum, in the political arena, in Iraq."

"It represents an important constituency in the citzenry of Iraq."

So...let's send some more U.S. troops into Sadr City to see what sort of reaction we can provoke!

*********************

PM Maliki:

"What Sahwa ? The role of the Sahwa is over. The only leadership is
that of the government."

This is Arabic, I suppose, for "Welcome to our new united front government, my dear Sunni brothers."

Neo-Con Mission in Iraq Accomplished? You Bet!

To understand whether or not the Neo-Con mission in Iraq was accomplished, it is necessary to understand what their self-appointed mission was and what they accomplished.

1) Iraq has been destroyed as an independent country capable of challenging Israeli or U.S. regional dominance.

2) Iraq has been destroyed as an independent country capable of controlling its own oil export business.

3) Washington has established a series of some 14 huge, city-like military bases in Iraq that can serve as launch platforms for whatever regional military adventure it may desire.

Mission accomplished? You bet it was!

If you thought the Iraq war was about destroying a WMD industrial capacity that the U.S. had been attacking and degrading ever since the 1991 Iraq War, wake up. If you thought the Iraq War was about democracy, take a look at the vicious slaughter Washington is now conducting in Sadr City. And, by the way, democracy does not come at the point of 14 huge, offensive military bases, nor does it require a 100-acre fortress-embassy.

The Neo-Con offensive in the Mideast has always had two themes: imperialist power politics and extremist religious fundamentalism. These two themes are fundamentally contradictory since the former is about establishing a position of power, the latter about destroying mankind in an orgy of slaughter to hasten the arrival of the savior (if you are confused about the distinction between fundamentalist Protestant rapture and fundamentalist twelver Shi’ite return of the Mahdi, you should be). Nevertheless, a political link of the crassest expediency (i.e., two groups with fundamentally divergent goals making a short-term agreement) was formed.

The imperialist goals were essentially to:

• place the Mideast in the hands of militant, right-wing Israeli politicians who, over the last three decades (see Trita Parsi’s Treacherous Alliance) developed Israel’s security-through-offense foreign policy;
• to cement U.S. dominance by controlling global oil.

But neither half of that vision could be realized by “stopping with Iraq, which even by Mideast standards is not a large country and was very much in decline by 2003 as a result of 12 years of U.S. attack.” Tehran is no more willing to kowtow to Israel or Washington than Baghdad was after 1990, when Saddam Frankenstein asserted his independence. The "mission" accomplished in Baghdad was never more than a pitstop on the road to Tehran.

Bad as that is, it is still not the whole story. Accomplishing the mission in Iraq also accomplished something else that, perhaps, was not part of that mission: it empowered al Qua’ida, both directly by effectively given bin Laden a pass while Washington focused on the wholly unrelated issue of destroying secular dictator Saddam, and indirectly by the nature of the long, brutal U.S. occupation that became a cause celebre for jihadis worldwide.

As I wrote in an earlier discussion of the impact of the Iraqi War:

Five years of war have produced a shattered society, a destroyed economy, and a mirage of a state: fertile soil indeed for cultivating a new jihadist movement that truly will be a threat to the U.S. …the longer American air war against Iraqi cities continues, the more likely it becomes. The longer groups that have formed to fill the power vacuum are prevented from participating as equals in the political process (be they Sunni Awakening forces or Moqtada al Sadr’s militia or others), the more likely it becomes. The longer the Iraqi oil industry remains structured for the benefit of the international oil industry rather than for Iraq’s benefit, the more likely it becomes. The longer U.S. military bases remain in Iraq, the more likely it becomes.

Al Qua’ida itself...benefits in a far more significant manner: as long as American troops and bases remain in Iraq, they serve as a convenient target for al Qua’ida and represent an incredibly powerful motivational issue to aid in the recruitment of new members. For this reason, the termination of U.S. military operations in Iraq would constitute an immediate and very significant loss for al Qua’ida. The U.S. invasion of Iraq was a gift to al Qua’ida, eliminating an Arab Sunni enemy, creating a convenient battleground, enhancing al Qua’ida’s reputation, and distracting attention from the shattered al Qua’ida headquarters organization. Five years later, al Qua’ida itself has gained time to reorganize, and the chaos flowing out of the U.S. occupation of Iraq has given the al Qua’ida message of global Sunni jihad a huge boost. That the U.S. succeeds in eliminating al Qua’ida from Iraq should come to Americans as little solace: such a victory would only return the situation to what it was after 9/11; Washington invites them into Iraq and then kicks them out. Iraq has been a sideshow for al Qua’ida, but one that brought al Qua’ida much profit.

So, yes, Bush accomplished his mission. The question is, was this America’s mission?

Iraq: The Actors Speak for Themselves. Pt.3

Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, a Kurd:


1. The law of the land says no militias. So any movement that has militias will be disqualified (from elections).

2. The Sadr movement is an indigenous, major political movement of this country. Attempts at isolating them or excluding them will not serve Iraq's stability and prosperity. It is in our interest to have the Sadr movement as an integral part of the political process. --source

Does anyone see a contradiction here?

Note also that, contrary to media reports, Maliki’s campaign has not been against “militias,” which are everywhere in Iraq, but specifically against al Sadr, which raises another question: is Salih indicating reservations about Maliki’s campaign? Salih’s comment comes just after a multi-party demonstration against the attack on Sadr City and new Sunni calls for an end to the violence and killings of civilians (reported and translated by Badger on his Arab Links blog). We may be seeing the beginning of the breakdown of Maliki’s brand new anti-Sadr political coalition.

Questions About A Nuclear Attack on Iran

To the Politicians Advocating the Legitimacy of a Nuclear War of Aggression Against Iran:

Leaving aside all issues related to the morality of committing mass murder in the absence of a clear and present danger and giving you a very generous benefit of the doubt by assuming for the moment that you truly do care about your country and are mentally stable, I have a few questions for you:

1. Why should we endanger our national security by provoking a war when there is no current threat to us?
2. Why should we start a war when we have, to date, refused to explore alternative options, such as, if you will pardon my language, talking?
3. Why should we start a war against Iran on behalf of an extreme right-wing militarist faction in a foreign country when that country (Israel) is a nuclear superpower probably 50 years ahead of Iran in terms of military technology?
4. Do you truly think that a country that would attempt to talk us into starting a nuclear war can be considered a friend of the U.S.?
5. If your answer is “yes,” why do you think a nuclear war near that country would actually enhance the quality of life and security of that country’s people?
6. Given the fact that Iran has no prospects whatsoever of catching up to Israel in nuclear weapons capabilities in our lifetimes, why does the issue of a nuclear attack on Iran even arise?
7. Given the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran has not ever invaded another country (unlike Israel) and has no colonies (unlike Israel), what is the evidence for asserting that it would be likely to commit a suicidal act of aggression?
8. Given that the most recent U.S. government/academic model of the environmental impact of a regional nuclear war determined that the global “nuclear winter” and skin cancer effects would be even worse than previous models had indicated, what makes you feel that these risks are worth taking? Include, in your answer, an estimate of the number of American civilians who would die from the fallout produced by an attack on Iran and the economic costs to agriculture from the resulting "nuclear winter" impact for: a) an attack that eliminated all of Iran's nuclear industrial sites, b) an attack that destroyed the Iranian regime, c) an attack that "obliterated" the Iranian population.
9. How many U.S. soldiers in Iraq do you estimate would die from radioactive poisoning or cancer as a result of the fallout from a nuclear attack on Iran for each of the three above scenarios?
10. How many U.S. soldiers in Iraq do you estimate would die from the resultant fighting and attacks on long U.S. supply lines in Iraq for each of the three above scenarios?
11. In light of the still unfolding long-term implications of a) the U.S. invasion of Iraq, b) the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, c) the two major Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1982 and 2006, d) the U.S. “Blackhawk down” episode in Somalia, and e) the 2006 intervention in Somalia by the U.S.-backed Ethiopians, what is your estimate of the situation that would result in the Mideast six months and six years after a nuclear attack on Iran? What justification do you feel there is for claiming to be able to make any reasonable calculation of the results?
12. What is your estimate of the global political changes that might result from an unprovoked attack on Iran? In formulating your answer, please consider: a) the attitude of nuclear power Russia, which has offered Iran certain nuclear security guarantees; b) the attitude of nuclear power Pakistan, which prides itself on having the world’s first Moslem nuclear bomb; c) the possible changes in behavior of all nuclear powers toward their own enemies, once a precedent is established that it is acceptable to launch a nuclear attack on a non-nuclear power in the absence of an immediate and existential threat to one’s homeland; d)Israel’s attitude toward all the rest of the Mideast; e) India’s attitude toward Pakistan; f) China’s attitude toward Taiwan; g) the attitude of North Korea, now mulling the possibility of terminating its nuclear weapons program; h) the attitude of industrial powers worldwide (e.g., Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Mexico, Turkey, Egypt) on the issue of becoming nuclear weapons states for their own security.
13. What do you think the risk is that a U.S. attack on Iran might provoke a global military alliance against the U.S., led by Russia and China but with the support of most other countries, out of pure fear of further U.S. aggression? In formulating your answer, please address whatever justifications you may have for viewing such a possibility with equanimity.
14. If the U.S. were to launch a nuclear attack on Iran, which poses no significant or immediate threat to the U.S., on the justification that any potential future threat to a U.S. ally constitutes sufficient justification for a U.S. attack, what U.S. response would be reserved for a true threat or an actual attack?
15. Should the U.S. have the option of employing calibrated responses to different types of attack (e.g., attacks on U.S. interests vs. attacks on the U.S. homeland, localized attacks intended to warn vs. full-scale attacks intended to destroy the U.S., non-nuclear vs. nuclear attacks)?
16. What would your response be if an unidentified source (possibly al Qua’ida, seeking to trap the U.S. in another Mideast quagmire) exploded a nuclear weapon to provoke the U.S. into attacking Iran?
17. Do you recognize any risk that an implacably hostile and rhetorically belligerent policy toward Iran might make the U.S. vulnerable to such a trick by a third party?
18. If you are one of the folks who brought us the Iraq War, then why should we listen to you at all?
    

Please provide answers on paper, with your signature. You will be held responsible for the results of your actions.

The Cost of Imperial Israel

Paul Craig Roberts, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury under Reagan, has written yet another excellent essay on U.S. foreign policy, entitled “What the Iraq War Is About.” Roberts argues, as the quotes below show, that Iraq is all about imperial Israel. I suspect he would argue that U.S. hostility toward Iran is about exactly the same thing.

My position is slightly different in that, as I have said before, I believe there are two primary reasons for Washington’s hostility toward an independent stance on the part of either Iraq or Iran: Israel and oil (feel free to substitute the word “power” for “oil”). Independent of a desire to ensure the ability of Israeli militarists to continue their expansion, oil (upon which power rests) and a broader concern with power itself still seem to me to explain a good deal of the enthusiasm for war. I admit that this costly war was illogical as a means of obtaining oil: Iraq and Iran under all their various regimes are always happy to sell us their oil. But that just shows the Administration couldn’t do its arithmetic.

As for the possible additional reason--that war was correctly seen as a highly profitable corporate business, I would encourage others to offer evidence about how significant that reason might be.

All that being said, Roberts’ logical argument about the centrality of supporting Israeli regional dominance is well and concisely stated. Quotes follow, but the whole article is strongly recommended. What is missing from the argument is evidence. Perhaps some of us will live long enough to see that in official U.S. records to be released in 30 years or so (assuming our democracy still lives). In the meantime, readers are cordially invited to offer whatever evidence, confirmatory or disconfirmatory, they may have.

Roberts’ key points:


If the U.S. invaded Iraq for any of the succession of reasons the Bush regime has given, why would the U.S. have spent $750 million on a fortress "embassy" with anti-missile systems and its own electricity and water systems spread over 104 acres? No one has ever seen or heard of such an embassy before. Clearly, this "embassy" is constructed as the headquarters of an occupying colonial ruler.
The fact is that Bush invaded Iraq with the intent of turning Iraq into an American colony....

If colonial rule were not the intent, the U.S. would not be going out of its way to force Sadr's 60,000-man militia into a fight. Sadr is a Shi'ite who is a real Iraqi leader, perhaps the only Iraqi who could end the sectarian conflict and restore some unity to Iraq. As such he is regarded by the Bush regime as a danger to the American puppet Maliki. Unless the U.S. is able to purchase or rig the upcoming Iraqi election, Sadr is likely to emerge as the dominant figure. This would be a highly unfavorable development for the Bush regime's hopes of establishing its colonial rule behind the facade of a Maliki fake democracy. Rather than work with Sadr in order to extract themselves from a quagmire, the Americans will be doing everything possible to assassinate Sadr.

Why does the Bush regime want to rule Iraq? Some speculate that it is a matter of "peak oil."…This explanation is problematic….

The more likely explanation for the U.S. invasion of Iraq is the neoconservative Bush regime's commitment to the defense of Israeli territorial expansion. There is no such thing as a neoconservative who is not allied with Israel. Israel hopes to steal all of the West Bank and southern Lebanon for its territorial expansion. An American colonial regime in Iraq not only buttresses Israel from attack, but also can pressure Syria and Iran not to support the Palestinians and Lebanese. The Iraqi war is a war for Israeli territorial expansion. Americans are dying and bleeding to death financially for Israel. Bush's "war on terror" is a hoax that serves to cover U.S. intervention in the Middle East on behalf of "greater Israel."

Note that nothing in the above in any way questions the right of Israel to exist as one among many Mideast states within its legally recognized international borders. The issue here concerns only whether or not Israel will be supported in its drive to expand beyond those borders to occupy Palestinian and Lebanese land and whether or not Israel's policy, in effect since the 1980s, of reliance on overwhelming military force to dominate the whole region will be supported.

Dealing with Nuclear War: Test for a Mature Democracy

Saudi Arabia and Iran, according to a storyline that militarist circles in the U.S. like to promote, are engaged in a fundamental struggle for survival. In that context, the following remarks from an editorial in the Saudi paper Arab News on Hillary's threat to "obliterate" Iran are noteworthy:

Editorial: Clinton’s Threat to Iran

24 April 2008

If there were any doubt that if she made it to the Oval Office, Hillary Clinton’s term would be George Bush Mark III, the lady made it plain on the eve of Tuesday’s Pennsylvania primary....
Monday night, Clinton drove home her “toughness” by threatening to “obliterate” Iran if it launched an attack on Israel. Given the kind of foreign policy advisers she has (the same as those who paved the way for Iraq war), she may not wait for Iran to “attack” Israel. It can be a pre-emptive “obliteration.”
This is the foreign politics of the madhouse. It demonstrates the same doltish ignorance that has distinguished Bush’s foreign relations. It offers only violence where there should be negotiations and war where there could be peace. At a stroke, Clinton demonstrated to everyone in this region that if she were the next occupant of the White House, Iraq-like death and destruction would be the order of the day.

Even the Republican candidate, John McCain, has not been so war-like in his views of Iran. This experienced politician has at least had the good sense to leave open as many options as possible. And there is now a strong sense that if he were president, Barack Obama’s inclination would be to try to pick up some of the many opportunities for negotiation and peace-making that have been discarded by the belligerent Bush administration....

There is little or no consideration of how simplistic Washington analysts actually plunged the region into chaos in the first place. America’s world outlook remains disturbingly black and white. Hillary Clinton has demonstrated that even if she knows better, she is prepared to ride and exploit this mulish ignorance.

The threat to “obliterate” Iran is dangerous folly. What though has this woman given to the implicit threat Israel makes to the rest of the region with its own nuclear arsenal? How does she imagine that such talk will play to those Iranians who want rapprochement with Washington?

Questions critical to the future of all of us...the kind of questions a mature democracy would be debating in an election season.

Iraqi Maneuverings

The decision officially made by Iraqi Prime Minister al Maliki, though perhaps with more than a little urging from behind the scenes, to corner Moqtada al Sadr seems to have been designed at a minimum to persuade Moqtada to give up his estimated 60,000-man militia and become just a weak factional leader in a political system where power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Instead--Surprise! Surprise!—it risks pushing him in the opposition direction, toward setting up his own competing political system.

Al Sadr has, over the past year, been taught several lessons:

• Unilaterally declaring a ceasefire does not protect you from being attacked;
• Participating in the political process does not protect you from being attacked;
• Allowing Tehran to broker a ceasefire in Basra does not protect you from being attacked in Baghdad;
• If you have a political perspective (unified state, rapid U.S. troop withdrawal) that puts you at odds with other power centers, you are at risk.

Given these lessons, one would indeed think it would be difficult to make the decision to give up a 60,000-man army and put one’s faith in the generosity of one’s political opponents. This is the context behind the comment of Mohan Abedin, director of research at St. Andrew’s Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, who said that "Muqtada has shown a great deal of patience not calling for an all-out war yet with so much pressure on him.” Indeed, one of al Sadr’s political supporters was anonymously quoted as saying that his “emphasis is now on weapons and fighting, not politics.”

While this is a serious indication of the direction in which al Sadr may be moving, it is nevertheless clear that he continues to play politics, as indicated by his nuanced refocusing of last week’s threat to fight if Maliki and the U.S. do not stop attacking his forces. Focusing on “open warfare against the Americans,” he is now stressing the importance of Iraqis avoiding killing each other.

Still calling on his own forces to avoid fighting, he is maintaining his threat of open warfare, but focusing it on occupation forces, saying "When we threatened 'open war' we meant a war against the occupier, not a war against our Iraqi brothers.” Nevertheless, war against Iraqi brothers continues, as this good background piece describes.

Meanwhile, al Sadr is calling on other Arab states to give political support to Iraqi efforts toward independence. The temporizing of Arab leaders at this week’s Kuwait “neighbor’s summit” suggests they may be listening to him.

And now, only a month after the Battle of Basra, the former prime minister Jaafari is rumored to be moving toward alliance with al Sadr, which would crack the wall of isolation that has been thrown around al Sadr in recent weeks.

Given the relatively restrained resistance of Moqtada's JAM in Basra, it seems fair to wonder if all the rhetoric about open war is anything more than bravado. It may be, as is being argued by some, that Basra has been not only an utter defeat for Moqtada but one popular with the people of Basra.

But the hypothesis that Moqtada chose to limit his resistance does fit with Moqtada’s historical behavior of avoiding open showdowns when offered an alternative. It also fits with his efforts to portray himself as a patriot and maneuver Maliki out of a complete break. Finally, it seems the better part of valor, for it could be argued that time is on Moqtada’s side. One could hypothesize that the longer he resists, the more he trumpets his independence from Iran (a claim al Hakim cannot easily make), the louder he calls on Iraqis to unite against the invader, and the more the Baghdad poor are subjected to collective punishment, the better Moqtada’s political position. Given the likelihood of American troop withdrawal, time may well be on his side militarily as well.

The opposite argument would be that time is on Maliki’s side because the longer he carries on the offensive, the more desperate Moqtada’s poor supporters will become and the longer Moqtada keeps retreating, the more he will look like a paper tiger.

For all the talk of who has military power, the issue may in the end be decided by two political issues:

1. the skill with which Maliki rewards all his new coalition partners, the Kurds salivating over Kirkuk and the Sunnis demanding control of ministries and access to the military;
2. the degree to which Moqtada’s religious and ethnic excesses have alienated him from the Iraqi people.

Maliki and his supporters want to create that “single center of power” that would so greatly simplify the Iraqi political system. He now appears to have made progress toward that goal in both Basra and Baghdad. Time will tell if he is really succeeding or if the “process of energizing” the political system will instead provoke the emergence of new and unanticipated dynamics.

Israel-Iranian Relations: A View From Israel

Although U.S. politicians and the mainstream American media seem to feel that honest analysis of the issue of Israeli security is virtually taboo, Israelis, not surprisingly, take this issue extremely seriously and frequently consider its implications thoughtfully. A recent article from the Jerusalem Post, from which excerpts are given below, is a good example of the kind of analysis that America's self-proclaimed "friends of Israel" should engage in.

Washington Watch: On Iran - also try diplomacy

By DOUGLAS M. BLOOMFIELD

As George W. Bush prepares to leave town, one of the many pieces of unfinished business is his vow to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions. Instead, Teheran is far closer today to having a nuclear weapon than when he came to office.


His refusal to engage in any substantive dialogue with the Iranians unless they first accepted his terms may explain why all three presidential contenders have promised greater emphasis on diplomacy....


IRAN'S DANGER is more than a nuclear weapon that may be years away. It is its financing, training, weapons and diplomatic cover for a terror network that targets Israel. Teheran is also spreading its influence across the Middle East - with a U.S.-provided foothold in previous enemy Iraq - that threatens not only Israel but also American's traditional friends in the Arab world.

A nuclear weapon will be a potent instrument of blackmail for Iran and an umbrella for its terrorist allies.

The threat to Israel should not be underestimated, but Iran has much more reason to worry.

Iran's nuclear weapon is still theoretical; Israel's is not. Israel is widely believed to have several hundred nuclear warheads, and its delivery systems are far more advanced, accurate and diverse than Iran's.


Iran is developing ballistic missiles, with North Korean help, and they are believed capable of hitting Israel. Israeli long range Jericho missiles are accurate and reliable. Iran has nothing to match Israel's batteries of the Arrow anti-missile missiles.

Iran's air force is barely functional; Israel's is one of the best in the world.

Israel's German-built Dolphin submarines, according to some reports, may be equipped with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, giving Israel a nuclear triad: airplanes, missiles and submarines.


That gives Israel a powerful deterrent: a second strike capability, a Cold War concept indicating the ability to launch nuclear missiles even after a country has absorbed a heavy first blow.

Israeli military officials have said they don't have the number of planes, missiles, aerial tankers and other systems needed to go after all of Iran's nuclear installations - which are widely scattered and deeply buried - even if they knew where to find them. But they do have the capacity to wreak enormous damage on the country's energy infrastructure and other assets.

THE AYATOLLAHS are perfectly willing to send thousands of children to die in a war with Iraq or suicide bombers to Israel, but you won't see any of them strapping on explosive belts themselves. They are not suicidal; their goal is not to die for the Islamic republic but to let others do the dying while they spread the Shiite revolution to the Sunni Arabs. They know that a nuclear attack on Israel will bring the kind massive retaliation that will leave their revolution in cinders.

For Israel, war against a nation state like Iran means no targets are off limits - unlike going after terror groups hiding among the civilian population in Lebanon or Gaza. Israel would have no compunction about visiting shock and awe on Iran, unfettered by delusions of converting it to democracy.

Iranian leaders seem to compete with each other in threatening to obliterate Israel, but when Israelis respond with their own bravado, the Iranians run crying to the UN, filing formal protests.

Every recent Israeli prime minister has considered Iran the one enemy which can pose an existential threat, and they have focused much of their diplomacy on trying to get the international community to take Iranian nuclear ambitions seriously as a global threat and not just as an Israeli problem.


The next American president clearly understands that, but also that the Bush administration's "no diplomacy" policy only made a bad situation worse.


And polls show the American Jewish community feels the same way.

Impact of "Small" Nuclear War on the "Winners"

'Regional' Nuclear War Would Cause Worldwide Destruction
By Alexis Madrigal

This invaluable science note in Wired reviews some of the damage that would result worldwide from a local, "small," contained nuclear conflict, including:

• severe damage to the ozone layer;
• sharp rise in skin cancer;
• global cold wave;
• reduction in global food production, which is already at crisis levels.

These dire results come from a model created by the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics and Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, University of Colorado; the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, University of California; and the National Center for Atmospheric Research.