From the field: Netanyahu blows off U.S. demand that construction be stopped on a site in occupied East Jerusalem

From the field: Netanyahu blows off U.S. demand that construction be stopped on a site in occupied East Jerusalem

Hezbollah expert Professor Richard Norton gave a nice overview of the Jerusalem issue in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in his blog today, concluding pointedly that:

If the Obama administration is silent on Jerusalem, it will be making a major mistake in terms of resuscitating U.S. credibility as an honest broker.

The Meaning of a Democratic Iran

Make no mistake! A democratic Iran would not become an American colony. It would be a proud emergent regional power, willing to resist Israeli regional hegemony, deeply involved in Iraqi society, and insistent upon a better deal for the non-Western world.

With all the thoughtless accusations flying around obfuscating the real issues that separate Washington from Tehran, perhaps it would be useful to take a moment to consider what a truly democratic Iran would be like.

First, (Warning: Sit down; this may take your breath away.) a democratic Iran will still defend itself. As long as it remains ringed by hostile American military bases and as long as nuclear-armed Israeli Zionists insistent upon retaining their military domination over the region remain in power, Iran will still want the option of a nuclear deterrence.

Second, a democratic Iran will still be proud of its glorious past, will remember the injustice of Russian and British and American interference, and will demand to be treated with respect. Washington will still be seen as owing Iran a truly sincere apology for the coup that destroyed Iran's nascent democratic movement in 1953, supporting a dictatorial shah, supporting Saddam's invasion, and shooting down an Iranian airliner.

Third, a democratic Iran will still be Muslim and will therefore find Israel's repression of the Palestinian people repugnant. Depending on the degree to which Washington moves back toward a less biased position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the degree to which Zionist extremists continue to hold power in Israel, a democratic Iran may or may not remain leader of the anti-Zionist front, but it is hardly likely to copy the Shah's willingness to ignore Israeli repression of fellow Muslims...any more than a democratic Saudi Arabia or Egypt would.

Fourth, a democratic Iran will still feel entitled to be a regional leader. It will not necessarily be a crusading Shi'ite revolutionary state, but it will still be Shi'ite and will therefore retain a special relationship with Iraq and Lebanon, just as the U.S. has a special relationship with Canada. It will still feel that it has a natural interest in the security situation along its borders and will thus pay attention to events in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Fifth, a democratic Iran will still want to reform the global political system to distribution resources and power more equitably. It will be energetic, articulate, and involved.

A democratic Iran could be a real blessing for a deeply sick global political system...provided that it is welcomed, rather than threatened, by the global elite. But do not expect it to kiss up or kneel down, any more than those 13 colonies of yesteryear did.

Experienced Technocrat Appointed to Head Iran Nuclear Agency

MIT PhD Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran’s permanent representative to the IAEA under Khatami, has been appointed Iran’s new Atomic Energy Organization chief. Appointment of a technocrat familiar with international negotiations, rather than a partisan hack, suggests Iran takes its nuclear dispute with the West seriously.

His initial remarks were firm but businesslike, avoiding the rhetoric that both sides have frequently indulged in:

Legal and technical discussions about Iran's nuclear case have finished and there is no room left to keep this case open. We hope that more efforts be made by the West in order to obtain mutual confidence instead of the past six year's hostile era and this case will be closed as soon as possible.

Although evidently making no reference to the possibility of Iran offering more transparency, he at least expressed the hope that relations with the West would improve, albeit by further Western efforts. Given the highly threatening “good cop-bad cop” game now being played by the U.S. and Israel, as well as the high level of domestic tension in Iran, a more accommodating statement could hardly have been expected.

Rafsanjani Calls for Compromise; Security Forces Answer With Violence

Security forces attacked the crowd at Friday prayers in the regime's rapid response to Rafsanjani's call for compromise.

Leading Friday prayers, Rafsanjani adopted a conciliatory tone of compromise and national unity. He did not, in the Iranian media’s English-language summaries, come across as a visionary, but he at least sounded like a leader, distancing himself from the arrogant tone of Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, and a long list of security and military officials.

Rafsanjani left no doubt that his call for compromise was a warning to the regime, noting, according to a rapid translation by a blogger, that, “The guardian council, the expediency council, everyone gets their legitimacy from the vote of the people.”

The existence of two distinct camps in Iranian politics was clear from the media.

IRIB identified Rafsanjani merely as Friday prayer leader and focused on his call on all to obey the law – which could be read as criticism of protestors or of the regime for its alleged electoral corruption and violent post-election crackdown and alleged torture of protestors.

Press TV highlighted the fact that Rafsanjani “heads both the top political arbitration body called the Expediency Council and the Assembly of Experts, the top clerical body which chooses and supervises the Leader of the Islamic Revolution.” Press TV quoted Rafsanjani stating:

Our key issue is to regain the trust which the people had and now to some extent is shattered.

The article also quoted Rafsanjani saying that “the Islamic Republic is not a ceremonial term. Should one of the two be tarnished, we will no longer have the Revolution."

Driving home the point that the Islamic Republic rests on the two pillars of Islamic rule and electoral legitimization of that rule, the article noted:

Recalling the perspectives of the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Revolution, on democracy, Rafsanjani urged the authorities to cherish the "the people's vote and opinion" as the most important aspect of the establishment.

It has become clear since the election that many in the Iranian elite would disagree with this assessment of the balance between the Islamic pillar and the democratic pillar.

ILNA featured his remark that “we are all members of a family,” a statement in stark contrast to the recent comment by Sayyed Hassan Firouzabadi, chief of Iran's Joint Armed Forces, that his troops were ready to fight to the death against demonstrators. Rafsanjani’s full comment clearly pointed the finger of blame:

We have to allow for an atmosphere that is calm and free There is no need for force, if military, security and intelligence forces allow. We are all part of one family.

Unfortunately, the regime wasted no time giving its response, implicitly slapping Ayatollah and ex-President Rafsanjani down by tear gasing and allegedly knifing post-speech demonstrators* from the enormous crowd that was listening to his speech on loudspeakers. One family no longer.

* See Demosthenes for a report with an eloquent discussion of what political legitimacy means.

The Negative-Sum Permanent War Against Islam

Forget rhetoric. Think about what is actually happening in the world. With the neo-cons kicked out and, in the minds of thinking people, utterly discredited, has anything changed? Or is Washington still fighting a war against Muslims?

The U.S. military has not left Iraq; on the contrary, it has consolidated itself out of sight. The threats against Iran have not only not ended; they have intensified. How else does one interpret the impatient remarks of Secretary Clinton and the highly public movements of Israeli nuclear-capable ships into better positions from which to attack Iran? U.S. forces are not withdrawing from the Muslim world; they are building up. Supply lines are shifting from ground to aerial. Deaths on both sides are rising. The main campaign under the neo-cons was in Iraq, a country of some 30,000,000, including the several million refugees and the 1,000,000 who died as a result of the U.S. invasion. Now the main campaign is in Pakistan and Afghanistan, an area with a population of some 190,000,000. The refugee flow in Pakistan is rising so fast it cannot even be calculated. That is not progress.

The war on Islam, or, to be more precise, the war against activist Muslims who talk back, demand their rights, and refuse to kowtow, is slowly becoming institutionalized. It is being transformed from an emergency response to a deadly threat from a small but evidently vicious, immoral, and possibly uncompromising group into a permanent policy of aggression toward all Muslim societies that refuse to submit.

Washington does not discriminate between extremist Muslim enemies and Muslim social reformers. Not just Hamas, in itself no enemy of the U.S., but the whole half-starved civilian population of tiny, helpless, half-starved Gaza is treated the same as anti-Western terrorists in their training camps. Moslems who talk back are threatened with the same military response as Moslems who shoot back.

This attitude toward Islam is irrational and self-defeating. Condemning Muslims to submission or resistance is a fool's game with endless unpredictable opportunities for disaster that only multiply as the game continues to be played. Even if the West managed to survive and maintain such a policy, eventually the side-effects of endless war would encompass the decline and fall of Western democracy: endless war and democracy are mutually exclusive. Western arms may, conceivably, always win, but Western society can only lose a zero-sum military conflict with Islam. If that tragedy occurs, it will come as no satisfaction to Westerners that Muslim society will also end up a loser. Nothing is more tragic than a negative-sum outcome.

Self-Destruction of Israeli Society

Many thanks to the reader who submitted the videos by the terse Israeli thinker Gilad Atzmon in the comment to the previous post. Here is more of Atzmon's trenchant analysis of what is really happening in Israel and the dangers that it poses for Israeli society:

The issue I am going to discuss today is probably the most important thing I’ve ever had to say about Israeli brutality and contemporary Jewish identity. I assume that I could have shaped my thought into a wide-ranging book or an analytical academic text but instead, I will do the very opposite, I will make it as short and as simple as possible.

In the weeks that have just passed we had been witness to an Israeli genocidal campaign against the Palestinian civilian population in Gaza. We had been witnessing one of the strongest armies in the world squashing women, elderly people and children. We saw blizzards of unconventional weapons bursting over schools, hospitals and refugee camps. We had seen and heard about war crimes committed before, but this time, the Israeli transgression was categorically different. It was supported by the total absolute majority of the Israeli Jewish population. The IDF military campaign in Gaza enjoyed the support of 94% of the Israeli population. 94% of the Israelis apparently approved of the air raids against civilians. The Israeli people saw the carnage on their TV screens, they heard the voices, they saw hospitals and refugee camps in flames and yet, they weren’t really moved by it all. They didn’t do much to stop their “democratically elected” ruthless leaders. Instead, some of them grabbed a seat and settled on the hills overlooking the Gaza Strip to watch their army turning Gaza into modern Hebraic coliseum of blood. Even now when the campaign seems to be over and the scale of the carnage in Gaza has been revealed, the Israelis fail to show any signs of remorse. As if this is not enough, all throughout the war, Jews around the world rallied in support of their “Jews-only state”. Such a popular support of outright war crimes is unheard of. Terrorist states do kill, yet they are slightly shy about it all. Stalin’s USSR did it in some remote Gulags, Nazi Germany executed its victims in deep forests and behind barbed wire. In the Jewish state, the Israelis slaughter defenceless women, children and the old in broad daylight, using unconventional weapons targeting schools, hospitals and refugee camps.

This level of group barbarism cries for an explanation. The task ahead can be easily defined as the quest for a realisation of Israeli collective brutality. How is it that a society has managed to lose its grip of any sense of compassion and mercy?

The Terror Within

More than anything else, the Israelis and their supportive Jewish communities are terrorised by the brutality they find in themselves. The more ruthless the Israelis are, the more frightened they become. The logic is simple. The more suffering one inflicts on the other, the more anxious one becomes of the possible potential deadly capacity around. In broad terms, the Israeli projects on the Palestinian, Arab, Muslim and Iranian the aggression which he finds in himself. Considering the fact that Israeli brutality is now proved to be with no limit and with no comparison, their anxiety is as at least as great.

Seemingly, the Israelis are fearful of themselves being the henchmen. They are engaged in a deadly battle with the terror within. But the Israeli is not alone. The Diaspora Jew who rallies in support of a state that pours white phosphorous on civilians is caught in the exact same devastating trap. Being an enthusiastic backer of an overwhelming crime, he is horrified by the thought that the cruelty he happens to find in himself may manifest itself in others. The Diaspora Jew who supports Israel is devastated by the imaginary possibility that a brutal intent, similar to his own, may one day turn against him. This very concern is what the fear of anti-Semitism is all about. It is basically the projection of the collective Zio-centric tribal ruthlessness onto others.

The extraordinarily high quality of Israeli self-criticism, in comparison to the utter superficiality of most American commentary on the subject never ceases to amaze me.

Israel Intimidates but Does Not Bomb Lebanon

Nothing happened in Lebanon today - just the normal Israeli belligerency to show who's boss.

In an act that anywhere else on earth would be considered an act of war, Israel today violated Lebanon's airspace with two jet fighters. This belligerent event of course neither deserved nor received any notice elsewhere because it is so routine. In the global crusa...sorry...war to teach Muslims a lesson, this is the type of trivial event no serious professional analyst of global affairs would bother mentioning.

Except...isn't there a principle here? If one country is allowed endlessly to violate international law with impunity, does that not establish a dangerous precedent? What if a less "advanced" country...say, Iran...were to follow this precedent? What if an IRGC general, perhaps one not well versed in the rules of global affairs, were to argue that the precedent of Israeli aerial violations of Lebanese territory justified Iranian placement of IEDs in Iraq where American military vehicles were expected to pass?

Yes, Israel owns victimhood. No, we, the rest of mankind, will never, ever be able to compensate Israelis for the harm done to their ancestors. Nevertheless, will Israel be grateful and wise in its use of its privileges if allowed to do what is permitted to no other nation? Will it use its privileges only when necessary, apologize for doing so, and go out of its way to offer to relinquish its privileges at the earliest possible moment?

Or might Israel actually cause harm to itself by too frequent indulgence? How much unprovoked violence can a state indulge in without becoming addicted? What are the impacts on a democratic society of becoming addicted to violence as the means of choice for resolving international disputes? Does it ever affect how society resolves domestic disputes?

I don't even enjoy the odd local police helicopter buzzing over my rooftop. If that aircraft were a loaded jet fighter/bomber sent by an enemy state that had repeatedly invaded my country and destroyed my home town, I wonder, how would I feel?

Iranian Governance: Collapse of the Compromise

A very nice overview of the impressive structure of the Islamic Republic has been published by Persicus Maximus. The author also points out the Western bias that both ignores the impressive Iranian effort to structure a workable system and ignores the democratic features of that system. Iran deserves credit for creating governing mechanisms that look rather good in comparison with those of other regional countries. Americans in particular should also have the honesty to admit that Iran's long effort to understand and adopt the Western concept of democracy would have been far more successful if the U.S. had helped instead of fomenting a coup that destroyed Iran's democratic movement in the early 1950's in order to preserve Western control over Iran's oil resources.

But back to the state structure, which is now under such stress. As I see it, the founders of the Islamic Republic consciously faced the same problem America's constitutional fathers faced: how to prevent dictatorship. They answered in essentially the same way, as well: checks and balances.

Of course, practice has never been perfect. In the US, corporations, government-allied media, and the emerging imperial presidency undercut the democratic structure laid out in the Constitution; in Iran, the Supreme Leader (imagine an imperial president who talks to God) had so much power that the temptation to interfere in politics by screening opponents out before they can even run for office has proven irresistable. As Khomenei was evidently well aware, power corrupts.

This process of power corrupting has now, it seems to me, led to exposure of the great secret compromise on which the Islamic Republic's state structure is based. The compromise is that it is based on two pillars - the Islamic leadership of Allah's representative (velayat-e faqih) and electoral legitimization. The "secret" is that these two concepts are directly contradictory.

Khamenei has exposed the secret by giving in to corruption (i.e., by interfering in the electoral process). This has caused the collapse of the compromise and made it necessary for all the members of the elite who had previously avoided looking too closely at this compromise to choose sides, i.e., do they now support Islamic dictatorship or electoral legitimization? Supporting the former risks the emergence of a harsh dictatorship that will strip them of their privileges (political access, status, and extreme wealth). Supporting the former risks the fall of Islamic rule altogether.

Politics by Prayer

Attention over the Iranian electoral dispute is shifting to Friday prayers in Tehran, which will be led by Rafsanjani. It is normal for him to lead prayers on rotation with about three other leaders, but he missed his rotation--perhaps because he saw that as an effective protest, perhaps because Khamenei managed to sideline him.

Uskowi on Iran has a nice summary of the latest based on Persian sources:

Qalam news website reports that the opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi will attend the Friday’s Prayer which will be led by Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani [Qalam, 15 July 2009].

Mousavi, in a letter published in Qalam, declared his readiness to join his supporters in attending the service, characterizing the move as the best way to protest the “unjust” suppression of the freedoms by the government.

It is expected that Mousavi supporters will also attend the gathering, potentially creating a protest atmosphere on Tehran streets after the service.

Countering the opposition, Hossein Shariatmadari, the influential editor of the ultra-conservative Kayhan, in an editorial to be published in Thursday's edition of the newspaper, has called on government supporters to attend the prayer services as well and has instructed them to chant pro-Khamenei slogans, such as “Khamenei, we are your soldiers; Khamenei, we are at you command!” [Kayhan, 16 July 2009].

So Mousavi has apparently finally discovered a forum--public prayer--from which even the regime sees no way to exclude him. Therefore, to compete, the regime feels it must meet him on his own chosen ground and compete on his chosen terms.

Details on typical atmosphere for such a meeting would be very interesting.

• Have they been politicized before?
• What typically happens on the street after prayers?

As for Friday:

• will the Basij be out in force on the street when prayers end?
• what will be happening in Friday prayers in other cities, especially Qom, where a lot of leading clerics--supposedly the conscience of the nation--are still trying very hard to remain invisible?

Fissures in Ahmadinejad's Coalition?

Mousavi has been mulling the establishment of a modern political party to institutionalize the so-far loosely organized electoral protest. He just received an endorsement from within Ahmadinejad’s own camp.

Highly placed conservative cleric and party activist Habibollah Asgaroladi has supported Mousavi’s plans for establishing a political party, saying:

Establishing a party to voice one's ideas and political perceptions is a wise move.

The establishment of a modern, permanent, institutionalized political party by Mousavi would constitute a permanent challenge to the hierarchical and subservient political system envisioned by both the IRGC and conservative Shi’ite clergy, though it is not clear how his plans for a potential new party differ from the numerous political organizations that already exist in Iran. However, in the current context, hardline regime supporters, such as Mesbah-Yazdi and Judiciary chief Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi, would probably consider the mere establishment of such an opposition party, regardless of its platform or the behavior of its members, as an act of sedition.

Habibollah Asgaroladi, secretary-general of the Islamic Coalition Party, is a member of the Expediency Council and former head of the Iranian Secret Service and Homeland Security Agency. (The Expediency Council, with about 28 members, advises the Supreme Leader and supervises the conduct of the elected portion of the government.) It would seem difficult for the regime to label him as a traitor.

Asgaroladi, labeled by Press TV a “vocal supporter” of Ahmadinejad, is general secretary of the pro-Ahmadinejad Imam and Leadership Front (or Principalist faction). He is also a central council member of the Islamic Coalition Party (Motalefeh), an old conservative organization. Reputedly extremely wealthy, he is a member of the Bazaar Merchant Coalition society.

His previous support for Ahmadinejad notwithstanding, he sternly admonished Ahmadinejad on June 18 for sneering at the protestors, saying:

If we imagine that the preferences of ourselves and of those around us are Right and all others are Wrong, and we look at the others as flotsam and jetsam, whoever has such concept, irrespective of his rank, that person has ceased to be a servant of God, for God has told His servants to have the best dialog with each other.

Whether Asgaroladi is criticizing Ahmadinejad out of respect for democracy, to defend his personal privileges as a wealthy cleric with close ties to the bazaar, or perhaps because he sees Ahmadinejad’s uncompromising hostility toward his opponents as dangerously destabilizing, remains unclear. Whatever the mix of reasons, his voicing of support for a reformist party strengthens the principle that parties have a legitimate role and sends a message to would-be centralizers that even conservatives can oppose dictatorship.

What influence Asgaroladi may have personally is also hard to say, although his attitude can hardly help but buttress his boss, Rafsanjani, who heads the Expediency Council (and who will lead Friday prayers this week after suspiciously missing his normal rotation last week), and make the effort to paint Mousavi as seditious all the more difficult. More serious for Ahmadinejad is the implication that Asgaroladi’s sudden disenchantment with the man whose candidacy he supported might herald a broader revolt within Ahmadinejad’s own coalition.

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Sure enough, hardliners are saying that Mousavi cannot have a political party:

According to the state run newspaper Kayhan, Mohammad Reza Mir Taj al-Dini, member of the principalist faction has said “in the Islamic Republic system, a person who does not accept the guardianship of the jurist and the Guardian Council is not qualified to form a party.”

The Deputy of the Council for Coordination of the Forces of the Revolution said, “Mousavi must first prove that he does not have enmity and hostility towards the regime and accepts the existing laws and then think about forming a party.”

“I believe that given current circumstances Mousavi wants to impose his illegal words by using partisan force and this in not acceptable and he should not be given a permit.”

Kayhan also quoted the speaker of the Society Loyal to Islamic Revolution who said “creating a party by people like Mousavi whose loyalty to the regime has not been proven is against the constitution.” Mohammad Azimi added “Mousavi’s behavior after the announcement of election results has risen doubts about his loyalty to the constitution…therefore he is not qualified to form a party.”

Thanks to NiacINsight website for this comment and translation from the Persian.

Israeli Violence Undermining the Peace Process

Washington is quite right that violence is undermining the peace process between Palestinians and Israel, but the main source of that violence is Israel...because peace would undermine the Israeli regime's goals. How long must we endure Washington's hypocrisy?

In order to overcome the biases taught by the politically subservient mainstream U.S. media, try reading the Israeli press, which offers several revealing English-language papers. If you think Israelis are the innocent victims, try, for example, this very recent Haaretz commentary:

Every time Gazans sit down for a meal, they face a depressing reality. The selection of foods available to them is dictated almost entirely by a harsh policy imposed by the Israeli government, which, as of late, has even refused to allow such innocuous-seeming foods as pumpkins, pasta or beans to cross the border. The goal behind Israel's tight control of Gazans' dietary regime is definitely not improving their health. Rather, the government argues that allowing "luxury" foods into Gaza would only add to the popularity of Hamas' leaders, enabling them to better feed their constituency. But, in the eyes of many observers, Israel's policy of limiting foods that enter the Strip is almost tantamount to starvation, and comes dangerously close to collective punishment, both of which are not only illegal and immoral methods to use in pursuit of Israeli security, but also do little to improve that security.

Washington has repeatedly expressed its opposition to countries that “support violence” designed to undermine the Mideast peace process. I totally agree. If Washington wants to put its money where its mouth is, it will have to realize that the primary offender against this principle is Israel. When Israel stops using violence—collective semi-starvation of the population of Gaza, brutality toward Gaza fishermen, military incursions into all of Palestine, army-backed settler terrorism against Palestinian homeowners, then progress toward the peace process will begin.

Western Media Bias Against Opponent of Western Regimes

According to a puzzling, if not downright racist, Reuters report:

A group of hardline Iranians gathered in front of the German embassy in Tehran on Saturday to protest against the murder of an Egyptian woman inside a German courtroom, a Reuters witness said.

Outraged Iranians protesting an unbelievably irresponsible crime by a German who stabbed an Iranian witness in court eighteen times are labeled "hardline." No attempt was made in the report to justify why people outraged at the fact that a German court cannot protect its witnesses or the fact that the murderer had time to stab the witness 18 times before being subdued might be considered "hardline."

Does this mean that in the opinion of Reuters, all Westerners who oppose violence by, say, Iranian authorities against pro-democracy demonstrators are "hardline?" Was the beautiful Neda, who allegedly put herself in the way of a Basij bullet, "hardline?" Did Hitler slaughter six million "hardline" Jews? Are Human Rights Watch analysts documenting Israeli killings of civilians in Gaza "hardline?" I suppose the victims of the military suppressing resistance to the recent coup in Honduras were also "hardline."

No, no, no. I'm getting carried away. The truth is very simple: Western media have rules. One of the rules is that when Western regimes oppose a certain country, then the organizations and people of that country are no longer "Iranian" but "hardline Iranian;" they are no longer "Hamas" but "terrorist Hamas." The first word, you see, is no longer an adjective but simply part of the name. If you are demonstrating against a Western crime, you are a "hardline Iranian." Who else but a "hardliner" would go out of their way to call attention to the murder in court of a witness? Who else but a "terrorist" would go out of their way to defend their people from Israeli collective punishment than a "terrorist?"

I'm feeling very depressed. Would a reader kindly write in and encourage me...by accusing me of being "hardline?" I would take that as a great compliment.

Historical Analogies for the Iranian Predicament

Finding Iran confusing? So is everyone else. We (i.e., Westerners threatening Iran and Iranian politicians who threaten it in their own myriad ways) might all just want to calm down and consider for a moment the lessons we might learn from history.

Zionist politicians intent on expanding Israeli territorial control and defeating any country (and Iran is the last) willing to defy Israeli regional military domination are doing their best to make the case the Iran is sui generis. On this one point, Khomenei would certainly have agreed. But Khomenei has been dead for a long time, and Iran looks more and more like other countries every day.

It is almost impossible to view the Basij without thinking of the Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution: naïve and no doubt frequently sincere youths full of indignation, minds crammed with ideology and played for fools by corrupt leaders. So far, they remain under control, but Mao ended up having to call out the army to control his teenage bully boys, and that pretty much trashed his revolution.

It is also almost impossible to view the IRGC without seeing that model of military kleptocracy, the Pakistani Army (see Alyesha Siddiqa’s Military Inc. on the latter). Pakistan and Iran are similar in many ways, not the least because both have politicized and educated publics that have demonstrated the will and capacity to take charge of their own fate and defend their rights. The impressive overthrow of Musharraf and the Lawyer’s Movement in Pakistan as well as the courage of protestors both against the Shah in 1978-9 and today in Iran hold lessons in democratic action that put complacent Americans, whose democracy is also under domestic attack, to shame. In Pakistan, the masses concerned about civil liberties tamed the military only to see corrupt and incompetent politicians slip back into power. Are senior clerics in Qom right now considering how Iran might do better?

There is no embarrassment in admitting that we foreigners don’t have a clue about what is happening in Iran. Events strongly suggest that Khomenei, Ahmadinejad, the IRGC, the Qom clerical establishment, and the Iranian populace don’t either. After all, while you were reading this article, the situation changed. But there are historical precedents worth contemplating while we all (hopefully) take a deep breath and calm down.

Clerics Take Exception to Regime Consolidation of Power

Elite maneuvering sparked by the Iranian electoral dispute continues to intensify. The regime is not backing down, but opposition to the regime’s hardline stance of depicting dissent as sedition appears to be coalescing and deepening.

Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, mayor of Tehran and former IRGC general and fierce critic of Khatami, called for revision of the electoral law on June 24. Today, Interim Friday Prayer Leader Ayatollah Mohammad Emami-Kashani, a member of the Assembly of Experts, urged the Majlis to take action. Given the insistence of Ahmadijad, Khomenei, and other regime spokesmen that nothing was wrong, this implicitly undermines, at least somewhat, the legitimacy of the whole regime and strengthens the argument of the protestors. The Fars News Agency report omitted reference to his call but noted that he said "All the four presidential candidates also shared the very same spirit (of honoring Iran),” further undermining calls for trial of Mousavi and Khatami. The Fars report also curiously noted that Ahmedinejad’s electoral victory “could” secure him a second term…so this is now suddenly a question to be decided by…whom?

So far, the IRGC appears to be united. The comments of ex-general Qalibaf and the initial protest by ex-commander Rezaei suggest the possibility that some IRGC reservations may exist about the course of its rapid politicization.

In a significant display of media freedom, Iran’s Press TV displayed the thoughtful faces of Mehdi Karroubi, Mohammad Khatami, and Mir-Hossein Mousavi side-by-side in an article noting their strong call for the release of those arrested for protesting and the return of the country to a normal security situation.

Rafsanjani, head of the Council of Experts and the Expediency Council, leads a key faction independent from both Ahmadinejad and the opposition and has been taking a cautious public position, though it is rumored that he has been actively trying to support the protestors behind the scenes. On July 5, the same day that the military leaders said no middle ground existed, he said:

I do not believe that any alert conscience could be content about the circumstances that have unfolded.

This statement leave him wiggle room but appears likely to be read as an implicit attack on the regime's post-election behavior. He also insisted that no power struggle was occurring, which undermines regime efforts to portray Mousavi as a traitor.

A number of factors may explain the intensifying elite conflict. First, the harsh and uncompromising attitude of regime figures puts the lives of all current and potential opponents on the line in a country where the execution of political opponents is common. Second, while all members of the elite may not be focused on power, from power flows money, and the traditional clerical elite, which comes from a rich landowner background, may see the rise of a military kleptocracy as a direct threat to its own privileges. Finally, the tradition of a clerical right to admonish political leaders is an honored and heroic one going back at least a century in Iran, but recent comments by IRGC leaders could be interpreted as challenging the right of anyone to talk back to the IRGC, and some in the clergy may find this going a step too far.

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See also this interesting article arguing that Iran's clerical establishment has been coopted by the regime and presents little threat.

Netanyahu: Dangerous Adversary

According to Haaretz,

Netanyahu appears to be suffering from confusion and paranoia. He is convinced that the media are after him, that his aides are leaking information against him and that the American administration wants him out of office. Two months after his visit to Washington, he is still finding it difficult to communication normally with the White House. To appreciate the depth of his paranoia, it is enough to hear how he refers to Rahm Emanuel and David Axelrod, Obama's senior aides: as "self-hating Jews."

One out of three isn’t bad! But just because Americans are desperate to get rid of this warmongering obfuscator who knows he needs a nice little war with Iran to keep his job (I will not, absolutely will not, name other recent Western leaders who used war against Islam to keep their jobs) does not mean he isn’t paranoid. Netanyahu is paranoid because he thinks destroying the Palestinian people is the only way Israel can survive. Netanyahu is paranoid because he sees Hitler mirages coming at him across the burning sands of Arabia every time he looks out the window.

Jews who want peace and justice are “self-hating?!?” Then what do you call a person like Netanyahu?

Obama Gently Signals Tehran

By releasing the Iranians jailed in Iraq, Obama has sent a gentle signal to Iran that the U.S. is interested in doing business. Will this tiny step become the beginning of a pattern, reversing years of American hostility?

In a very low key signal of Washington's desire to pursue accommodation with Iran, five Iranians arrested by American occupation forces in Iraq were released to the Iraqi government. This removes one small irritant on Iran's long list of grievances against the U.S. and thus sends the message that Washington is not trying to make matters worse. This is exactly the type of signal I have repeatedly advocated.

No one should imagine that it will have much impact on the Iranian "neo-con" war generation, but it serves both to calm the waters a bit and to provide evidence to those Iranians who might wish to make the case for international moderation. One can imagine a Rafsanjani or Khatami or Moussavi citing this to Qom clerics worried about the legitimacy of their Islamic Republic but also concerned about the U.S./Israeli threat, saying, "You see, the Americans do understand something other than the language of force!"

Since the extremist input to Iranian relations with the outside world is coming primarily from Israeli hawks and their U.S. supporters, however, perhaps the major significance of this small concession is that it establishes a U.S. precedent for shifting away from a policy of threat toward a policy of accommodation. Previously, the Obama effort in this direction had been essentially nothing but hot air. Now that a bit of substance has been added, as long as the sky does not fall, this precedent may strengthen the hands of pragmatists in highly factionalized Washington.

The release of the Iranians represents only one tiny conciliatory countermove after years of antagonistic U.S. behavior. Perhaps the most outrageous single American action was (whether you believe it to be astonishing carelessness or intentional) the shooting down of an Iranian airliner full of people during the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. Apologizing for that would attract Iranian attention.

Obama Reins in Likudniks

Even as I was writing the previous post on Biden's outrageous remarks on behalf of the Likudniks, Obama was saying this:

it is the policy of the United States to try to resolve the issue of Iran's nuclear capabilities in a peaceful way through diplomatic channels. That is our policy, I have been talking about this for the last two years, we are going to continue to pursue this, and you know we have said directly to the Israelis that it is important to try and solve this in an international setting in a way that does not create major conflict in the Middle East....Now this is a tough job and nobody is under any illusions that it will be easy, and I've always said that we, the United States, preserve the right, and I as the commander in chief preserve the right to take whatever actions are necessary to protect the United States. But we are committed to a peaceful resolution to this conflict and I think it is still possible, but ultimately if we present an opportunity to the Iranians at some point, they've got to seize that opportunity.

Translation: "Biden, you may be here so the Likudniks can say they have a man in the White House, but that does not give you the right to make U.S. foreign policy."

At least, I hope that's the message. I will admit that it could all be a "good cop, bad cop" act. When Obama announces to the world that any air force carrying out aggressive action across the Persian Gulf will be terminated by the U.S. Navy," then we will know if he is willing to back up his words and be a force for peace. Until then, I'm crossing my fingers.

And the next time you discuss the issue of nuclear aggression, Mr. President, feel free to lift some of my ideas about principles and the common good.

Nuclear War: Not Your "Independent" Right

Biden’s attitude that Israel, as an “independent country” has the right to decide on war or peace on its own represents the policy of piracy raised to an international principle. It is about the most irresponsible attitude a superpower official could adopt.

The subject of course concerns launching a war of aggression against Iran, on the pretext that it might someday pose a threat. That his mindless rambling might raise the likelihood that Iran would someday decide to pose Israel a threat perhaps did not occur to him. In any case, the subject did not deal with some potential future war but with Israeli nuclear aggression today against a non-nuclear state.

That cannot by any rational human conceivably be considered a reasonable decision to be made independently. To suggest that a decision about nuclear war is “independent” violates every principle of the common good and international law, not to mention common sense. There is no such thing as a private nuclear war. Your neighbor does not have the "independent" right to choose nuclear war: it affects you! First comes the issue of the nuclear fallout that would encircle the globe. Second is the political fallout that would immediately blow back on the American superpower that created the Israeli military monster in the first place and could therefore never escape responsibility for its behavior. Third is the precedent of using nuclear weapons for short-term political gain against non-nuclear states posing no “clear and present danger.” Would it be overly emotional to suggest that an Israeli (or American) nuclear attack on Iran would return the world to the moral equivalent of the late Roman empire?

But there is also another way of looking at Biden’s remarks: they were degrading. Representing the world’s last remaining superpower, Biden said that superpower takes a hands-off attitude, has no advice to give, no guidance to offer, no interest to defend. If some little country somewhere wants to start a little nuclear war for its own private purposes, why should that concern the ruler of the world? Why should the patron that armed the client take any responsibility for the client’s behavior? Why should the city on the hill care what the natives in the swamps below are doing?

It is too trivially obvious to merit mentioning that Biden’s remarks were oozing hypocrisy. He would never have offered Iran or China or North Korea the same rights as an “independent country.” Everyone knows the last thing a U.S. decisionmaker wants is countries all over the world making their own independent decisions about nuclear war. But Biden committed a further sin – he made his country look like the land of idiots.

When the occasion calls for statesmanship, long-range thinking, and a global perspective, the politicians we are saddled with give us sound bites worthy of “Saturday Night Live.” When there is a crying need for philosophy, we get short-sighted partisanship and cheap political maneuvers that sell out America in favor of a foreign militarist clique.

Iran: Pro-Democracy Clerics vs. IRGC Hardliners

Pro-democracy senior clerics are legitimizing dissent while senior IRGC leaders demand a “deciding role” in governing Iran. Khamenei continues his balancing act but looks more and more exposed as elite discord intensifies.

Pro-democracy clerics are legitimizing dissent, defying attempts by clerics favoring strict guidance from a clerical “representative of Allah” to define opposition to Ahmadinejad as seditious and urging Mousavi to form a political party.

Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Hossein Mousavi-Tabrizi, leader of a reform group of Qom clerics called the Assembly of Qom Seminary Scholars and Researchers, has urged “people such as Mousavi” to set up “strong political parties,” calling them good for “strengthening democracy.” The inherent contradiction in Khomenei’s dual concept of a state based on both veliyat e-faqih (guidance by Allah’s representative) and open elections is becoming ever more clearly revealed.

Even in Iran, calling for a political party may not seem unusual since there are numerous parties and factional associations that participate in the vigorous political scene, but in the current circumstances when leading supporters of Ahmadinejad are urging that Mousavi be tried for sedition, such calls from within the clerical establishment directly challenge the legitimacy of the hardliners.

The IRGC is meeting the implicit challenge to its rising star with equal boldness. Yadollah Javani, head of the IRGC’s Political Bureau, asserted flatly:

Today, no one is impartial. There are two currents; those who defend and support the revolution and the establishment, and those who are trying to topple it… the eye of the mischief must be blinded completely and gouged out.

IRGC commander Mohammad Ali Jafari seemed to offer a clear military definition of “those who defend” with his unambiguous challenge that “the IRGC must play a deciding role in the preservation and continuation of the revolution.”

Opposition = sedition. We are in charge, and there is no room for compromise.

The Ahmadinejad faction may feel secure with the support of Khamenei, the conservative portion of the senior clerics, and an apparently united military/security apparatus, but the clumsy behavior of that group seems to be provoking more and more resistance. In revolutionary Iran, the national security elite may find the combination of mass protests and increasingly outspoken ayatollahs a difficult challenge.

Two days ago Ayatollah Mousavi-Tabrizi was making remarks to foreign reporters and on his website. Today, his remarks are being carried by Iranian media.

Slightly reversing course in a continuation of his historical balancing act, Supreme Leader Khamenei gently chastised extremists and offered a degree of protection to the pro-democracy faction, warning:

The [Iranian] nation, scholars and all political factions should be careful not to mistake friends for foes and as a result adopt an approach with friends that is only appropriate in dealing with foes.

The IRGC and various clerical factions are now battling it out in the open, while mere politicians run for cover. Majlis Speaker Larijani left immediately for another foreign trip as soon as he returned from Algeria. Ahmadinejad, who took a trip right after the election, had scheduled a second one but curiously canceled it. Cancelation may have been due to concerns by the African hosts that he would distract them from their business, but he does seem to be very quiet at the moment.

Background on Iran’s clerical establishment

Several clerical organizations have offered public judgments about the recent political turmoil, suggesting rising clerical concern over the revolution they led amid clear disagreement within senior clerical ranks.

Hojjatoleslam Ahmad Salek, a member of the Central Council of the Society of Combatant Clergy, cautioned, according to Mehr News,:

The preservation of society and the Islamic Revolution… is dependent on maintaining unity and kindness among intellectuals and political thinkers.

According to Wikipedia, Khamenei was one of the founders of the conservative Society of Combatant Clergy, whose current members include Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ahmad Jannati, Mahdavi Kani, Reza Akrami and Hassan Rohani.

In a qualified victory for Ahmadinejad, the Qom Seminary Teachers Society congratulated him on his reelection as president but also “insisted that now that the competition is over it is a time for friendship and cooperation,” according to Mehr News.

The conservative Qom Seminary Teachers Society, which proposes judges for the judiciary, includes Ahmadinejad’s religious mentor Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi as well as Ayatollah Morteza Moghtadai, Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi, Grand Ayatollah Moslem Malakouti, Grand Ayatollah Hossein Mazaheri, Ayatollah Mahmoud Shahroudi, Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, Ayatollah Ebrahim Amini, Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, and Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati.(Wikipedia) Given the membership of Mesbah Yazdi, Shahroudi, and Khatami (who has been an outspoken critique of the dissidents since the election), one might have expected a stronger endorsement of Ahmadinejad from this organization.

The Assembly of Qom Seminary Scholars and Researchers, a reformist group of Qom clerics distinct from the Qom Seminary Teachers Society, said the Guardian Council no longer had the "right to judge in this case as some of its members have lost their impartial image in the eyes of the public." The group’s message, which apparently was ignored by Iranian media (at least by its English-language media), continued:

How can one accept the legitimacy of the election just because the Guardians Council says so? Can one say that the government born out of these infringements is a legitimate one? --AFP

An English website of Iranian news, Tehran Broadcast, reported an interview with Hossein Mousavi-Tabrizi, quoting him as supporting Mousavi’s right to demonstrate and asserting that “any regime who denies peoples’ rights is unlawful.”

Ayatollah Mousavi-Tabrizi, also head of the Political Parties House, is the former chief prosecutor of the Revolutionary Court and a former member of the Council of Experts, and seems to have been quite the vicious extremist in the desperate years of the 1980s, but he has a history in recent years of defending democratic principles. In 2002, he was quoted in Newsweek as taking a starkly different attitude toward the role of religion in politics from that of such arch-conservatives as Mesbah-Yazdi, saying, “The idea that only a select number of clerics have the right to make decisions for the masses is un-Islamic and illegal. God hasn't given anyone an exclusive right to rule. If religion interferes in every detail of government, it will fail.” A couple years later, he criticized the Guardian Council’s oversight of elections before as constraining the people’s legitimate rights to elect their own representatives.

Pro-Ahmadinejad comments from within the regime:

Tehran's Interim Friday Prayers Leader Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati –

“The world has its eyes fixed on Iran's post-election developments so we need to end the ongoing dispute.” Press TV, June 3

Ayatollah Ebrahim Amini –

“Unfortunately, in the election… the nation was divided into two groups and this issue is a poison for our system,” Mehr News, June 4

Guardian Council Secretary Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati –

“We did whatever we could do in this election and the election was really a healthy election and there was nothing wrong with it.”

“We are all brothers and should maintain unity and if anybody disturbs unity (his action) is considered a betrayal of the Islamic Republic system.” Mehr News, June 3

"Those who hold illegal rallies and gatherings should be legally pursued," parliament member Muhammad Taghi Rahbar was quoted as saying by the hardline Javan newspaper. Kayhan International July 4

In an editorial against Mousavi, Shariatmadari wrote, "It has to be asked whether the actions of (Mousavi and his supporters) are in response to instructions of American authorities."

He added that Mousavi was trying to "escape punishment for murdering innocent people, holding riots, cooperating with foreigners and acting as America's fifth column inside the country" and called for Mousavi and former reformist President Mohammad Khatami to be tried in court for "horrible crimes and treason."

Can Iran's New Regime Hold On?

As promised, I propose to start evaluating Iran’s new regime according to a theoretical framework composed of about a dozen generic criteria for evaluating the performance of any political system. The goal, needless to say, is to escape from the suffocating biases that poison any discussion of Iran today and gain some insights into how well the Iranian system of governance actually functions.Since the cohesiveness of Iran’s leadership is one of the most prominent issues now being debated, I will start with that criterion.

Leadership cohesiveness

Evidently perceiving itself as under severe attack, the Iranian regime should, to maximize survivability, have moved to strengthen unity by maximizing inclusiveness. Instead, it did the opposite – slamming the doors on system supporters who disagreed over tactics and highly negotiable details.

Explanation A. Panic. One explanation is that the regime panicked in the face of a stunning popular slap in the face.

Explanation B. The Coup. Another explanation is that the Ahmadinejad faction in fact did not truly perceive itself to be under severe attack; instead, the shrill denunciations of within-system factional opposition as traitors may have been nothing more than propaganda by a faction that saw an opportunity to cement its control.

If Explanation A. (“Panic”) is correct, then the Ahmadinejad faction’s reaction represents a mistake that is likely to leave the elite dangerously fractured, even though it may still give the Ahmadinejad faction temporary control. By rejecting compromise, it has needlessly weakened the Islamic Republic.

If Explanation B. (“The Coup”) is correct, then a skillful maneuver by the Ahmadinejad faction has just frozen out much of the broader elite, including both Rafsanjani and many Qom clerics who favor a system resting more on popular support than the supposed divine selection of a leader (veliyat e faqih) and enabled the anti-Saddam war generation to take control.

Whatever the perceptions of the Ahmadinejad faction, continuing dissent by elite figures suggests that legitimacy of the system has been undermined. In the event, an emerging military dictatorship may substitute force as the glue holding things together.

At this point, Leadership Cohesiveness appears severely impaired. However, that conclusion rests on the assumption that the operative definition of “leadership” is the whole revolutionary elite. It could be argued that such a definition, while perhaps accurate a generation ago, is now outdated. Given the discord within the clerical camp, the age of the revolutionary generation of leaders, and the rapidly growing control by the military over the economy, it could be argued that the operative definition of “leadership” today in Iran should be exactly Ahmadinejad’s apparent definition: namely, the coterie of national security officials and conservative clerics surrounding him. This group now appears confident that it totally controls political power in Iran and can afford to freeze out not only the masses but also Rafsanjani and all the clerics who support free elections.

Even if the importance of Leadership Cohesiveness is accepted, this still does not allow one to conclude anything about the likely course of Iranian politics; it only raises the question of how Leadership Cohesiveness should be defined for Iran at this moment. Theoretical analysis underscores the need to evaluate leadership cohesiveness, but the only clear conclusion it allows one to make is that more data are needed to determine whether or not Iran’s system of governance has been fundamentally destabilized by the regime’s response to the electoral dispute.

A More Detailed Look.

One way to deal with the apparent absence of data is to refine the analytical lens. “Leadership cohesiveness” as an analytical concept can be refined into a set of scales for measuring its impact on system health. The set of scales that is applied here consists of individual scales, each set up to go from positive impact on system health on the left to negative impact on the right. They do not measure the degree of cohesiveness, since under certain circumstances either high or low cohesiveness could be damaging. High cohesiveness might, for example, lead to groupthink. Instead, each scale is designed to measure rising damage.

The six proposed scales:

1. Attitude toward Skeptics. The attitude of the Ahmadinejad faction since the election toward skeptics not only has been harsh but appears to be getting harsher even as the streets quiet down. Foreigners, voters in their millions, and committed elite system supporters are all being lumped together and threatened with the charge of treachery until one almost wonders who, in the end, will remain to be invited to join the in-group. It is difficult to defend this behavior as rational.
2. Attitude toward New Information. As more and more members of the elite voice warnings about the need for inclusivity, the attitude of the Ahmadinejad faction appears increasingly dogmatic, with in-group members appearing significantly harsher and more unforgiving even than Khamenei. Evidence is thin, but the trend is ominous.
3. Policies. Insufficient evidence.
4. Lessons Learned. The only lesson that appears to have been learned so far by the Ahmadinejad faction is that their victory is total and that no constraints need any longer be given heed. This is a dangerous lesson to learn.
5. Attitude toward Colleagues. The attitude toward colleagues at the top of the elite structure is arrogant and dismissive.
6. Attitude toward Traditional Rules, Values, and Institutions. Vicious infighting within the elite is nothing new in the Islamic Republic, but the sense is growing that the Ahmadinejad faction is pushing for a fundamental restructuring of the state away from a republic based to a significant extent on popular support voiced through elections toward a military dictatorship supported only by extreme proponents of clerical oversight. This approach challenges much of the Islamic Republic’s tradition and seems likely to narrow both the regime’s elite support and its popular support.

The highly preliminary bottom line at this early point is that the new Iranian administration is doing itself no favors as far as the development of leadership cohesiveness is concerned. Although only one part of overall regime functionality, it does not suggest smooth sailing.