Turkish-Egyptian Possibilities

Does a little anti-Israeli PR from Cairo when the Egyptian government obviously needs to calm down its population really matter?

The Egyptian Foreign Ministry website reports:

On receiving the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Michael Williams, Foreign Minister Mohamed Amr affirmed the importance of exerting all possible efforts to maintain stability in Lebanon and protecting it from all regional developments which might be negatively reflected on the country and the importance of excluding any political actor from the Lebanese equation

Spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Counselor Amr Roushdi stated that the Minister stressed that the main guarantee for Lebanese and regional stability is the immediate halting of the daily Israeli violations of the Lebanese airspace and respecting the Lebanese sovereignty over its space and soil.

In the context of a world nearly united in favor of the recognition of a Palestinian state, the popular Egyptian calls for an end to the Egyptian-Israeli alliance, the collapse of Israeli-Turkish ties, and the utter loss of U.S. credibility as a peace broker, yes, it matters.

While it is likely that no one would anticipate immediate Egyptian military moves to protect Lebanon, the mere launching of a diplomatic initiative focusing attention on Israel's belligerence against Lebanon changes the Mideast political environment. It says that now, suddenly, Israel no longer has the essentially unchallenged (except by Iran) right to do what it wants. (It also says that Iran no longer "owns" the issue of supporting Palestinians, something Washington should applaud.) Already on the defensive over the U.N. campaign by Palestinians for recognition of a Palestinian state and over its attack on the international delegation trying to bring aid to Gazans, Israel will now be preoccupied by a third embarrassing diplomatic battle.

Will Israeli FM Lieberman advocate support for anti-Egyptian terrorism, as he did with Turkey? (One might well wonder why Israel would want to legitimate the use of terror as a tool of state policy...) Indeed, Lieberman's threat suggests more clearly than anything else the disarray of the Israeli government. Israel's free ride during the post-9/11 years may be drawing to a close.

Given the obsequious attitude of Washington toward anything desired by the Israeli right, the military side of the whole issue of the Israeli campaign of Lebanese border violations seems likely to be minor, although the imminent transfer of Turkish warships to the Eastern Mediterranean with the apparent intent of protecting future popular efforts to break Israel's Gaza Ghetto blockade raises the possibility of a future military response on behalf of Lebanon.

For now, however, the real significance of Cairo's statement is its perfect timing in support of Erdogan. Erdogan will get off the plane today in Cairo knowing that his trip is already a success: Cairo is now publicly committed to raising the heat on Israeli transgressions of international law. Moreover, Cairo has selected an issue, very possibly after careful secret discussions with Ankara, that can only make Israel look bad and in response to which Tel Aviv probably will not be able to do much. Beating up on helpless Lebanon only accomplishes one thing: it legitimizes Hezbollah. A real friend of Israel would so inform them, but Israel's lackeys in Washington are not, in the end, such friends.

So Tel Aviv must watch helplessly while Cairo and Ankara bask in the strong, warm sunlight on the high moral ground. After all, who can object to the integrity of international borders?

One caveat is important: the whole idea of a military alliance between Turks and Egyptians is, well, shall we just say "sensitive" and leave it at that? I mean, all that U.S. military aid in limbo, and Turkey probably does not want to be expelled from NATO (North Atlantic Treaty for Protecting Israel Organization). Then, there's all that historical baggage...I mean, let's just say that Cairo and Ankara do create a military alliance and do emerge supreme in the Mideast. Down the road a bit, sure, but let's just say they do. Then what? Will the land of Nasser, the Custodian of the Three Holy Pyramids play second fiddle to the new Ottoman Empire? Will the neo-Ottomans, who used to rule Egypt, play second fiddle to an impoverished country dependent on U.S. aid?

So, over the long run, many sensitivities will need to be managed. Nevertheless, for now, even a tiny step toward serious Turkish-Egyptian military cooperation in the context of worsening relations between each and Israel constitutes a tipping point. The weakening regional position of the U.S. only underscores this. Arguments over how many centimeters down the slippery slope this carries the Mideast are beside the point. The momentum has shifted. Instead of a dominant dynamic of U.S.-Israel-Saudi control of the Mideast, one now sees the potential rise of dominance of a new dynamic: political initiative shifting to a moderate (primarily peaceful and supportive of international law) coalition with real military power and popular support that will challenge Israel's right to play by special rules. Washington of course remains free to continue supporting everything Tel Aviv does, but only at the cost of harming U.S. national security a little bit every single time it does so.

And Erdogan? All he has to do is shake hands with Egyptian leaders, congratulate them loudly on their foresight, proclaim Ankara's strong support, visit the pyramids, and go home. That will suffice to change the dynamics of Mideast affairs. Anything beyond that will be icing on the moderate Islamist, moderate nationalist cake.

And that raises the question of what further steps Cairo and Ankara might indeed take in the context of an Egyptian call for Israel to respect Lebanese security, a Palestinian campaign for statehood, and Ankara's announcement that its warships will start patrolling off the coast of Israel and Lebanon.

Syria and Palestine. A strongly worded joint call for peaceful resolution of domestic conflict that lays out a set of principles to be applied equally in Syria and in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute would put Cairo and Ankara nicely on the moral high ground.

Lebanon. A joint statement supporting the territorial integrity of Lebanon would be a minimal step. Joint naval patrols off Lebanon's coast would add substance. Holding discussions on possible joint military aid to Lebanon and leaking the story to the media would go a step further. If they want to be really creative, Cairo and Ankara could announce support for the principle of the integrity of "all regional state borders," specifically including the borders of Bahrain, Lebanon, a future Palestinian state, and the 1967 borders of Israel.

Gaza. And then, there's Gaza. Some initiative regarding the right of Gazans to participate in international trade, fish off their coastline, receive the income from any hydrocarbons in Gazan territorial waters, and travel into Egypt is the absolute minimum that must come out of the Turkish-Egyptian summit in order to avoid the charge of hypocrisy. Whatever else the two sides do, Cairo must figure out a way to start extricating itself from its complicity in the Gaza Ghetto.

The amazing thing about Erdogan's visit is the abundance of possibilities on the Egyptian-Turkish table.

Emerging News: Egypt Warns Israel Over Lebanon

Cairo has reportedly warned Israel to cease its constant violations of Lebanon's border with its warplanes. On the eve of Erdogan's summit visit, this is an interesting initiative for Cairo suddenly to take. If Cairo wants to make progress toward a military alliance with Turkey, what better issue for joint action could have been thought up than a diplomatic move to protect poor, nearly helpless Lebanon?

If this report is not true, it should be. Is Erdogan kicking himself for letting Cairo take the obvious first step, or might they have jointly decided to allow the Egyptian military dictators to get the credit for it? Keep watching. This could turn into something.

Building a Mideast Strategic Triangle

Erdogan's hopes for a new Mideast have been given a boost by...Israel! But as the dispute deepens, its long-term impact becomes more difficult to calculate.

Insisting on its right to murder opponents in international waters, Israel dismissed Turkish demands for a clear apology. What did Israel care? It was supreme in the region. Then, the Arab spring cracked the foundation of Israel’s strategic plans. Ignoring the shift, Israel killed several Egyptian policemen. What was Israel thinking – that they were just Lebanese? So now Israel finds itself having wrecked ties to Turkey precisely at the moment it has infuriated Egyptians, nicely setting the stage for the Turkish-Egyptian summit, where Erdogan wants to discuss a possible Turkish-Egyptian alliance that could reshape the Mideast.

Cairo surely wants to avoid angering Washington, its U.S. military aid being treasured far more than justice for eight dead Turks. But the protesters are in the streets tearing down the wall Israel put around its Cairo embassy, not attacking the military rulers of Egypt, and the rulers of Egypt would just as surely like to keep it that way. Israel has made Erdogan’s task much easier than it might have been.

And Israel’s response? Just to ensure that Erdogan does not lose momentum in his campaign to unite his country behind him, Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman is planning a revenge campaign of supporting anti-Turkish terrorism! Responding to diplomatic moves by launching a terrorist campaign may be a bit much even for Netanyahu, but Lieberman’s brilliant reposte is now openly known so the point made by Israel’s piracy against the Mavi Marmara has been underlined: cross Israel and you will be attacked.

While Israel’s tactics may at first glance appear curious, they do have at least one logical explanation: provoking international tensions can be relied upon, as always, to freak out Israelis and win votes for the extremist ruling clique, not to mention even more military aid from the obedient U.S. Congress. The hidden agendas, both at the party and individual levels, contributing to the rising state-to-state tensions will make controlling Egyptian-Israeli-Turkish relations increasingly difficult.

Wouldn’t it be interesting to be a fly on the wall when Erdogan sits down with the Egyptian generals!

Freeing Palestinians…to Save Israeli Democracy

A Palestinian state would not only offer justice to Palestinians but restore Israel's weakening democracy and consolidate Israel's security by strengthening the emerging Arab center.

Rafah: Opening the Gate to Mideast Change

Cairo has just taken the initiative, upping the ante for all those trying to woo her: Rafah will be opened. Now for the devil in the details: let the bidding begin.

Wooing Cairo

Everyone now wants to be friends with Egypt; to put it differently, everyone now wants to push Egypt to remake itself in a way convenient to them: Riyadh and Tel Aviv missing the nice, safe old dictatorship; Tehran searching for entrée into the Mideast community without having to bow down to Washington; Ankara looking to buttress its position as leader of the moderate middle. Meanwhile, Cairo’s face is properly veiled, as she considers her options.*

The Suitors.   Riyadh crassly flashed its wealth, first allegedly threatening economic punishment of Egypt were Egypt to pursue Mubarak and then offering a big ring (economic aid) at a price (“security”) that could be read as an insulting attempt to interfere in Egypt’s delicate domestic affairs, where the issue is not security but liberty. Riyadh also allowed Mubarak to make a speech on Saudi TV that widely irritated Egyptian reformers; Cairo’s investigation of a Saudi billionaire’s land deals in Egypt suggested a lack of proper deference to the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.

Tel Aviv’s influence over Cairo remains palpable, but a cautious Cairo has slightly softened its own blockade of Gaza (which still buttresses that of Israel), and a Cairo-sponsored Hamas-Fatah deal that leaves Tel Aviv out of the loop is breaking news. With the collapse of the Hamas-Israel ceasefire, it seems unlikely that Cairo can continue to keep the Gaza issue on the back burner. A newly free Egyptian populace demonstrated against Israel’s attack on Gaza on April 8 and again on April 12, and the newly independent Egyptian daily Al Ahram reported the events. Indeed, an Egyptian diplomat has reportedly stated that changes in Egyptian rules governing the Rafah border crossing, now that long-time critic of Mubarak’s Gaza policy--Nabil El-Arabi--is the new Egyptian foreign minister, are imminent. Tel Aviv needs a zero-based foreign policy rethink.

The tone of ties with Tehran has already improved, with the passage of Iranian warships through the Suez Canal in February and Foreign Minister El-Arabi’s recent public advocacy of the reestablishment of official relations. But Ankara has already traveled this path with Tehran, obtaining few Iranian concessions in return. Tehran needs to decide if it wants inclusion in a new Mideast that may be less dependent on Washington but still hardly “on Tehran’s side” or whether it prefers the status of remaining outsider and troublemaker.

Ankara faces both an opportunity and a trap. As Davutoglu’s discussions with the new Egyptian civilian leadership on April 10 illustrate, Turkey and Egypt can cooperate to resolve a host of regional problems, with Gaza perhaps the key test, assuming they can avoid falling into the trap of competing for leadership of a moderate bloc at the expense of substantive accomplishments.

Cairo’s Calculus. Egypt now has the opportunity to step into the limelight, with all those suitors precisely when Washington, having overplayed its regional hand, is nursing its wounds, struggling with the effects of mismanaged imperialist adventures and a mismanaged domestic economy. Whatever Egypt may lack in terms of money, oil, or military power, Egypt now has pride, stands center-stage with de facto leadership of the emerging bloc of post-dictator states, and has more flexibility than any other regional state: Cairo’s moment has arrived.

The mere hesitation of Cairo to commit herself creates a new regional fluidity: where diplomacy in the old Mideast tended to be zero-sum, it can now be positive-sum. Done carefully, Cairo can have her cake (independence) and eat it too (cooperation with Iran and Turkey, continued U.S. aid, peace with Israel, pride, status, and regional influence). Extremists, from Zionist expansionists to Salafi jihadists, won’t find such an outcome to be “positive-sum,” but all regional societies eventually will.

Ankara needs help making the case for a policy of good neighborliness to replace the old confrontationalism. Tehran needs the security guarantee of friendly ties with a major Sunni state to break the Arab-Israeli-U.S. front that has been opposing it. Saudi Arabia may find that it too has needs – the support of an independent regional power, rather than just a handful of sheikdom clients. Washington needs the cooperation of a Sunni power that is moderate, democratic, popular, and successful: what better antidote to jihadi terror could one imagine?

Storm Clouds.

So the storybook romance, in this case, is that the beautiful girl should marry no one, date everyone! But storm clouds darken the horizon:

Gaza. Israel has been playing Nazi Germany to Gaza’s Warsaw Ghetto. That approach is not working. Gaza, both literally as an incubator of extremism and figuratively as a global symbol of oppression, is a terrorism factory. If a new Egypt actually does emerge (not yet certain), Gaza will be an intolerable contradiction with an obvious “solution:” opening the Rafah border crossing. Can Cairo manage the instability that might result?

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Positive-Sum Vision on Palestine

"With this united Palestinian [government] Israel can negotiate for real, can carry through the implementation of UN Resolution 181 of 1947 which called for an Israeli and a Palestinian state"

[Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabeel Arabi, Israeli National News.]

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Zero-Sum Israeli Policy

"My sense is that if Israel continues to ignore international calls for achieving peace on a just basis, and allowing the Palestinians to establish their state, there will be more and more bitter and negative feelings towards Israel, and the difference now, after January 25 [when the uprising began], is that no government in Egypt will be able to ignore those feelings'' [Hossam Zaki, senior advisor to Egyptian foreign minister]

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The Egyptian Economy. If Egypt’s revolution produces a democracy without economic progress, the democracy will quickly give way to chaos, zenophobia, fundamentalism, chauvinism or some other process of desperation. Total GNP and corporate profits are not the issue; payoff for the population is.

Egypt’s Governance. Notwithstanding all the bravery by Egyptian democracy protesters over the last five months, the prospects of Egypt achieving responsible governance remain dim. With military aid pouring in from Washington and economic aid pouring in from Riyadh, the temptation on the part of the “temporary” military dictatorship to hold onto political power will be hard to resist.

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Start With the Military Council

"You want a revolution in Egypt? You can't have one with Tantawi as the leader.  An Egyptian revolution would require the removal of the Egyptian military council which serves by order of the US/Israel.  You want to remove all appointees of Mubarak?  Don't start with the Ministry of Agriculture.  You will get there later. Start with the Military Council."  [As'ad AbuKhalil, Angry Arab News Service.]

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The Army is Fooling the People

Tahrir Square protests are starting up again, amid rising condemnation of Egypt's self-appointed military dictatorship. According to a protester, "The army is fooling the people." [Heba Fahmy, Daily News Egypt.]

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Iran’s Neo-Cons. What highly factionalized Tehran really wants remains unclear. Although working with Ankara and Cairo might be a deal attractive to Tehran national security types, it would also come at a domestic political cost to the anti-Saddam war generation of “Iranian neo-cons,” a political clique exploiting Palestine’s plight to pad their own resumes. An Ankara-Tehran-Cairo partnership could trim Israel’s sails, but such a partnership would require Tehran to make hard choices.

Bahrain. Repression of dissent in Bahrain will empower hard-line Iranians, making more likely sectarian violence and an Iranian-Saudi military clash. Riyadh’s Bahraini chickens will come home to roost, undermining efforts to promote regional compromise.

Revenge of the Fanatics. Fanatics, extremists, those who believe that only those who obey are “friends,” will seek to punish Cairo for moderation; Egypt will need to get its own house in order quickly in order to keep its balance.

Yemen. Yemen is a disaster unfolding before our eyes and a potential trap that could once again entangle a reactionary Riyadh with a progressive Cairo. Alternatively, a post-Saleh Yemen could conceivably join Egypt and Tunisia in a new progressive bloc that, given well managed coordination with Turkey, could revolutionize Mideast politics.

Cairo’s Tipping Point.

Washington can play a critical supporting role by guiding rather than opposing change. It should stake out a position in support of Bahraini democracy that will offer Bahraini dissenters an alternative to putting themselves in the hands of Iran. Washington needs to demonstrate that ties with the U.S. can translate into a better life for a mistreated population and, specifically, for a Shi’i majority. Equally urgent is a solution for Gaza that would remove Israel from the equation, accept Hamas as the political party currently in charge, and provide Hamas with the means to govern well in return for mutual security along the Gaza-Israel border. Washington’s standards for interacting with Damascus and Sana’a also need to be brought into sync.

Whether Washington helps or hinders, Cairo now finds herself at a tipping point. She can try to hand victory back to the counter-revolution, thereby encouraging empire-builders and advocates of the Zionist garrison state while empowering both Iranian rejectionists and militant Sunnis to whom many embittered moderates will feel forced to turn. The rising frustration of Tahrir Square activists at the self-appointed Cairo military government’s agonizing crawl toward democracy, Cairo’s endless toying with a pro-Palestinian policy regarding its joint border with Gaza, and Cairo’s acceptance of a massive economic aid package with God knows what secret strings attached from arch-conservative Riyadh all illustrate the obstacles facing Egyptians who advocate change. Clearly, the danger of Egypt tipping back into dictatorship remains very real.

Alternatively, Cairo can make Egypt the center of a new moderate, democratizing movement to offer the Mideast a positive-sum vision of progress for all of Egyptian society and for the whole Mideast. Cairo can tip toward a combination of domestic democratization and foreign policy independence based on Arab nationalism.

May she choose wisely.

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*My thanks to Media With Conscience for publishing a shorter version of this article.

Readings

Barak Barfi argues that Cairo has no choice, financially, but to bow down to Riyadh.

Ramzy Baroud argues that Cairo is still treating Gazans at Rafah like "animals."

Tehran's National Security Opportunity

Tehran has done an impressive job of managing its national security challenges over the last 20 years. Can it now put the icing on its national security cake by teaming up with Arab moderates, especially the new Egypt, and isolating Saudi Arabia in embarrassed league with Israel?

One of the major questions regarding the long-term state of Mideast affairs is how Tehran will react to the simultaneous Arab democratization wave and sectarian Saudi challenge. By itself, a democratizing wave would not seem likely to attract very serious Iranian support nor offer Tehran’s hard-line leadership much opportunity, since it contradicts the militant foreign policy and domestic repression dominant in Iran. However, the Saudi counterrevolution makes Riyadh the leader of the region’s anti-democratic forces, and the brutal, obviously sectarian approach of Riyadh offers Tehran an opportunity to enhance its regional image, enhance its national security at low cost simply by supporting the newly emerging moderate Arab regimes. These regimes, to a discerning and patient Tehranian eye, could be seen as legitimate partners over a fairly long period on the simple basis of their desire for foreign policy independence. The more Tel Aviv and Riyadh team up to undermine Arab liberty, the easier it will be for Tehran to strike a tactical deal with any neutral, democratic Arab regimes that may emerge.

Whether such a deal actually transforms Iran into just another Turkey or in the end proves little more than a cloaking device for hard-line Iranian nationalism devoted to establishing a new world order is a question that will only be answered years from now, and will depend greatly on how things work out in the meantime: the answer is not preordained. Tehran kept its cool in the face of the flood of the U.S. military into its backyard and smoothly emerged the victor in the 20-year-long war between Washington and Saddam, while simultaneously maintaining its independence and avoiding Israeli attack. Now, Tehran has an opportunity to improve on this impressive record by “joining” an emerging Arab moderate center and thus isolating Israel and Saudi Arabia far off in right field. In five years, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, and perhaps a couple other regional states could be comfortably tied by a booming hydrocarbon network of priceless strategic value to Western Europe and thus also of priceless strategic value to Iran. As the source of most of the gas, Iran could become, in European eyes, “too big to fail,” and thus protected from Israeli attack.

The big payoff for Washington would be if Tehran decided that the energy superpower game was more attractive than the game of leading the campaign to overthrow the U.S.-centric global political system.

The first move is up to Tehran, and so far, it is choosing the road of moderation and cooperation. Tehran has responded only with words to Riyadh’s brutal repression of Bahraini Shi’a, but simultaneously Tehran is moving steadily to shift regional strategic relations by pulling Egypt away from the Saudis. By ineptly interfering with the democratization process in Egpyt, the Saudis are only facilitating Iran’s way forward. Trading Egypt for Bahrain can hardly be a wise strategic move for Saudi Arabia.

The next move is up to Cairo and seems likely to come in Gaza. An Egyptian move to bring any significant measure of justice to the people of Gaza would simultaneous cause a fundamental rift with Riyadh and pave the road to normalization with Tehran.

Saleh’s Ultimate Weapon: Apres Moi, C’est al Qua’ida!

With exquisite timing, “Yemen’s army repelled an attack…by al Queda in the Arabian Peninsula,” according to Saleh’s regime, as Saleh ran out of all options for maintaining his dictatorship except waving the bloody flag of “terror” in Washington’s face. Why not? It has worked for him so far, and, indeed, might, with a grain of salt, even just possibly be true, but could al Qua'ida be so shortsighted as to pick this moment to make its move, giving Saleh precisely what he wants?

A Return to Sectarian Conflict?

The Saudi military intervention in Bahrain risks re-igniting the sectarian warfare provoked in Iraq by the U.S. invasion.

The Saudi decision to play Metternich will have ominous consequences. First is the possibility that Washington, Tel Aviv, and Riyadh have decided to push for war against Iran. That is a bit of a leap from the evidence. Let's hope it is not the case, but even if it is not, the momentum is now moving in that direction. The temperature of the Persian Gulf has just risen, and in Bahrain a first small explosion has occurred; today more effort will be required to prevent a Persian Gulf meltdown than would have been required last week.

Aside from the danger of war with Iran, Riyadh has now split the Arab world. Note, for example, how events clearly show coordination between the crackdown in Bahrain and the crackdown in Yemen. Perhaps the old guard will win, as Metternich did after 1848, and succeed in repressing all Arabs again, but that will not turn the clock back. The Arab world has changed; millions have voted with their feet and faced down police goon squads. That is empowering.

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The Meaning of Empowerment

On my daily afternoon walks, I overhear Saudis of all ages and walks of life analyzing the events that led to the overthrow of the Tunisian regime. Everywhere I go, people are hypothesizing on whether the same could happen to “them,” referring to the possibility of a Saudi Arabia not headed by the Al Sauds. Although most concur that it is highly unlikely, they are nonetheless more convinced than ever of the power of the people to bring about change.--Khuloud on Jadaliyya

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If repressed, the next time the people will have learned that peaceful demonstrations do not work. For an analogy, 1848 will turn into 1917. That is of course just an analogy; it should not be read as implying that communism is in the Mideast's future but simply that political radicalization is becoming more likely by the minute. Iran, al Qua'ida, and militant Arab nationalism will all be invigorated. A new Saudi-Egyptian proxy war in Yemen should come as no surprise, and Saudi-Iranian competition in Iraq will intensify.

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The Logic of Saudi-Egyptian proxy war in Yemen

Egypt is now standing tall; no Egyptian ruler will aspire to crouching behind Saudi Arabia. Expect competition for leadership of the Arab world regardless of whether the Egyptian army succeeds in establishing a new military dictatorship or democracy is established. Egypt, however haltingly, is moving toward modernization, Saudi Arabia is looking backwards. Their interests will clash. Meanwhile, the Yemeni regime has been radicalized by the Saudi intervention in Bahrain, and many of those supporting the protesters in Yemen must surely have very bad memories of the Saudi military attack on the Houthis. Civil war now appears far more likely than it did a month ago, and it is hard to see how Riyadh will watch Saleh go down to military defeat without trying to help him. At that point, Cairo will face a fateful double decision: stand aside and give regional preeminence to Riyadh or take action; support democracy advocates who copied those in Egypt or turn its back. No matter who is in charge in Cairo, governments like legitimacy, and legitimacy for an Egyptian regime will not be found in a policy of bowing down before the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.

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The other change is truly tragic. The Arab democracy revolt was unifying and secularizing: more liberty for everyone. Saudi Arabia's military intervention, in contrast, not only splits the Arabs but risks sparking sectarian conflict. Bahraini democracy protesters are going to have a very hard time remaining united in the face of what looks very much like repression of the Shi'a. Admittedly, it also looks like repression of civil liberties, which it surely is. The key to the story may well lie in the struggle between these two conflicting dynamics: patriotic and democratic resistance to Saudi troops enforcing repression vs. the natural tendency to interpret events as Sunni vs. Shi'a. Moqtada al Sadr's initial sectarian reaction (justice for Shi'a rather than justice for Bahrainis) exemplifies this tendency, and al Qua'ida will surely be examining the situation in a search for opportunities.

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Provoking Sectarianism

Bahrain TV has been giving a voice to extremists among government loyalists, with one caller reportedly offering demonstrators a “return to the days of Saddam, how he [Saddam] dealt with his Shia population.” --Jadaliyya

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Nuclear war with Iran might be down the road, but a more likely result of the Saudi intervention in Bahrain is a repeat of the horrifying sectarian conflict provoked in Iraq by the U.S. invasion.

After Mubarak...the Army

Amidst rumors that Mubarak will finally "step down," it is important to realize that the removal of an aged dictator who has already appointed his clone to replace him is no victory. It is certainly not defeat, and the protesters did an impressive job of behaving with vastly more legality and decency than did the regime, including the army with its illegal arrests and torture of opponents and innocents alike and its repulsive non-action while Mubarak's goons attacked the people. Nevertheless, the vicious Egyptian security state remains astride the population, for the good of U.S. empire, Israeli mini-empire, and its own greed.

The significance of Mubarak's removal is the degree to which it is perceived by Egyptians--and the rest of the Muslim world--who are not yet in the streets as evidence that victory for democracy, civil rights, and a government based on law with the consent of the governed is now possible. Mubarak's removal would not be victory, but it might well provide the protesters with a winning hand.

That winning hand, in turn, could lead to the emergence of a new type of Muslim politics. Given the sophistication of the Egyptian and Tunisian transformations, a genuinely innovative combination of Arab nationalism, Islam, and Western civil rights just might be in the process of emerging and taking power in the Arab world. Precedents already exist in Indonesia, Lebanon, Turkey, and Pakistan, but moderates have almost always been on the defensive, pinned between the Scylla of imperial extremism and the Charybdis of Islamic extremism. The removal of Mubarak would be a big step in the direction of a most welcome combination of Arab moderation and justice, but that victory remains far from assured as the world awaits the decision of the Egyptian military high command.

Egyptian Revolt: A Classroom Exercise

A scenario analysis is a provocative way to guide students to think about the implications of the Egyptian revolt. The gemstones of scenario analysis are revealed by asking not the traditional “what” but “how.”

Scenario analysis can be complicated to describe, but the steps flow naturally in a group discussion, allowing the students to take the initiative and figure out for themselves how to think about the future.

The basic steps are:

1. Select the question: “Where is Egypt headed?”
2. Identify the causal factors: desire for civil rights and desire for economic security.
3. Draw a grid generating the scenarios. The graph is a useful aid to the real challenge of this step: identifying the likely differences in outcome of each scenario.
4. Identify the key dynamic powering each scenario. Much more important than asking what might happen is explaining how your predicted outcome could occur.
5. Identify at least one other scenario that would change behavior if it became dominant. Whatever you think will happen, some other invisible dynamic is surely present in the background and needs to be identified to avoid surprise.
6. Explain possible tipping points. Ask how a tipping point leading to a shift in dominance might occur.

That process is plenty for two or three one-hour class sessions separated by a day or two for related homework. For further challenge and further realism, the whole system can fruitfully be considered as a complex adaptive system. This provides insight into the underlying evolutionary processes of the whole system within which, in the current case, Egypt exists.

The Tsunami of Arab Nationalism

It still remains unclear whether or not the phrase "tsunami of Arab nationalism" is justified, but with the astonishing image of perhaps 2,000,000 Egyptians all walking calmly through Tahrir Square, "tsunami" is beginning to sound about right. One wonders if we will see soldiers fighting against police goons, one begins to start looking for the next regime to be fired, and one seems justified in asking if demands for liberty will translate into a full-blown Arab nationalist movement.

Egyptian Army: Shoot the People or Join the Revolt?

Egyptian protesters are, according to reports, focused on getting rid of Mubarak, a goal that, if achieved, would leave the population far short of having achieved any sort of revolution. More to the point is whether the army, now being deployed in view of the apparent defeat of the police by the people, will choose to disobey orders or murder the protesters.

The People Are the Enemy: Egyptian Chapter

The struggle for Arab democracy is now squarely focused on Egypt, with the intensity vastly hotter than that of the Tunisian, Lebanese, or Algerian chapters.

Washington’s Mideast Dilemma: Choices Exist

Washington faces a dilemma in the Mideast as a result of its long-time policy of supporting Arab dictators and right-wing Israeli expansion, but policy-makers do have choices, if they can imagine new ways of doing business.

Teaching Iran a Lesson

Washington believes pressure is the way to get what it wants from Iran…and the effect so far?

Washington grandly threatens to cut off gasoline supplies. Tehran has responded to this threat by carrying out an experiment to temporarily raise gasoline production, which may or may not work of course but will certainly give Iranian leaders ideas and teach them valuable technical lessons. Washington is training Iran, whose economic abilities are minimal, to get its economic house in order.

Iran also has significant diplomatic weaknesses. Curiously, Tehran has made great use of extremist rhetoric, though it is not at all clear why they should copy the practice of their main adversaries, the U.S. and Israel. Iran has also sent arms freely to its friends, again copying the behavior of its adversaries. Everyone sends arms to their friends; Western criticism of Iran for so doing is purely hypocritical. But Iran’s awkwardness in combining “playing rough” with positive inducements has for decades undermined its quest for influence. Ahmadinejad’s failure to give Erdogan something to work with in recent weeks, embarrassing an innovative and important regional figure who has been trying to make a place in the regional china shop for the Iranian bull.

Now, under Washington’s harsh tutelage, Tehran seems to be learning a more sophisticated strategy – negotiation, courtesy, and inducements.

Iran & Egypt.

On December 20, Iranian Parliamentary Speaker and key national security decision-maker Ali Larijani held a notable two-hour meeting with Egyptian dictator Mubarak in which the two discussed, among other subjects, “regional matters.” Larijani’s summary remarks suggested significant progress in formerly cold Iranian-Egyptian relations, claiming:

There may be differing views in [sic] tactics (over Israel) between Iran and Egypt but the strategies of the two countries are not different.

Whether Iranian bravado or the sign of a real breakthrough, these are the highest level bilateral public talks in a generation, and Mubarak’s lengthy participation with an Iranian whom he greatly outranks sends a signal that perhaps he too is learning a lesson or two, regardless of what he says publicly.

Coming only a month after Ahmadinejad’s friendly visit to Turkey, in the wake of a sustained effort to make friends in the Gulf, and in the broader context of Iran’s profound influence courtesy of George Bush over now-Shi’ite-run Iraq, Larijani’s cordial visit to Cairo takes on greater significance.

A test of Mubarak’s true attitude is before him at this very moment: whether or not he will allow the Viva Palestina humanitarian aid convoy into Gaza. Building a steel underground wall with the U.S. to prevent smuggling into Gaza plus cooperating with the global pro-Palestinian movement by allowing the aid convoy on the surface to combat the utterly immoral Israeli collective punishment campaign would constitute a nicely neutral Egyptian position; let’s see if Mubarak can design such a finely balanced policy!

Meanwhile, others are also learning lessons.

Iran & Turkey.

Turkey’s Foreign Minister Davutoglu made it clear that Turkey has already learned the lesson that it must take the initiative to bring the region back to some semblance of sanity back in October, saying:

If something goes wrong, as a leading country in the region, we cannot remain silent…. We will not let civilians die in the region. We will do everything we are capable of doing.

Iran & Syria.

Syria too is learning lessons.

In a blunt indictment of Israel, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad just stated at a joint press conference with Erdogan:

Israel is the main cause for the deadlock in peace. The Israelis want negotiations devoid of principles, that is to say endless talks….We now want [Turkish] mediation more than ever.

That Syria is learning the lesson that it needs Turkish support to deal with Israel because Washington’s bias prevents the last remaining superpower from mounting its natural pedestal as honest mediator is made doubly significant in the context of the lesson Turkey has learned that it, despite being a U.S. ally, also cannot rely on the U.S. when it comes to ensuring regional stability.

In case anyone might make the mistake of thinking that the improvement in Turkish-Syrian ties is only a minor bilateral process, the official declaration at the conclusion of this week’s Turkish-Syrian cooperation council meeting noted that:

Turkey and Syria agree to clear the region from [sic] nuclear weapons and call for a diplomatic solution of the problem over Iran's nuclear program.

As Iran moves to strengthen its weak ties with its neighbors, turning--albeit haltingly--the neo-con attitude that "if you are not with us, you are against us" on its face with the much more sophisticated new (for Iran) policy of "if you are not against us, you are with us), Syrian rapprochement with an increasingly moderate, center-of-the-road Turkey only puts on a firmer foundation a Syrian-Iranian relationship that might otherwise come to be seen in Damascus as a highly dangerous adventure.

Iran & Lebanon.

It is also worth noting that “Washington’s man in Lebanon” has recently been in Syria. Let’s see; if Syria backs both Hezbollah and the anti-Hezbollah forces in Lebanon, then what exactly is Washington’s role to be?

Firas Azmeh gave the following concise summary of the significance of Hariri’s pilgrimage to Damascus:

To secure Damascus’ support, Hariri will have to commit to some core values that are key to Syria: Re-affirming Lebanon’s Arab identity, securing an unambiguous position vis-à-vis the conflict with Israel, supporting the resistance (i.e. Hezbollah) and committing to a distinguished relationship with Syria. From Syria’s perspective, all other issues may be negotiated.

Teaching Washington a Lesson.

In sum, Washington is provoking an impressive degree of instability in Mideast affairs as the various countries—both U.S. allies and antagonists—learn lesson after lesson about how to manage the heavy-handed intrusion of the world’s last superpower. That instability is, however, not paving the way for a rise in U.S. influence; quite the contrary. Antagonists are learning to strengthen themselves domestically and make alliances internationally. Allies are learning that a violence-prone America is not the friend it might have seemed during the Cold War. So both allies and antagonists are learning to work together to protect themselves from an increasingly dangerous level of regional instability provoked by Washington.

Iran: Mideast Model of Reform?!?

Is Iran the model for reform in the Mideast? To anti-democratic regimes, is Iran frightening not because of its nuclear ambitions but because it offers a model of, by regional standards, a relatively moderate, modern, democratic state?

Consider: despite all the viciousness of the regime toward mostly very peaceful and very moderate protestors expressing very minimal demands, the fact remains that by the standards of Egypt or Saudi Arabia or Israel (as far as Palestinians are concerned), Iran looks very modern and democratic.

• In Iran, intense criticism of the regime and of individuals is printed in the mass media.
• In Iran, there are a parliament, elections, open organizations that while not quite modern political parties nevertheless express political positions.
• In Iran, checks and balances against dictatorship are assiduously built into the state structure.

It is wonderful to measure countries against the standard of perfect democracy and not so bad to measure the laggards against the high achievers, either. But let's be a little more fair about our day-to-day metric for judging a country that has only been allowed to figure things out for itself for a generation. Compare Iran to the U.S. if you wish, but the relevant comparison might be Iran today vs. the U.S. a generation after it was formed. Does anyone remember the Alien and Sedition Laws, slavery, or the vote for men only? Or perhaps we should compare Iran today with the U.S. today: say, treatment of protestors in Iran jails today vs. treatment of prisoners at Bagram or Guantanamo.

But much more relevant would be to compare neighbors. Compare the treatment of elite dissenters in Iran with Egypt's treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood or Saudi Arabia's treatment of the leaders of Riyadh Spring or Jordan's treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood. Compare Iran's treatment of Majlis criticism with Israel's treatment of Palestinian members of Knesset.

And while you're at it, compare the number of people in Iran willing to put their personal safety on the line by going into the streets unarmed and peaceful to protest injustice with the number of Saudis or Egyptians or Jordanians...or Israelis or Americans willing to protest the faults in those countries.

Lebanon: Mideast Tipping Point

The many countries that feel that Lebanon is their playground are behaving with particular irresponsibility at this moment of historic importance for the Lebanese. It would come as no surprise if some of these countries were actually planning to start a war, should their favored factions fail to emerge victorious in the June 7 election, but even if this is not the case, the aggressive interference in Lebanon's internal affairs by so many rich and powerful outsiders risks yet another disaster for the long-mistreated Lebanese.

This election is a historic moment for Lebanon. Given a little outside encouragement for Lebanese democracy and stability, there is good reason to hope that Lebanese political actors can emerge from this election with a consensus to put the civil war firmly into the past by creating a political system in which all Lebanese factions can meaningfully participate and which will offer benefit to all Lebanese groups. One can make the argument that Hezbollah is evolving into a reformist democratic party and the other "parties," in reality feudal factions, are doing the same. One can make a much stronger argument that such an evolution would now be likely if the international political context were to be supportive. As a recent UN report described Lebanon's domestic situation:

Over the past six months, the domestic political and security situation in Lebanon has continued to improve markedly. The commitments made at Doha have been either fully implemented or meaningfully acted upon. Political divisions between the majority March 14th and opposition March 8th have not led to paralysis, although there have been occasional tensions. The President, Michel Sleiman, has worked tirelessly to forge national unity.

Even this rosy scenario contains the seeds of its own destruction because it still leaves the 400,000 Palestinian guests marginalized, mistreated, and hopeless. That enormous cancer on Lebanese society must be cured either by a resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that would enable the Lebanese guests to return home or by their inclusion in Lebanese society.

Palestinian refugees aside, Lebanon now has a real opportunity, if it can pull national consensus on both power-sharing and resource-sharing out of a very corrupt (thanks to the foreign influence) electoral hat. Given the apparent moderation of all Lebanese parties at the moment, this rosy scenario seems conceivable.

Unfortunately, the international context is obstructing the democratic evolution that most Lebanese now seem to agree is Lebanon's only hope of avoiding a return to civil war. The behavior of outsiders is making the rosy scenario fade with each passing day. Cairo's vitriolic anti-Hezbollah campaign may be designed primarily to crush democratic sentiments at home and to warn off Iran, but it must surely be raising tensions in Lebanon as well. On top of that, we have nastily-timed anti-Hezbollah rumors in Der Spiegel (which Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak rushed to accept, without providing any evidence to support the allegations) and the rapidly emerging but still confusing Israeli spy scandal.

Then, there's the ineptness of Biden's threat to punish Lebanon if it does not vote according to Washington's preferences: diplomatic incompetence worthy of Rush Limbaugh or Dick Cheney.

So would the US cut off and turn its back on strategically important Lebanon if Hizballah wins? Its tough to say. It didn’t go so well when the US did it to Hamas, when they were democratically elected in Palestine. Doing so with Lebanon would be a major debacle, showing the world once again that the United States only supports democracy when its suits their interests.--source

In addition, Lebanon's best international friends seem to be conducting all sorts of vote-rigging, intent to the man on doing their best to crush every green shoot of democracy the instant it emerges from Lebanese political soil. And all this comes against the background of the highly provocative Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace, acts any country on earth would consider acts of war, and suspiciously-timed Israeli military maneuvers the week before the election. According to the above-cited U.N. report, "Intrusions into Lebanese airspace by Israeli aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles continued in high numbers in violation of Lebanese sovereignty and Security Council resolutions." These illegal provocations are particularly ominous in light of Israeli claims that it, in effect, has the right to control Lebanon's ability to defend itself.

Lebanese army sources said on Saturday that the country's military had been placed 'on full alert,' ahead of large- scale Israeli army

maneuvers expected to begin on Sunday.-- source

All this adds up to a post-election situation that will most likely be extremely tense and prone to misunderstanding and over-reaction. Indeed, a repeat of Israel's vicious summer 2006 invasion seems more likely than the rosy scenario of the broadening of Lebanon's fledging democracy to incorporate the poor Shi'a represented by Hezbollah and the evolution of all leading Lebanese political parties into trustworthy democratic forces. If Hezbollah emerges victorious in the face of such blatant foreign manipulation, its leaders will have difficulty restraining themselves. If Hezbollah loses, it will have difficulty controlling its anger at outside forces. Lebanon would be fully justified in shooting down Israeli jets violating its border; Israel might strike to prevent Lebanon from gaining such a capability, even if it did not want to start another war. Given the efforts of outsiders to villify whichever Lebanese factions they dislike, it would take a miracle to avoid an incident, but the reality is much worse.

The likelihood is high that Israel is planning to attack Lebanon should Hezbollah win:

• the pessimists in Israel, and they are firmly in control of power, will surely see an opposition victory not as a sign of the evolution of Lebanon toward inclusion of the Shi'a poor in the political system and a step toward the "Lebanonization" of Hezbollah but as a victory for Iran requiring an Israel military response even though Hezbollah is only running a small number of candidates and is in a coalition with Christians;
• Netanyahu needs some foreign adventure to fend off Washington and distract world attention to facilitate his continuing effort to absorb the West Bank;
• after Israel's embarrassing failure to defeat Hezbollah in 2006 and failure to destroy Hamas in December 2008, Israeli militarists must surely be looking for an opportunity to send to Tehran a clear message of Israeli power and determination;
• Netanyahu's determination to prevent U.S.-Iranian accommodation would be perfectly served by the outbreak of a convenient little war that Israel could then portray as evidence of "the Iranian threat" in order to radicalize politics in Washington and return Washington to a position of subservience to Israeli extremists.

Obama has an opportunity, should he be looking for it, to return the Mideast firmly into the era of subversion of democracy, proclivity of all sides to settle disputes through violence, and a general rise in radicalism. The situation that is developing in Lebanon would make such an outcome quite easy to achieve.

If, on the other hand, Obama happens to want a Mideast under the control of moderates, moving toward democracy, and resolving underlying conflicts, then he will need to think through much more carefully than he appears to have done so far the long-range implications of the behavior of the U.S. and its allies. Washington could treat a Hezbollah victory as the healthy incorporation of Lebanon's Shi'a into the political system and reward Hezbollah for its "democratic" behavior. Such a reaction by Washington would facilitate the victory the next week in Iran's presidential election of someone other than Ahmadinejad and, more importantly, would facilitate compromise with the U.S. by Iran's next administration. Such a reaction by Washington would also instantly lower tensions in the Levant and send a clear signal to Netanyahu that invading Lebanon will not be supported by Washington this time around.

Lebanon today is the Mideast's tipping point, and Obama has a clear choice to make: work for war or work for peace.

Israel Blinks???

Can we believe the new less belligerent tune from Israel, not coincidentally in a meeting with Mideast envoy Mitchell? Did Mitchell carry a private message more pointed than recent timid public hints that Washington really did not need yet another war against Islam at the moment?

Peres seemingly rejected the idea of a war of aggression against Iran:

Israeli President Shimon Peres said on Thursday that there was no military solution to arch-foe Iran's controversial nuclear programme.

"The solution in Iran is not a military one," Peres was quoted by his office as telling visiting US Middle East envoy George Mitchell.

Over the past several years Israeli officials have repeatedly warned that all options were possible in resolving the standoff over Iran's nuclear programme.

Israel, widely considered to be the Middle East's sole nuclear armed power, and the United States suspect the Islamic Republic of using the programme to develop atomic weapons, a charge that Tehran has repeatedly denied.

If this in fact now represents the policy of the Netanyahu government, it directly contradicts Netanyahu's own words and would appear to move Israeli policy in a dramatically less confrontational direction. We shall see if Netanyahu goes along.

If Peres' remarks are to be believed, it leaves Egypt, which has recently descended into near-hysterical public rhetorical attacks against Hezbollah that presumably were designed primarily to be heard in Tehran, looking a bit like the odd man out.

General Mideast War Increasingly Likely

EXCERPT: A scenario analysis study over the August 2007-February 2009 period indicates that the Mideast appears to be taking significant steps toward a general Mideast war, perhaps provoked by al Qua’ida but in any case, benefitting only al Qua’ida.

TEXT: Evolution of Iranian-Israeli Relations

The Mideast appears to be taking significant steps toward a general Mideast war, perhaps provoked by al Qua’ida but in any case, benefitting only al Qua’ida. Rigorous analysis of trends since 2007 suggest that the Mideast political situation is not under control and is steadily worsening. A few pieces of good news for those who hope for peace and justice, or at least a measure of stability, are on the horizon (e.g., talk of an Obama Administration move toward compromise with Iran, relative calmness in Lebanon, movement of Turkey toward a more balanced position between Israel and Palestinians, a tentative movement toward an Iraqi understanding by Washington and Tehran), but the steps that have actually occurred are overwhelmingly in the direction of intensification of regional hostilities.

Background.

The original scenario analysis of Iranian-Israeli relations done in August 2007 rested on two parameters: the degree of equality in status and the degree of equality in power. Relative status is highly bimodal and thus tricky to summarize – Western powers following the U.S. lead accord Iran virtually no status at all, indeed egregiously trying to isolate and insult its regime, while according Israel a blank check regardless of its behavior. Elsewhere in the world, Israel can frequently do no good while Iran frequently is accorded status out of proportion to its actual actions (as differentiated from its rhetoric). The distinction between Iran and Israel in terms of power, particularly military power, is much clearer. Since the relative distribution of power still overwhelmingly favors Israel, the two scenarios generated by unequal power (“unequal power + unequal status” and Nuclear Standoff [“unequal power + equal status”]) merit updating to assess whatever changes may have occurred over the year-and-a-half since the original study. The moderately negative Nuclear Standoff Scenario was updated recently. This essay updates the disaster scenario Victory to al-Qua’ida.

To make the purpose of this essay perfectly clear, the immediate task is to accept the premises of the original study and ask how the world has evolved. In brief, what evidence exists that reality is evolving toward any one of the scenarios? For this exercise, the milestones originally defined will serve as useful guides. The more fundamental questions about the propriety of the two axes (power and status) and the utility of adding one or more additional axes (at the cost of exponentially rising analytical complexity) will be held for future discussion.

The Victory to al-Qua’ida Scenario.

Iran continues striving to escape from Israeli nuclear blackmail and remains frozen out of regional affairs led by Israel while Israel remains frozen out of regional affairs led by Iran - leaving both feeling deprived, anxious, and insulted. In the zero-sum context of each side trying to marginalize the other, no leader proves sufficiently statesman-like to agree to unconditional bilateral talks. This leaves each issue separating the two sides festering, which further strengthens extremists. The division of Palestine becomes more absolute, leading to ever rising Iranian involvement that in turn pulls Saudi Arabia in on Israel’s side. A similar proxy struggle intensifies in Lebanon. The competition spreads to Jordan, collapsing under the weight of an Iraqi refugee population exceed one-quarter of Jordan’s own population, and these refugees become increasingly radical, supporting a rise in Palestinian radicalism. The Moslem Brotherhood overthrows the Jordanian monarchy, offers citizenship to the refugees, and—on the basis of ex-refugee and Palestinian support--easily wins a free, democratic election. That immediately energizes both Hezbollah in Lebanon and Moqtada al Sadr in Iraq. Hezbollah walks out of a shaky Lebanese government of national unity that had been able to accomplish little because the West had withdrawn its support after Siniora’s fall from power. Hezbollah wins power in a free election. On the nuclear front, Israel refuses even to discuss the principle of a nuclear-free Mideast, leaving Iran with no incentive to compromise on that issue and feeling confident as its influence spreads rapidly in Jordan and Lebanon. Iran intensifies a policy of nuclear catch-up that is part fear-driven and part negotiating tactic but which is seen in Tel Aviv completely as indicating offensive intent. Simultaneous, in response to Israeli provocations, both Lebanon and Jordan ask Iran for military aid. Iran responds. Netanyahu rides panic among Israelis to victory as the region remains haunted by a double threat: Israel threatens to commit the ultimate crime of nuclear war against a non-nuclear power while Iran searches for some comparable or asymmetric counterthreat. Al Qua’ida sees its chance, blows up an Israeli embassy in a way that gets the attack pinned on the new Jordanian regime, and Israel invades. Israel’s tactics of collective punishment against the whole population causes a wave of resentment sparking regional war.

Assessment.

The Victory to al-Qua’ida Scenario given above is exactly as I wrote it in August 2007, but with highlighting added. It seems frighteningly close to the actual evolution of events to date, except that it totally misses the (still potential) impact of a compromise-oriented Obama Administration that could, though it still has not chosen to, have a profound overnight impact.

• Considering just the two principals, no statesman capable of breaking the zero-sum competition between Iran and Israel has yet emerged.

• Extremists on both sides have indeed been strengthened, though offers from the Ahmadinejad administration to talk to the U.S., the obvious U.S. need for Iranian cooperation on several fronts, and Khatami’s decision to run for president offer some hope of moderation.

• The division of Palestine has indeed become even more striking, with the pro-Israeli stance of Abbas during Israel’s attack on Gaza and the continued post-conflict collective punishment of Gaza by Israel. Moreover, this has indeed enticed the Saudis—and even more blatantly the Egyptians—further into competition on, respectively, the side of the Israelis and of Hamas.

• Not only has the Muslim Brotherhood been energized in both Egypt and Jordan, but cracks have appeared in the Jordanese regime over that country’s hostility to Hamas.

• Netanyahu has indeed moved closer to power, though the actual outcome remains unclear at the time of writing, and the reason seems less panic than a combination of hopelessness and hubris.

• Another development totally missed in the original scenario was the strength of the Turkish reaction to Israel’s Gaza attack. In retrospect, one might have forecast that Turkey under the leadership of a Muslim party could only stomach an Israeli policy of brutality and collective punishment for so long. Whether or not a real reorientation of Turkish-Israeli relations will follow remains unclear, but this is a milestone that should be added to the study.

• Israel has indeed continued to refuse any discussion of the most obvious cause of Iranian-Israel hostility – the Mideast nuclear double standard. [For an example of the blindness of Israelis on the double standard, see historian Benny Morris' attempt to analyze the inevitability of Israeli aggression against Iran that completely ignores the option of offering Iran a deal.]

• Finally, Hezbollah indeed appears within reach of an electoral victory in Lebanon.

To have the system take so many clear steps in the direction of the most disastrous of the four scenarios in only a year and a half should give all observers pause. The most important message of this scenario analysis is not just the commonplace observation that the Mideast is highly unstable (although Israeli and American decision-makers seem frequently to be in denial even about that) but that the danger of major war is rising. That conclusion may be obvious to any who step back and think dispassionately; how many decision-makers take the time to do that is unclear. Moreover, this exercise spells out the multiple tendencies contributing to that rising danger: the rising power of extremists in Israel, the apparent conclusion of Israelis that the lesson of the Gaza violence is that violence and collective punishment pay, the aggravation of domestic politics in Arab countries, and the aggravation of Iranian relations with Arab countries.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Further research:

1. Update scenario description.
2. Review milestones.
3. Identify causal dynamics.
4. Consider adding a third axis.
5. Evaluate Iranian-Israeli relations as a complex adaptive system.