Western-Islamic Confrontation: The Elite vs. the People

Is the confrontation between the West and Islam a clash of civilizations or a clash between the interests of self-centered elites and the people on both sides?*

[* first published on Media With Conscience]

Why did Tel Aviv rush to snatch the first excuse to break its own agreement with Hamas? On the surface, Israel got an excellent deal – Hamas stopped fighting even though Israel did not grant Palestine autonomy or agree to recognize Hamas as the legitimate government of Gaza, much less free the Palestinians from their colonial status. Israel has not even halted its steadily expansion into Palestinian territory. Hamas relinquished the main lever it has to persuade the rest of the world to pay attention to it even as Israel further consolidated its already overwhelmingly dominant position. So why did Tel Aviv leap at the opportunity to violate its own agreement?

Explanations of chronic international political disputes can be made on multiple levels, with each having a measure of truth. The level of explanation used in the media is frequently one of the least important of the several perspectives that together reveal reality. The Palestinian-Israeli dispute exemplifies problems that need to be seen in significant part as a struggle between elites and people rather than as a struggle between two different societies and, in particular, as a struggle between a “good” side and an “evil” side. The past two weeks’ events are a case in point:

• On June 19, Hamas and Israel implemented an agreement halting Hamas rocket attacks in return for an end to Israel’s economic war against people of Gaza.
• On June 24, Israel launched a military operation on a Nablus university campus, killing two Palestinians.
• On June 25, Palestinians (Islamic Jihad, not Hamas) fired rockets from Gaza to protest the Israeli attack; Israel immediately took advantage of this to abrogate its part of the agreement, reinstituting its economic warfare against the whole population of Gaza.
  

Why? Why the rush to break an agreement with Hamas orchestrated by Israel’s ally Egypt and return to the morally repugnant collective punishment of the people of Gaza because a radical faction (Islamic Jihad) responded to an egregious case of Israeli incitement that clearly violated the spirit of the new ceasefire? Does Tel Aviv not understand that this only promotes the unity of Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the whole population of Gaza--if not all of Palestine? Why would Tel Aviv not take advantage of this opportunity to split Islamic Jihad from Hamas?

Indeed, Hamas is practically inviting such an attempt by insisting that it intends to continue observing the ceasefire in the face of Israeli abrogation of its side of the bargain even as it refuses to “police” Islamic Jihad. After all, if Hamas, which claims to be the legal government of Gaza, will not police the Gaza population, then who else can do it…but Israel?

There may well be many answers to the question of why Tel Aviv was in such a hurry to violate its brand new agreement with Hamas, including a mental block on the part of Israeli politicians who simply cannot imagine any form of useful cooperation with their “implacable” Hamas opponent. But one level on which these events must be viewed for complete understanding is that of the competing interests of the elite and the people.

The Israeli garrison state receives almost limitless military and economic aid from the U.S., enabling it to stride the world stage as a mini-superpower and maintain its governing elite in power. Without the endless flow of free offensive weapons, Israel would have to learn to compromise with its neighbors to develop a joint security strategy. Without the endless flow of economic aid, Israel would be forced to cooperate economically with its neighbors and live within its means. Without being able to wave the bloody flag of fear, the political elite that now controls Israel would, in Israel’s vibrantly open system, be faced with overwhelming challenges from outspoken Israeli intellectuals who believe Israel can be a good neighbor and oppose the steady encroachment of the garrison state on Israeli democracy. Both the garrison state and the current Israeli governing elite that manages it stand on a foundation of fear. Neither would be possible without the occasional Palestinian cross-border military strike to keep both the Israeli and American populations on edge.

A ceasefire would do even more damage to the Israeli elite than that – it would allow the world to take a breath and actually look at the situation, at which point all would see that Hamas is actually doing a relatively professional job (by regional standards) of local governance despite being the victim of full-time Israeli economic warfare and intermittent Israeli military warfare. For the world to realize this would embarrass a lot of elites – not just Israeli, but also the Egyptians, whose indifference to the plight of the people of Gaza has been so clear in recent months.

Beyond this, a ceasefire would greatly inconvenience Washington, which finds the unsinkable Israeli aircraft carrier a very nice base from which to impose its will on the Mideast. Note I am not claiming the highly counterproductive “unsinkable Israeli aircraft carrier” actually is an efficient way to dominate the Mideast; just that Washington, afraid of less “realist” approaches to power projection (e.g., setting an example, finding a win-win solution), perceives traditional military force projection over the Mideast from an Israel armed to the teeth with attack aircraft, missiles, submarines, and nuclear weapons as too great a convenience to give up.

In short, elites in every direction view a compromise solution to the Israeli-Hamas stand-off with consternation despite the urgent need for peace on the part of both the Palestinian and the Israeli people. Yes, the dispute is inconvenient and occasionally dangerous for Israelis living near the Gaza border. Yes, the dispute requires the oppression and torture by economic warfare of the whole population of Gaza. Yes, the dispute provides grist for every real radical (e.g., al Qua’ida types; the extremists in the part-radical, part-local government movement, Hezbollah; Islamic Jihad) and every opportunistic politician (e.g., Ahmadinejad) in the region. Yes, it amounts to an Israeli-run terrorist factory. And, yes, it lays the groundwork for a far more dismal long-term future for Israel, Palestine, and everyone else in the region, not to mention the rest of the world. Nevertheless, for the elites, the Israeli-Hamas standoff offers a simply irresistible array of goodies.

The phenomenon of an international political dispute becoming chronic in part because it benefits elites despite the harm that it does to populations on both sides is much more widespread than just the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In fact, it underlies the whole global clash between the West and Islam. Inflammatory headlines, irresponsible rhetoric, and mutual misunderstanding may make the intensification of the Western-Islamic confrontation appear inevitable. But these superficial characteristics conceal a more basic reason for the confrontation: the benefits that elites on both sides derive from the confrontation. In truth, the basic problem is less a matter of irreconcilable differences than a matter of how the two sides are defined.

On both sides, politicians and media frequently paint a picture of a zero-sum confrontation between Western and Islamic societies. The meaning of the confrontation and the path to resolving it would be instantaneously transformed if it were instead perceived as a confrontation between power-hungry, violence-prone elites on one side and common people on the other.

Many groups benefit from this confrontation:

• Politicians (in Western electoral systems; Christian, Jewish, and Moslem fundamentalist movements; and Moslem dictatorships) use fear and nationalism to marshal support;
• Arms manufacturers gain endless profit from endless war;
• Big Oil (both Western oil companies that buy the petroleum and corrupt elites in Moslem societies who sell the petroleum) just keeps getting richer as the price rises.

It is in the interest of all these groups—call them The Elite--to convince everyone else that a clash of civilizations is occurring in which neutrality, compromise, and consideration of potential positive-sum outcomes are immoral and treacherous. Indeed, the fact that these extremists so often fall back on the emotional charges of immorality and treachery to prevent thoughtful dialogue is a key clue to the situation: what they fear more than anything else is that people will simply start talking, analyzing the situation, and searching for mutually beneficial solutions. The extremists understand with crystal clarity that their hold on power depends on the myth that “our society” faces an existential threat from “your society.”

It is not the societies that face existential threats, however; it is the power structures. Western control over global oil and the concomitant continuation of the West’s orgy of consumption probably are essential to the maintenance of the current power structure, but this behavior is not essential to the average person. Indeed, it is extremely dangerous. The longer the world continues to consume oil as though it had no limits, the sooner the collapse will occur and the harder it will hit. What would be in the real interest of our societies would be slowing the consumption of oil as much as possible to ensure that the supply lasts until a viable alternative can be made available in combination with a mature social attitude toward conserving our rapidly deteriorating environment.

An international political system organized to maximize egalitarianism and local control—a democratic, global confederacy of units composed of people who choose to be members—would be in the interest of society. The democratic nature of the system would enable all units to participate; the confederate structure would minimize central control but overcome the tendency of our current system based on state sovereignty to spawn “rogue states.” Such a system would certainly undermine current power structures – both of the states that compose the current system and of movements such as al Qua’ida who are challenging that system: superpowers, dictatorial client states, and extremist anti-system movements would all be extraneous in an all-inclusive, participatory system based on the rule of law but designed to maximize local initiative.

What is good for The Elite is bad for society. Ahmadinejad, bin Laden, and Bush all have built careers out of the clash of civilization myth. Moslem oil exporting elites and the Western military-industrial complex both benefit from the artificially high oil prices resulting from global conflict, and they both benefit from the conflict itself – the wars inflate their importance, provide profit, marginalize opposition, and create opportunities.

The benefits that the Israeli elite derives from the dispute with Palestine is just one example. Analogous arguments can be made about benefits that Iranian and American elites derive from blowing out of proportion “clash of civilization” rhetoric.

A more efficient economy and strengthened civil liberties are clearly in the interest of the Iranian people and almost certainly recognized by most Iranians as among their top goals, but Ahmadinejad is maintaining an impressive level of political support despite failing to deliver on either score simply by waving the bloody flags of fear and nationalism. Every one of the endless threats and insults flowing out of Washington and Tel Aviv is pure gold in Ahmadinejad’s pocket, on which he skillfully obtains compound interest.

Similarly, those threats and insults panic ignorant Western voters, convincing them to grant “near dictatorial powers” to elites with a private exploitative agenda. Constraints on civil liberties that undermine democracy to solidify elite control are sold to voters as necessary for security. Environmental destruction for the short-term profit of the rich is sold as necessary for energy independence. A war of civilizations designed to empower extremists is sold as the only way to survive.

So, what is good for The Elite is frequently bad for society; fear and anger are the tools the power-hungry use to manipulate society. That is not necessarily completely true or always true, of course. But the starting place is important. Starting with the assumption that people everywhere have a common interest that differs from the interests of those in power is a fundamentally distinct perspective from starting with the assumption that a zero-sum conflict exists among societies or cultures. The assumption of common interests shared by all humanity opens doors to a host of new ways to overcome problems, such as replacing the view that “national security” in a system of sovereign states must be maximized at everyone else’s expense with the view that security is a common good.

To assert that the enemy is not someone else’s culture is not at all to belittle the real dangers that exist. All major global cultures include individuals and, today at least, movements that are absolutely dangerous to humanity. The danger comes, first, from those individuals and movements; second, from the ignorant who are tricked into supporting them or the desperate, angry, and frustrated who understandably seek any port in the storm. But the solution is not the destruction of a culture, a people, a religion, or a country.

The key to resolving the confrontation between the West and Islam lies in redefining the definition between “them” and “us.” Certainly, problems will remain. Replacing fear with trust will require a long struggle. We will still need to figure out how to share insufficient water and land resources. But when “The Elite vs The People” becomes recognized as a major element in the confrontation between the West and Islam, then the door will open to addressing the needs of the desperate, the angry, the frustrated, and the insecure of all societies as a shared problem to be resolved jointly, partly—to be sure--through compromise but also in great measure through the definition of breakthrough, win-win solutions.

Breakthrough, win-win solutions are not fairytales for the naïve. The nuturing of democracy in post-World War II West Germany and Japan was one example; the peaceful breakup of the Soviet empire was another. In both cases, the challenge was defined as a shared problem to be resolved for the benefit of both sides. When leaders govern professionally, win-win solutions are possible. In contrast, elites who encourage conflict for their own benefit enormously raise the cost of solving the world’s real problems.

Elite vs. People

Inflammatory headlines, irresponsible rhetoric, and mutual misunderstand make the intensification of the Western-Islamic confrontation appear inevitable. Headlines focus attention on the news of the day, no matter how unrepresentative it may be of underlying trends. Politicians on both sides see the confrontation as beneficial for a host of reasons from crass self-promotion to genuine conflicts of interest. Mutual misunderstandings and misperceptions give the impression of enmity when insecurity is closer to the truth; actions born of ignorance create real hostility that could easily have been avoided.

The basic problem is less a matter of irreconcilable differences than a matter of how the two sides are defined.

In the West, politicians and media typically paint a picture of a zero-sum confrontation between Western society and a religion, a race, or a group of countries. The meaning of the confrontation and the path to resolving it would be instantaneously transformed if it were instead perceived as a confrontation between power-hungry, violence-prone elites on one side and common people on the other.

Many groups benefit from this confrontation:

• Politicians (in Western electoral systems; Christian, Jewish, and Moslem fundamentalist movements; and Moslem dictatorships) use fear and nationalism to marshal support;
• Arms manufacturers gain endless profit from endless war;
• Armies in the countries fighting insurgencies gain resources and power from the very rebellions they are charged with suppressing;
• Big Oil (both Western oil companies that buy the petroleum and corrupt elites in Moslem societies who sell the petroleum) just keeps getting richer as the price rises.

It is in the interest of all these groups—call them The Elite--to convince everyone else that a clash of civilizations is occurring in which neutrality, compromise, and consideration of potential positive-sum outcomes are immoral and treacherous. Indeed, the fact that these extremists so often fall back on the emotional charges of immorality and treachery to prevent thoughtful dialogue is the key clue to the situation: what they fear more than anything else is that people will simply start talking, analyzing the situation, and searching for mutually beneficial solutions. The extremists understand with crystal clarity that their hold on power depends on the myth that “our society” faces an existential threat from “your society.”

Political elites in general are manipulators of people’s
tragedies and dreams
--Ilan Pappe

It is not the societies that face existential threats, however; it is the power structures. Western control over global oil and the concomitant continuation of the West’s orgy of consumption probably are essential to the maintenance of the current power structure, but this behavior is not essential to the average person. Indeed, it is extremely dangerous. The longer the world continues to consume oil as though it had no limits, the sooner the collapse will occur and the harder it will hit. What would be in the real interest of our societies would be slowing the consumption of oil as much as possible to ensure that the supply lasts until a viable alternative can be made available.

An international political system organized to maximize egalitarianism and local control—a democratic, global confederacy of units composed of people who choose to be members—would be in the interest of society. The democratic nature of the system would enable all units to participate; the confederate structure would minimize central control but overcome the tendency of our current system based on state sovereignty to spawn “rogue states.” Such a system would certainly undermine current power structures – both of the states that compose the current system and of movements such as al Qua’ida who are challenging that system: superpowers, dictatorial client states, and extremist anti-system movements would all be extraneous in an all-inclusive, participatory system based on the rule of law but designed to maximize local initiative.

What is good for The Elite is bad for society. Ahmadinejad, bin Laden, and Bush all have built careers out of the clash of civilization myth. Moslem oil exporting elites and the Western military-industrial complex both benefit from the artificially high oil prices resulting from global conflict, and they both benefit from the conflict itself – the wars inflate their importance, provide profit, marginalize opposition, and create opportunities.

Just for one example, a more efficient economy and strengthened civil liberties are clearly in the interest of the Iranian people and almost certainly recognized by most Iranians as among their top goals, but Ahmadinejad is maintaining an impressive level of political support despite failing to deliver on either score simply by waving the bloody flags of fear and nationalism. Every one of the endless threats and insults flowing out of Washington and Tel Aviv is pure gold in Ahmadinejad’s pocket, on which he skillfully obtains compound interest.

Similarly, those threats and insults panic ignorant Western voters, convincing them to grant “near dictatorial powers” to elites with a private exploitative agenda. Constraints on civil liberties that undermine democracy to solidify elite control are sold to voters as necessary for security. Environmental destruction for the short-term profit of the rich is sold as necessary for energy independence. A war of civilizations designed to empower extremists is sold as the only way to survive.

So, what is good for The Elite is frequently bad for society; fear and anger are the tools the power-hungry use to manipulate society. That is not necessarily completely true or always true, of course. But where one starts matters. Starting with the assumption that people everywhere have a common interest that differs from the interests of those with power is a fundamentally different perspective than starting with the assumption that a zero-sum conflict exists among societies or cultures. It opens doors to a host of new ways to overcome problems.

To assert that the enemy is not someone else’s culture is not at all to belittle the real dangers that exist. All major global cultures include individuals and, today at least, movements that are absolutely dangerous to humanity. The danger comes, first, from those individuals and movements; second, from the ignorant who are tricked into supporting them or the desperate, angry, and frustrated who understandably seek any port in the storm. But the solution is not the destruction of a culture, a religion, or a country.

This essay just touches the surface of a very complicated issue that strikes at the heart of the organization of the world into sovereign states. To get a little deeper into the issue, see this discussion of international security as a trap and this discussion of the concept of a national security commons.

The key to resolving the confrontation between the West and Islam lies in redefining the definition between “them” and “us.” When The Elite vs The People becomes recognized as the real confrontation, then the door will open to addressing the needs of the desperate, the angry, and the frustrated of all societies, at which point the power of The Elite to manipulate us will wither away.

Signs of Reason in…Tel Aviv(!)

Latest self-appointed Israeli warmonger slapped down by Israeli (!) officials...but the Western epidemic rages on.

On Friday Israeli Transportation Minister Shaul Mofaz, who is seeking to become Israel’s next prime minister), said in a newspaper interview that "if Iran continues with its program for developing nuclear weapons, we will attack it.” Swiftly denouncing Mofaz, Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilnai observed:

Turning one of the most strategic security issues into a political game, using it for the internal purposes of a would-be campaign in Kadima, is something that must not be done.

Indeed. The epidemic of inflammatory remarks by self-serving Western politicians who seek career benefits (or stock profits) from whipping up ignorant voters has been more dangerous over the past seven years than the Islamic terrorism which opened wide the doors to such behavior in the first place. Not only do such remarks made it more difficult to find rational solutions and raise the likelihood of extremist “quick fixes” that will exacerbate the very insecurity they are supposedly addressing, but the constant repetition of outrageously extremist remarks of the type made by Mofaz, as well as neo-cons and extremist Protestant “political preachers” in the U.S., creates a cancer that eats away at the moral integrity of society. Just as Hitler endlessly repeated the Big Lie to entice Germans into supporting anti-Jewish pogroms to pave his way to control of the German state, the propaganda campaign against the mythical Iranian nuclear monster paves the way toward a war society dominated by the military-industrial complex.

Political figures like Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilnai with the courage to speak out against such reckless irresponsibility are all too rare. How many denounced Hillary Clinton for her obscene “we will obliterate them” remark or the mad doctrine of preventive war and the constant Bush/Cheney threats that “all options” are on the table?

But to create a responsible, moral political culture, much more than just denunciations of warmongering are needed. If society deems it improper to make racial slurs, how much worse is the advocacy of war against a whole people, race, or religion? Irresponsible remarks that add to a war fever are not just dangerous and wrong but direct incitements to mass murder. How else can one describe a needless war? A “needless” war is a war caused by inflammatory rhetoric rather than political realities. Inflammatory rhetoric is improper because it promotes action based not on need but on the rhetoric itself, i.e., the rhetoric creates a twilight zone distortion of reality.

In the real world, Iran has an outspoken leadership but, in practice, a rather cautious foreign policy characterized by repeated offers to negotiate as an equal; has no colonies; and has no armies in other people’s lands. Iran is ruled by a politically combative group of factions...that are in agreement that Iran has as much right to nuclear technology as any other country and outraged by the discriminatory treatment to which Iran is being subjected on this issue. The latest U.S. NIE on the subject judged that whatever Iranian nuclear weapons program may have existed appears to have been on hold for several years, and is still short of actually creating even the most primitive sort of actual weapon. Israel’s nuclear weapons program, in contrast, is well developed, ready for war, and years (probably decades) ahead of anything Iran could even dream of. And Israel’s program is not on hold. Israeli politicians regularly threaten Iran, and Israel’s track record of invading its neighbors suggests that its threats should be taken seriously. Also in the real world, regional superpower Israel has not relinquished its “right” to use those weapons…even in an offensive, first-strike war, while Iran has repeatedly rejected the morality and rationality of even possessing such weapons.

In the twilight zone rhetorical world, Iran is an irrational and aggressive bully that only understands the language of force, implacably hostile and terrifyingly powerful, a country that would commit suicide by employing whatever primitive WMD capability it could acquire against one of the world’s great nuclear powers backed up by the world’s greatest nuclear power. Nuclear Israel, in contrast, is an innocent, democratic, pioneering society trying to live in peace but under threat of immediate destruction.

To justify war by the rhetorical evocation of an imaginary world is morally outrageous and should be recognized as a crime. Inflammatory rhetoric about war by public figures is the moral equivalent of pouring gasoline on a fire consuming a whole nation and should be punished accordingly.

Politicians who advocate war should be put on “administrative leave” pending public trial for “endangering the good of mankind.” Given that they chose to pose as leaders, the burden of proof of innocence should be on them, and the bar set high. People who want to be leaders should be expected to set standards of behavior superior to the average person. The shocking reality is that today the situation is often the reverse: politicians behave with a level of irresponsibility that would not be tolerated in the general population. The man in the street is not allowed falsely to scream “fire” in a crowded theater; he is not allowed to advocate discrimination against minorities. So how can we justify allowing politicians to lie in order to build support for a war?

If the theater is indeed burning, screaming “fire” is still a questionable tactic, but at least it gets people’s attention. In contrast, if the danger is merely that the theater does not have sufficient fire extinguishers to put out some possible future fire, then screaming “fire” and provoking people to trample each other is, to put it politely, "inappropriate"…and murder charges may result. Aggressive rhetoric about war is all the more inappropriate. If a war cannot be justified by careful analysis, then it cannot be justified.

Establishing a legal process for judging the permissibility of words uttered by political figures would underscore the seriousness of the crime and encourage people to think about the implications. Questions that society now evades would be center stage. For example:

• Should the advocacy of a war of choice be considered a crime?
• Should the advocacy of the use of nuclear weapons be considered a crime?
• Should the advocacy of the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state be considered a crime?
• Should the advocacy of the use of force to prevent a state from building (not using) weapons be a crime?
• Should warning that war will be “inevitable” unless some action is taken by the opponent be a crime?
• Should threatening that “all options are on the table” be a crime?
• Should the above be considered crimes at the same level or should the seriousness of the violations be scaled?
• Should hostile rhetoric by a regime with the power to carry out its threats be considered more criminal than the same rhetoric by a regime that is obviously helpless to do anything more than talk?

And the penalty? Merely getting society to the point of considering what penalties should be imposed for inciting war would be a huge step forward; more important than the actual penalty because the fundamental purpose is to raise the moral bar, to set a standard of responsible behavior. But for egregious cases, I would suggest: suspending the speaker from all public office for some period of time without pay and condemning the speaker to working on his or her hands and knees removing land mines and gathering up unexploded cluster bombs, followed by hospital service in a war zone.

Trapping the Next U.S. President in Permanent Confrontation With Islam

If the terms of the new U.S.-Iraqi security arrangement now reportedly under negotiation are being correctly reported, the implication is clear: a country that hosts another country's military with the guest army having the right to conduct military operations without the host country's permission and whose laws take precedence over the host country's laws is a colony. No more, no less.

Will the world be a better place with overt, permanent colonization of Iraq by the U.S.?

The answer to this question may be debatable. The urgent need for an open discussion of such a fateful return to 19th century politics is not.

Consider, for a start, the likely attitude of Iran. Iran has tolerated U.S. intrusion into its neighborhood these last five years with a mixture of cooperation, patience, and restrained resistance for several reasons, including:

• its happiness at seeing its main enemy, Saddam, finally eliminated;
• its recognition that patience was paying off since the Iraqi disaster was strengthening its own position;
• its understanding that the U.S. presence was temporary.

If Iraq is turned into a permanent U.S. colony, exactly why should Iran continue to play ball, supporting the regime in Baghdad and intervening diplomatically to persuade various Iraqi parties to avoid violence?

Second, consider the propaganda victory this gives al Qua'ida, which will be able persuasively to present itself as the defender of Arab liberty in the face of a new crusade. Beware the confusion of religious extremism and nationalism in the Mideast. If American heavihandedness were to enable al Qua'ida to stand before all Sunnis as the accepted symbol of Arab nationalism, American national security would be truly at risk and the new U.S. administration might well face a term in office even worse than that of Bush.

Third, what would this mean for Iraq? How is a government to stabilize Iraq without legitimacy, and how can it gain legitimacy if it is so visibly a colonial client regime?

Colonial status for Iraq would open the door to war with Iran, reinvigoration of al Qua'ida's position throughout the Mideast, and endless civil war in Iraq: in short, a very neat gift from Bush to his replacement.

War Party Marginalized?

An Arab Voice

Sometimes a member of a group that has been victimized (in this case, a “Middle Easterner, an Arab woman”) can just cut through all the academic intellectualizing of us arm-chair political scientists and see things with embarrassing clarity.

Israel is a racist, chauvinist state based on so-called Judaism. It tortures, imprisons, steals lands, ethnically cleanses, erases history, destroy homes, displaces, exiles...

Iran is a racist, chauvinist state based on so-called Shi'ism. It tortures, imprisons, steals lands, ethnically cleanses, erases history, destroys homes, displaces and exiles...

Citizens of the smug and comfortable United States of America, do not for an instant think she is letting you off the hook just because you were not specifically cited.

Attacking Iran to Sabotage Obama?

Angry Arab noted on May 19, “Nobody knows American politics more than Hariri rags. This Hariri rag, for example, reports that if Obama wins the presidency, Bush will attack Iran in the two months separating the election from inauguration.”

Don’t laugh; just because that thought is idiotic and criminal does not mean that it is not frighteningly believable. Would Obama have the courage to stand against the thoughtless tide of American anger against the Iranian victim that would inevitably result or would he allow himself to be locked into four more years of self-defeating American aggression?

Concerning poor Lebanon with its elites so fond of inviting external patrons to involve themselves in its internal disputes, how long would Hariri last under such circumstances? And if he did manage to survive Hezbollah anger, would he really want to see another 20-year-long Israeli occupation of his country?

P.S. Does anyone who reads Arabic see anything in the “Hariri rag” article worth translating?

External Patrons & the Collapse of Moslem Polities

Shifting the burden of political compromise to one of cracking down on superficial symptoms such as political instability or the rise of opposition militias is needlessly intensifying local political instability and sacrificing independence to external patrons.

In comparison to most other societies, Islamic societies seem to be experiencing an unusually large amount of political discord. That is pretty obvious. Differentiating between myriad local causes and a few overarching systemic causes originating at the level of the global political system is not so easy, since the two classes of causes interact in any number of ways. But making that distinction is critical to figuring out the solutions. To the degree that the problem is one of distinct local issues of governance the solutions will be very different from those for a situation characterized by a Western-Islamic confrontation.

One of the many patterns that seems to be cropping up with disturbing frequency across the Islamic world is a process of burden shifting that is needlessly intensifying local political instability and, as an unintended consequence, enhancing the power of external patrons over local clients. When external patrons gain influence over local actors, a society’s political process is warped to serve the interests of the patrons rather than the society. The numerous clients in the Mideast who knowingly sell their freedom to external patrons in return for help in fighting their domestic battles are playing with fire.

Burden-shifting is a very common but subtle dynamic in human affairs. We are usually rather good at perceiving symptoms and, perhaps unfortunately, quick to identify solutions that have at least some success in addressing those symptoms. This is arguably unfortunate because those “symptomatic solutions” tend to be short-term “solutions” that provide false assurance and thus blind us to the more fundamental solutions that the situation actually requires. Tricked into thinking we have solved the problem once the particular symptom we have noticed takes a temporary turn for the better, we walk away from the underlying problem, which proceeds to worsen.

But that is just the beginning of the problem. Often, the short-term palliative we have come up with creates a new problem that intensifies underlying problem, perhaps by aggravating the symptom we were complaining about in the first place or perhaps by inhibiting implemention of the fundamental solution (that we haven’t even figured out yet). The “Shifting the Burden” diagram illustrates this whole process. Note that the actual problem is not even in the diagram! Think of the REAL PROBLEM as something hovering in the background, messing up your life but as yet unrecognized by you.

Any number of different specific examples of burden shifting may exist, the research challenge being to identify which ones are operative in any specific situation. One example that appears particularly common today in the Islamic world is “Shifting the Burden of Political Compromise,” illustrated in the graphic. The implied problem in the background is poor functioning of the political system. This problem generates a variety of symptoms, such as political instability and the rise of militias.

A common symptomatic solution to address these symptoms is for the regime to adopt a hardline stance toward domestic political opponents, entailing:

• neglect of social services to those represented by the opposition (e.g., to Palestinians both in conquered territory and even in Jerusalem by Israel, to tribal regions in Pakistan, to the rural Shi’a in Lebanon, to the residents of Sadr City in Iraq, to the rural poor in Colombia, Bolivia [under the previous regime], and Venezuela [under the previous regime]);
• the closing of opposition media;
• efforts to minimize opposition participation in the political process (e.g., refusal by the Siniora-Hariri regime in Lebanon to allow Hezbollah additional ministers);
• the organization of pro-regime militias (e.g., the AUC in Colombia, Hariri’s funding of a Sunni militia in Lebanon over the last two years);
• military strikes against opposition militias (e.g., al Maliki’s attack on the Mahdi Army in Basra and Sadr City).
  

This hardline stance may initially reduce instability and the activity of militias but over time is likely to increase those symptoms because it will in practice tend to minimize efforts to resolve the real underlying problem, which is the absence of power-sharing. One could imagine a sophisticated two-track effort by a regime to, say, attack opposition militias but invite the opposition to participate in the political process. Indeed, both Qatar vis-à-vis Lebanon and Iran vis-à-vis Iraq seem to be advocating such a process at the moment. However, most politicians seem to find it too difficult to juggle a combined hardline/softline policy. Even if a politician happened to have the creativity and open-mindedness to advocate such a sophisticated policy, the hardline aspects will provoke radicalization of the opposition (e.g., Hizballah’s tough reaction to Siniora’s recent attempt to destroy its communications network) and politicians frequently fall into the simplistic trap of labeling the opposition as “evil,” making compromise much more difficult. In brief,

H1 = the more the regime adopts a hardline stance, the more political instability and related symptoms will be provoked.

In addition,

H2 = the more the regime adopts a hardline stance, the less power-sharing will occur, and the less power-sharing occurs, the more
instability will be generated.

That describes the dynamics of the blue arrows.

The red arrows represent an additional set of dynamics. A hardline stance is difficult (e.g., military confrontation is expensive and provokes domestic opposition so it gets increasingly expensive over time). Therefore,

H3 = the more a regime implements a hardline policy toward the domestic opposition, the more tempted it will be to request the support of an external patron.

But that support will come at a cost (patrons want payback), and the cost is likely to be that the patron is getting involved because it has broader reasons of its own to desire the suppression (or at least marginalization) of the opposition, so the cost is insistence of the patron on an even more extreme hardline stance. Thus,

H4 = the more a regime asks for external support for a hardline
policy, the more hardline that policy will become, and the less opportunity there will be for power-sharing.

Of course, like H1- H3, that is just an hypothesis. Such need not be the case: it depends on the attitudes of the various external patrons. The lesson for client regimes: choose your patron wisely.

In today’s Islamic world, the following process is all too common: governance is poor, but the burden of political compromise is deemed too great by the regimes, which therefore adopt a hardline stance in order to alleviate the symptoms. This hardline stance threatens to provoke a domestic reaction that will get the regime overthrown, so it calls in external support, which gets the regime involved in a much bigger game, one that it cannot control, and the influence of the patrons rises. But two can play that game, and the opposition also calls on external patrons. As the process continues cycling, both sides become radicalized. Political disputes turn military; policy differences are distorted into sectarian differences; and each side increasingly thinks and speaks of the opponent as “evil,” thus defining any solution aside from a “final” one as immoral. In practice, a “fundamental solution” has now been defined as impossible, so the society disintegrates.

The subtle process of burden shifting is bad enough by itself. When it aggravates the process of selling out one’s independence to an external patron, it should come as no surprise that the result may well be aggravation of sectarian strife that may lead to years of turmoil, the undermining of economic progress, and the destruction of society. The most critical lesson here is that the many societies we see engulfed in sectarian strife today got there less because of “traditional hatreds” than as a result of external interference that intentionally enflamed local divisions in order to facilitate the manipulation of local actors.

External Encouragement of Lebanese Conflict: Evidence?

Lebanese political instability can be viewed on many levels. The knee-jerk reaction in some circles is to explain everything as an Iranian plot. The opinions typically range far ahead of the evidence, so…what evidence is there?

Here’s one piece, for what it may be worth (I have no way of judging):



well trained militias have run over the airport and allowed an Iranian jet with 400 people aboard to land. Who were these passengers is still a mystery but some unconfirmed rumors claim that these 400 were elite members of the Iranian Party of God who might have been the ones to have spearheaded the Beirut and the Chouf offensives.


And here’s a bit of evidence on the other side:

For months the Egyptian daily Al-Akhbar has been publishing reports about Sunni groups receiving military training in Tripoli and in Palestinian camps. In one story published on 10 January, Al-Akhbar reported that the U.S., Egypt and Saudi Arabia had agreed on a strategy of fostering increased cooperation between Tayyar Al-Mustaqbal and Fatah in an attempt to offset the influence of Hizbullah and Hamas. Although most of the reports are unsourced, the parties mentioned have not issued denials. The newspaper has also reported that Ahmed Al-Khatib, a former leader of the Arab Army, a Lebanese Sunni militia with Nasserist leanings, and Tayyar Al-Mustaqbal, were coordinating their activities. Al-Khatib is said to have set up recruiting and training centers in the Beqaa Valley. During Lebanon's civil war, Al-Khatib fought alongside the Palestinians.

A balanced review of the evidence of external intervention in Lebanon’s domestic political battles would be a valuable contribution…and a nice shift from the typical polemical treatment of this issue. Now, shall we return to that discussion about chickens coming home to roost?

Radicalism & Representation

Robert Fisk, perhaps the most eminent reporter of the Lebanese scene, says “As a Tehran versus Washington conflict, Iran has won, at least for now.” Well, yes, although it is quite possible that it was Washington’s idea to provoke this week’s showdown, after a year of building up a mercenary Sunni militia that was supposed to enable Hariri (fils) to confront Hezbollah, Tehran does seem to have come out ahead.

However, the Lebanese political struggle is not primarily a Tehran-Washington conflict. It is primarily a conflict over political power between a sectarian group (i.e., a group that is definable by religious or racial features) that can also be distinguished on economic basis (the Shi’a tend to be the poor of Lebanon) which is underrepresented in national government and two other sectarian groups (Sunnis and most of the Christians) who are relatively richer and have long had the power without bothering to extend governance (e.g., civil services) to those on the outside.

The distinction between viewing the Lebanese instability as a Tehran-Washington conflict and viewing it as a political struggle for representation is critical because the solutions are fundamentally different, depending on which is correct. The debate is complicated and the answer unclear (and, by the way, I am certainly not implying that Mr. Fisk actually believes this to be primarily a Tehran-Washington conflict; after all, he did say “As a…”). It all goes back to the origins of Hezbollah. Hezbollah arose as a national liberation movement against Israeli aggression with the aid of Iran…but which part of that sentence is the more important – “against Israeli aggression” or “with the aid of Iran?” More to the point, which is more important today? Is Hezbollah today primarily an agent of Iran or primarily the party representing one-third and rising portion of the Lebanese population that is Shi’ite and poor?

Perhaps the only way to know for sure would be for Hezbollah to take control of the government and demonstrate its loyalties by its behavior as leader rather than as opposition. What we do know is that nature abhors a vacuum, and Hezbollah has over the past generation moved into the power vacuum of the Lebanese Shi’ite poor. Hariri (pere) with all his Western support and Saudi money rebuilt downtown Beirut; he did not build or provide effective governance (hospitals, schools, homes, jobs, or security from Israel) for the poor rural Shi’a.

For Washington to blame Iran is an exercise in futility. Were Iran to vanish, Hezbollah would still be the most powerful military force and the best organized political party in Lebanon. It would still constitute the source of public services for the rural Shi’ite poor. It would still be the only organization in Lebanon willing to defend the country against Israel. It would still be the leader of Shi’ite aspirations for political equality. One can of course argue about how high on the list of priorities of Hezbollah’s leaders the lifestyle of their followers is; but as long as no other organization provides them with effective civil services, that is beside the point.

It is fashionable in rightwing Western circles to go far beyond Fisk’s position and flatly blame Iran for Lebanon’s problems. Blaming Iran for Hezbollah does many things. Blaming Iran for Hezbollah exacerbates tensions, enhances Ahmadinejad’s career prospects, provides an excuse for not facing up to the need to help Lebanon create a decent system of government for all its people, puts the regime under the thumb of the West, scares Saudi Arabia into toeing the line, and avoids the embarrassing truth that Hezbollah exists because of Israeli aggression. But what blaming Iran does not do is lead to a solution to the problem of Lebanese political instability.

The pattern is clear in rural, Shi’ite Lebanon; in Sadr City; in Gaza; in Somalia; in southern Afghanistan; in the tribal regions of Pakistan –

• First, if there is a power vacuum, some group will move in to fill that vacuum.
• Second, if that group and the people that group speaks for are ostracized, they will be radicalized.

Wringing hands and deploring the rise of “Islamic extremists” is ignorance, hypocrisy, or both. Extremism is opportunistic. Opening the doors of government to such a group may not guarantee that everyone will instantly turn moderate, but slamming the door in its face will almost certainly guarantee the opposite.

Lebanon - Comments by Participants (2)

Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt:

The US has failed in Lebanon and they have to admit it. We have to wait and see the new rules which Hezbollah, Syria and Iran will set. They can do what they want.

Causes of Muslim Extremism

The following editorial in Pakistan’s Daily Times on May 6 is too subtle to reproduce in part. The argument is neither particularly easy nor beyond question. One might well raise an eyebrow at the degree of faith expressed in Saudi Arabia’s purported new view of extremism as “the new religion masquerading as Islam.” On that point, I’d like to see the evidence.

Nevertheless, this editorial deserves to be read carefully and completely by everyone concerned about where the Western confrontation with Islam is headed. It is important that a newspaper in a Moslem country lay out the argument that, aside from whatever mistakes or bad intent Washington may have been guilty of, Moslems also share a significant amount of the blame for Islamic extremism. Why? Because “the collapse of Arab nationalism tilted the Arab world into a new-found faith in Islam” promoted by a conservative Saudi state that opposed such nationalism. Strong words from a country as dependent on Saudi money as Pakistan.

The editorial also makes a second important point: “It is tragic that every time we help the US to win, the Muslims are the biggest sufferers.” Indeed. It would be a real sign of progress in a global political scene that is rapidly deteriorating if the new administration that will come into power in Washington next January were to focus on trying to overcome that tragic pattern of events. The editorial proposes that “Now that Saudi Arabia and Iran are embarked upon a new and less adversarial relationship, they should agree that when Sunnis and Shias kill themselves they will not tell their funded madrassa leaders to simultaneously blame the West for the carnage.” Washington should not only encourage such a move toward moderation by the two Moslem state leaders of extremism but should also advocate and support a broader effort to put the focus on improving Arab educational systems, to minimize not only Shi’ite-Sunni antagonisms but also Moslem-Western antagonisms. Of course, educational changes will be of little value unless the reality that “every time we [Muslims] help the US to win, the Muslims are the biggest sufferers.”

What this editorial omits is the way Washington promotes Islamic extremism for its own short-term benefit, provoking Islamic religious extremists against Moslem nationalists, which in turn radicalizes the nationalists, and provoking intra-Islamic sectarian strife by encouraging conservative regimes to adopt hardline stances against domestic opponents. Americans could do with a little improvement to their education, as well.

Editorial: Muslim extremism and wars

The ambassador of Saudi Arabia in Pakistan, HE Mr Ali S Awadh Asseri, in an interview given to Daily Times, has made some thought-provoking remarks on the state of the Muslim mind that need to be dwelt upon. Correctly, he said that there was a need to revisit “the logic behind the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq” and engage the fighting sides there in dialogue. He spoke of Muslim extremism in the same context: “Those few who are engaged in their nefarious effort to promote the cult of extremism and violence are heretics and deviants. They must be controlled through a combined effort of all peace-loving nations of the world”.Of course, the world knows about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But those who think clearly separate the two wars on the basis of the sanction behind the two invasions and it is the extremist who equates the two to whip up immoderate emotion that has never benefited the Muslims. The war in Iraq has been analysed and the neocon administration of President George W Bush has been found guilty of having made a trespass into the region on false pretences. But if we are to get at the root of the current Muslim mind we must also look into the war of Saddam Hussein against Iran. And blaming the United States will not do this time.The collapse of Arab nationalism tilted the Arab world into a new-found faith in Islam. This movement was greatly encouraged in all kinds of ways by Saudi Arabia which emerged as the ideological antithesis of Nasserism. But what was seen as the victory of Islam against secular nationalism was also objectively the victory of the United States in the Middle East against its Cold War rival, the Soviet Union. It is tragic that every time we help the US to win, the Muslims are the biggest sufferers. And Saudi Arabia helped America win its war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan too, and we are still living with the devastating after-effects of this victory. In fact, the victory of Islam against Arab nationalism came with a “faith package” that was funded by Saudi Arabia under the tutelage of its great mufti of immoderate views, Mr Bin Baz.The rise of Islamism was accompanied by a recrudescence of its historical rift when in 1979 the Islamic Revolution broke out in Iran and immediately threatened the Arabs living across the Gulf. The Iranian revolution was understandably anti-American, but it also saw the conservative Arab states as America’s proxies. A new conflict began at this point which cannot be laid at the doorstep of the wicked West which is allegedly determined to destroy the Islamic world. In fact if we look at the transformation of Pakistan from a liberal Islamic state into a fanatically extremist one, with laws framed to reflect this tightening of the faith, we will clearly see the effect of a pan-Islamic change in the direction of intolerance. The Islamists, while fulminating against the West, have more effectively and violently eliminated the traditional pockets of moderation among fellow-Muslims.Pakistan has seen the rise of extremism in the words of the religious leaders who have engaged in sectarian polemic while blaming the West for the “conspiracy” of pitting Muslim against Muslim. A “relocated” war between the Sunni Arabs and Iran was fought in Pakistan for over 20 years and it is still going on in the Kurram Agency and its adjoining areas. The Arab Islamists that fled their own country to fight jihad in Afghanistan — with Saudi money no less than American money — spread around their new intolerant faith that first materialised into governance in Afghanistan under the Taliban and is now spreading in Pakistan too under the name of Talibanisation. No one except the Muslims is to blame for this. If the image of Islam is negative in the world — and that includes friendly states like China — it is not the Western media covering the Sunni-Shia war of Iraq which is to blame, but the Muslims themselves.How can we say goodbye to this extremism and Muslim-kill-Muslim violence? Now that Saudi Arabia and Iran are embarked upon a new and less adversarial relationship, they should agree that when Sunnis and Shias kill themselves they will not tell their funded madrassa leaders to simultaneously blame the West for the carnage. The biggest plus in the Islamic world today is that Saudi Arabia has begun to see extremism in the new religion masquerading as Islam which is, in the words of Ambassador Asseri, a faith of peace, not of violence and aggression. It is our great good fortune that Saudi Arabia is today asking the Muslims the right questions and has the capacity, by reason of its spiritual leadership and economic clout, to change their way of thinking.

Lebanon - Comments by Participants (1)

Ambassador Yussuf Ahmed, Syria’s representative to the Arab League, to Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Faisal at the Arab League meeting on Lebanon:

"Now you want to send forces to Lebanon? Why didn't you think of sending these forces to confront the Israeli invasion when Lebanon was incessantly being bombed?"

Attack Iran...Then What?

What plans do the glib and arrogant war party politicians in Washington and Tel Aviv have for dealing with the consequences of the war of aggression against Iran that they keep threatening?

In a recent post, I argued that even if total victory over Iran were guaranteed in advance, to launch a “preventive” war, i.e., a war of choice, a war of aggression, against Iran would be a questionable deal for the U.S., certainly entailing some serious costs that the politicians with their smug grins are not anticipating.

So, what about the reality in which nothing is guaranteed? In a word,

Short of total victory, would a U.S. attack on Iran be worthwhile?

Incomplete victory could occur in any number of ways – military victory but political defeat (a soberingly familiar outcome), inconclusive military advantage (also familiar), or a victory so expensive as to feel like defeat. The U.S. has been fighting continuously in Iraq for 17 years, off and on in Somalia for 15 years, and in Afghanistan for 7 years (not counting the war against the Soviet Union). Israel fought in Lebanon for 18 years (1982-2000) and re-invaded in 2006. In Iraq, a vicious secular dictator has been replaced by utter social chaos plus a terror campaign that did not exist there until we invaded. In Somalia, utter social chaos existed when we intervened on a humanitarian mission and remains now that Washington is supporting the overthrow of a government whose independence was viewed with disfavor. In Afghanistan, a vicious regime that befriended bin Laden has been replaced by a civil war. In Lebanon, civil war was supplemented by a national war of liberation, provoking the rise of Hezballah, now the most modern political party in Lebanon and a model for all Moslems trying to organize national anti-Western movements. This record suggests the possibility that an attack on Iran might also have unpleasant long-term consequences that should be considered before it is too late.


Military Victory but Political Defeat:
Unprovoked military attack would be likely to unite and outrage the Iranian population, just as 9/11 united and outraged Americans. As with 9/11, if the Iranian government continued to exist, conservatives would be likely to reap the benefit of the subsequent “rallying around the flag.” Just as after 9/11, foreign policy militancy would most likely overwhelm calls for moderation. The reservoir of goodwill toward the U.S. visible in modern Iranian society would vanish; any calls for compromise would be attacked as “treachery.” An attack on Iran would leave Iran weakened militarily but more unified and committed both to acquiring weapons sufficient to protect it and to getting revenge. Even a solid U.S. military victory would thus leave the world a more dangerous place.

Inconclusive Military Advantage:
Making war on an industry is a strange concept. Iran denies planning to acquire nuclear weapons but brags about its nuclear industry, which has been widely reported to be vast in scope and widely disseminated throughout the country. Moreover, military power today comes in many guises. Aside from the obvious question of the likelihood of total success in destroying Iran’s nuclear industry, the ability of even the U.S. to destroy all forms of Iranian military power is an open question. What about guerrilla warfare in Iraq? What plans may Iran have put in place regionally or globally to respond even after destruction of the homeland? Might nuclear-armed Pakistan or China--concerned about Iranian oil--or Russia--concerned about limitless growth in American power—provide just enough support to enable Iran to keep resisting? How long would Americans tolerate endless, one-sided, unprovoked slaughter by their own government? Might this war, in ways different from but reminiscent of the years of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, just drag on?

Victory So Expensive As to Feel Like Defeat:
“No,” the militarists will surely answer, “this will be a truly overwhelming “shock and awe” campaign that will transform one of the world’s great cultures into a desert. Iran will have no surprises for us. Iran will not manage to fire any of the Russian anti-ship missiles it has reputedly purchased at all the U.S. ships now arguably trapped in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s oil wells will sit quietly waiting for pro-American groups to start operating. Saudi oil facilities will come through unharmed; the Saudi Shi’a will remain loyal to Saudi Arabia. American troops and their families in Iraq at the end of that long supply line will continue to receive food and water. Iranian naval mines will prove to be paper tigers. There will be no ships sunk in the Straits of Hormuz, no oil stoppage, no global depression. In contrast to the war in Iraq, Al Qua’ida will find no opportunity to exploit this American adventure. This war may have fallout, but it will have no fog: all will go according to plan. It will not be like Somalia or Lebanon or Iraq or Afghanistan. The war will play so well on TV that far from turning against Washington, the American people will voluntarily, even eagerly trade in democracy for imperialism. Scientific militarism will control every detail.” That would sound good on the campaign trail, if one of the slick war party candidates were honest enough to go into such detail, but where’s the evidence?

Or will the Iranians’ brand new Russian anti-ship missiles sink a couple aircraft carriers, a Shi’ite revolt force a Vietnam-style flight from Iraq, and attacks on Israel by Lebanese Hezbollah provoke Tel Aviv into another disastrous 1982-style ground war trap? Will the American people kick out the war party and take a turn back toward isolationism? After all, why not, given that the world’s lone superpower now arguably faces both the absence of a credible threat for the first time since the beginning of WWII and a recession caused by mismanagement at home.

The U.S. attacked tiny Afghanistan, a semi-feudal society with no power projection capability, in 2001 and remains bogged down, having facilitated an explosive growth in Afghan heroin exports and provoked destabilization of the bordering region of Pakistan.

The U.S. attacked Iraq, a country whose military and economic capabilities had been severely degraded by a dozen years of U.S. military attack and economic embargo. We remain bogged down there, as well, having destroyed the country’s ability to govern itself, facilitated the rise of Iran as a regional power, and given al Qua’ida a new lease on life.

The U.S. fought two wars against such pathetically weak opponents that Washington decision makers did not consider post-war planning to be necessary. Years later, still with no light at the end of either tunnel, the war party is contemplating a third war, against a vastly larger and more unified opponent that has had years of warning time to conceive of all manner of high tech and asymmetric countermeasures. It would seem that even the most eager imperialist would have to admit that a bit of post-war planning might be in order. (Only a fundamentalist hoping for a final explosion that would end the world and bring to earth a savior to carry the souls of the chosen few to heaven could “rationally” argue against post-war planning.) Post-war planning does not begin with “assuming everything goes according to plan...” Post-war planning begins with evaluating the range of possible outcomes and preparing to deal with each of them.

1. What is the plan to deal with military victory but political defeat?
2. What is the plan to deal with inconclusive military advantage?
3. What is the plan to deal with victory so expensive as to feel like defeat?
4. And finally, what is the plan to deal even with the long-term implications of total victory?

Attacking Iran: Would Victory Be Worth It?

I recently posed several questions that I think need to be answered by any who advocate a nuclear attack against Iran. War is like blowing up a dam; the water goes where it will. The one aspect to be said for a war of choice is that timing is up to the aggressor, so there is no excuse whatsoever for not thinking things through before it is too late.

If you are considering voting for a politician in the war camp, you may wish to take a look at what happened the first time the U.S. used nuclear weapons.

Even if no one plans actually to start a war, making threats can be dangerous. Threats repeated often and loudly enough can take on a life of their own creating an infernal reality beyond our control (because we get ourselves too angry to think clearly, because we persuade the opponent that he must strike first for self-preservation, or because a third party takes advantage of the tension to provoke a fight neither of the combatants really wants). So even without actually starting a war, just advocating it can risk the nation's future.

Beyond those two general dangers posed by an aggressive foreign policy stance come the many specific concerns related to the idea of a U.S. war of choice against Iran. The first question I posed was:

Why should we endanger our national security by provoking a war when there is no current threat to us?

War entails several areas of uncertainty: victory is uncertain; the impact of victory on one’s own society is uncertain; even if victorious, the thoroughness of the opponent’s defeat is uncertain; the implications of partial or total defeat of the opponent are uncertain. Indeed, those implications are so uncertain that it is not even clear that one should want complete victory: who cleans up the mess?

All this is by way of an introduction to what is truly as difficult to analyze as any question facing human society, so the point here is not to resolve the issue but just to push folks to replace the pathetically emotional and irresponsibly dangerous rhetoric with a little actual thinking.

In this post, then, let’s limit the discussion to the best possible outcome: total victory. The likelihood of such a scenario and possible alternative outcomes can be considered later. So the question here amounts to the following:

if total victory could be guaranteed in advance, would that be a good deal?

Even total victory entails costs. Having won a total victory, you are the only one left to clean up the mess. In the modern world, simply sneering and going home is not an option. Nuclear fallout, depression resulting from oil price rise, global terrorist campaign by those sympathetic to the loser, destablizing refugee flows, and epidemics are among the key dangers on the list of messes the victor will have to deal with. Then, there's the unwanted influences on the victor itself.

Effects on the aggressor of aggression that works:

• denial of one’s own immorality weakens ability to see and avoid future acts of immorality, pushing one further down that pathseeing the first act of aggression persuades others to defend themselves, acts that will be misinterpreted as new threats;
• these new threats could, just like the perceived “threat” of a weak but independent Iran, be dealt with in any number of ways, but force will be all the more tempting, having once been used;
• war becomes a habit;
• populace salutes the flag and supports whatever charlatan happens to be in office, believing whatever lies are told, and ends up with a government prone to exploit fearmongering in order to maintain its hold on power;
• those who see the truth tend to be steamrolled; moreover, those whose power in office is based on lies tend, logically, to feel insecure and therefore constantly to be looking under the bed for more enemies – the two conditions together rapidly undermine civil rights.
  

Victory in a war of choice can be a very dangerous thing. The way of life the aggressor claims to be defending by starting a war may be destroyed even by victory. In a future post, some of the implications of an outcome that falls short of the mythical "total" victory will be explored.

Neo-Con Mission in Iraq Accomplished? You Bet!

To understand whether or not the Neo-Con mission in Iraq was accomplished, it is necessary to understand what their self-appointed mission was and what they accomplished.

1) Iraq has been destroyed as an independent country capable of challenging Israeli or U.S. regional dominance.

2) Iraq has been destroyed as an independent country capable of controlling its own oil export business.

3) Washington has established a series of some 14 huge, city-like military bases in Iraq that can serve as launch platforms for whatever regional military adventure it may desire.

Mission accomplished? You bet it was!

If you thought the Iraq war was about destroying a WMD industrial capacity that the U.S. had been attacking and degrading ever since the 1991 Iraq War, wake up. If you thought the Iraq War was about democracy, take a look at the vicious slaughter Washington is now conducting in Sadr City. And, by the way, democracy does not come at the point of 14 huge, offensive military bases, nor does it require a 100-acre fortress-embassy.

The Neo-Con offensive in the Mideast has always had two themes: imperialist power politics and extremist religious fundamentalism. These two themes are fundamentally contradictory since the former is about establishing a position of power, the latter about destroying mankind in an orgy of slaughter to hasten the arrival of the savior (if you are confused about the distinction between fundamentalist Protestant rapture and fundamentalist twelver Shi’ite return of the Mahdi, you should be). Nevertheless, a political link of the crassest expediency (i.e., two groups with fundamentally divergent goals making a short-term agreement) was formed.

The imperialist goals were essentially to:

• place the Mideast in the hands of militant, right-wing Israeli politicians who, over the last three decades (see Trita Parsi’s Treacherous Alliance) developed Israel’s security-through-offense foreign policy;
• to cement U.S. dominance by c