Breaking the Iranian-American Nuclear Ice

The question is simple: how can the nuclear ice preventing progress in U.S.-Iranian relations be thawed?

Accepting and taking advantage of the current Iranian tactic of proposing six-party talks with the West including general global disarmament while reserving specific discussions of Iran's nuclear program to IAEA auspices might be a useful approach.

The Iranian approach is superficially logical. The IAEA is the place for nuclear discussions, after all. How can Washington oppose that? The IAEA is a key institution supporting the American-dominated global world order.

The oddity of Iran's tactic is that one cannot in practice intelligently discuss global disarmament without including Iran's aggressive program of nuclear research. To implement such a two-track process would provide limitless opportunities for the six-party discussions and the IAEA discussions to overlap, one venue competing with the other. Perhaps this would be all to the good, providing Washington and Iranian moderates with the ability to pick what they like from each track.

The double-track approach would also provide two alternative ways of eliciting Israel cooperation. If Israel wants to be accepted as a legitimate member of the international community, it can hardly refuse to participate in a discussion about global disarmament. Perhaps Iran can be persuaded that sincere participation can enable it to achieve serious national security goals.

The threats and bluster of the last decade have only made the situation worse. Why not try a little creative diplomacy?

Washington Needs a Realistic Position for Iran Talks

On the issue of Iranian nuclear arms, the U.S. imperils its own national security by continuing to function in a dreamworld, denying the unfairness of its position, which is based on Likudnik propaganda rather than reality. Only after opening its eyes will Washington be able to devise a negotiating position that will attract the serious attention of Tehran.

George Perkovich, director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carneige Endowment for International Peace, has given an interview on the U.S.-Iranian nuclear dispute that deserves attention as it represents an effort to present to an American audience a relatively thoughtful analysis of a subject that is usually, for Americans, filtered through a highly biased Likudnik perspective. Unfortunately, even this interview remains fundamentally colored by cultural biases. Nuclear war is a fairly serious topic; our national security requires that it be discussed dispassionately and fairly. On this topic, the U.S. cannot afford to operate in a fairytale world. It needs to face squarely its own biases and the weaknesses that undermine its negotiating position. Needless to say, on the issue of Iranian nukes, it remains far removed from reality, mired in a degree of confusion that imperils global political stability and U.S. national security. Perkovich’s interview illustrates some of the problems.

Perkovich begins with a flat statement that fault in the dispute lies with Tehran:

The question isn't our willingness to negotiate or to try to find some resolution with this government in Iran. The real question is whether this government in Iran is at all willing to make compromises on its current posture and take the steps that are required by the Security Council.

Actually, it’s not quite that simple. First, he ignores the 50-year-long record of U.S. efforts to curtail Iranian independence, which cannot but make Iranians highly sensitive to national security concerns. Aside from that history, making demands backed up by none-too-subtle threats of potential aggression against Iran do not constitute “negotiation;” calling current U.S. policy an effort to achieve “negotiated surrender” would be more accurate. It is the U.S. (and its trouble-making ally, Israel) who are making the demands.

Iran is just doing what any number of other countries have done: trying to master nuclear technology that Pakistan and Israel already have in spades, force the world to pay attention to it by a policy of nuclear ambiguity taken straight from the Israeli playbook, and enhance its security via some version of mutually assured destruction. Tehran may want more; it may plan more. Nevertheless, seeking technological parity, asserting nuclear ambiguity, and enhancing its security is what Iran is currently doing: a very weak copy of what India, Israel, and Pakistan have done. The U.S. does not have much legal or moral basis for opposing such behavior by Iran while condoning and even actively assisting worse behavior by India, Israel, and Pakistan.

That is certainly not to say that the U.S. does not have perfectly good security reasons for wanting to see Iran modify its nuclear policy. If the U.S. can make a sincere case to the world that it apologies for having introduced and first used nuclear weapons and that it now understands the importance of eliminating nuclear arms, that would be a contribution to global security. If the U.S. could lead an effective campaign for a non-nuclear Mideast, it would constitute a huge step forward for human civilization and fully justify a Nobel Peace Prize. Given the dependence of the Israeli military machine on American largesse, Washington is in an excellent position to take a solid first step toward a nuclear-free Mideast whenever it so chooses.

Focusing on Iran, however, is something else again. If the U.S. wants non-nuclear Iran to make the extraordinary concession of giving up the pursuit of what its neighbors are already allowed or even encouraged to have, then it is up to the U.S. to make Iran a suitably extraordinary offer. If the U.S. has made an offer comparable to the desired Iranian concession, I’d appreciate having someone identify exactly what that American offer is. Offering to treat Iran with the normal respect due all societies, to stop threats, or to “allow” Iran to have access to the same technology as every other country (including ones that possess nuclear arms) are all nice door-openers but don’t make the cut as a serious negotiating position. If Iran is going to be expected to give up a valuable bargaining card (not to mention a measure of national security), it follows logically that it should be offered something of unusual substance in return. So, the “real question” is whether or not the U.S. itself is “at all willing to make compromises on its current posture.” The question of whether or not Iran will bargain is a secondary one.

What might constitute a reasonable offer? Washington should put the nuclear status of Israel on the table.

Acknowledging that Iran and Israel should be on a level nuclear playing field would first of all be a moral issue designed to open the door to serious Iranian participation in negotiations. It would effectively state that Iran is now accepted as a legitimate society entitled to respect, consideration, and national security. The details of negotiating a practical process of achieving such a level playing field would surely take decades, but it would finally provide Iran with both excuse and serious rationale for negotiating on its core national security issue.

Perkovich is absolutely correct that the critical question is whether or not Iran is willing to compromise, but to answer that question, Washington will need to make Iran a real offer.

Iran Is Trying to Talk

According to Iran in the World:

The ISIS writes that while the number of active centrifuges has decreased from 4,920 in June to 4,592, the increased number of total centrifuges (now 8,308) is significant as filling them with uranium is a “relatively minor step”.

This relatively minor technical distinction seems to me to constitute an extremely important negotiating tactic: namely, “Look, we can do what you don’t want, but we are offering to desist. We are developing the capacity for a nuclear breakout; Israel did it; we have every reason to match them. However, we are willing to relinquish our right: make it worth our while."

Iran has absolutely no reason to trust the West. Iranian leaders would be remiss to give something away for nothing. But this either is an offer to compromise or could be transformed into one by skillful Western diplomacy.

Washington needs to seize the moment, treat it as an offer, and make an attractive counteroffer. If I were an Iranian national security official, what I would want as a counter would be the international imposition of some constraint on the Israeli nuclear juggernaut.

Forcing the Mideast to Renounce Nuclear Arms

Despite the obvious bias of John Bolton's tunnel-vision view of Mideast affairs, his writings should not be dismissed out of hand. There is no obvious substantive reason why his rather superficial piece in the Wall Street Journal should have been published, but if you read between the lines, you can infer the glimmerings of a genuinely useful idea.

Bolton referred to "hard decisions on whether to accept a nuclear Iran or support using force to prevent it."

On its face, that may not be very useful, but think about the logic of the fundamental underlying question.

Should the U.S. employ force to create a nuclear-free Mideast?

If the U.S. created a level playing field by enforcing a Mideast nuclear-free zone, no country would have a legitimate reason for acquiring nuclear arms. The Mideast would be free of that particular source of tension.

All regional countries would be justified in asking why the U.S. had the right to tell them what to do, but in return the U.S. could reasonably argue that it was protecting them from a very expensive fool's errand. Nuclear weapons in South Asia, for example, have enormously undermined the security of the people of that region, where nuclear wars have almost begun several times.

Is the U.S. a "mature and responsible" country that, after managing the Cold War for all those horrifying decades, has demonstrated a sufficient maturity so that it "deserves" to hold the fate of other countries in its hands? In the Cuban missile crisis, the U.S. did manage to avoid a war; its record in the last 10 years is of course a bit less stellar. Nevertheless, perhaps there is a case to be made that the Mideast would be better off with the U.S. imposing a nuclear-free zone than allowing continuation of the insane situation that exists today.

If the U.S. were to make such a choice, it would do well to make it quickly, however. Having to force one Mideast country to relinquish nuclear arms would be a lot better than having to force two of them. And today, there is only one. Bolton is looking at the wrong country.

Call Tehran's Bluff

Iran, it seems, will replace insult with diplomatic finesse in an attempt to deflect Western pressure that is building to a dangerous climax. Much like the American shift from Bush/Cheney to Obama, Iran will now apparently promote a combination of a more reasonable face on the same old policies plus a willingness to negotiate the full range of international relations. Neo-con savagery will be replaced by diplomatic skill; the assumption that the opponent only understands the language of force will be replaced with the assumption that one might possibly be able to reason with the opponent.

This approach would make sense, and not just because the danger of Israeli aggression against Iran is very real. This approach also makes sense because in fact Iranian relations with the West go far beyond the nuclear obsession.

The potential exists for Iran to be drawn tightly into the international system.

1. The need for Iranian gas is urgent, not just for Pakistan and India but for Western Europe, now dangerously subject to Russian blackmail each winter.
2. The war between the West and independent Islam (i.e., that portion of the Muslim political world that demands the right to follow its own independent course) seems impossible to resolve either on its Iraqi or Central Asia fronts without the cooperation of Iran.
3. Persuading Israel to adopt the path of justice and moderation depends in great measure on persuading Iran to accept Israel’s existence. An extremist, racist, expansionist Israel both provokes and is provoked by an extremist, crusading Iran.

So Washington should embrace Iran’s new tactics and try to weave the strongest network of ties that it can. The more Iran becomes integrated with the rest of the world, the more benefits it derives, the more respect it receives, the less interest it will have in angering the West by building a few nuclear bombs that will almost inevitably be pitiful and backward in comparison with Israel’s stockpile. The larger Iran’s gas profits, the stronger will become the gas bureaucracy, which will argue against risking it all in a vain race to compete with Israel.

Gas exports will not trump national security, but the existence of such benefits of international cooperation will pave the way for Iran to buy into whatever new and more balanced regional security regime that Washington may be prudent enough to persuade Israel to accept.

All the major players are composed of multiple factions. Short of genocide, the extremist factions are not likely to be eliminated, but the factional balance—in the U.S., Iran, and Israel—is delicate. Skillful international diplomacy slowly constructing a mutually beneficial network of ties can marginalize the neo-con war parties so eager to profit from destruction.

If Iran announces willingness to negotiate, call its bluff. Respond to its complaints. When it offers a tidbit (e.g., a single visit to Arak or Natanz), express thanks, offer an equivalent response on some issue of concern to Iran, and push for a further step. Consider the potential bureaucracies (e.g., gas exporters) to which cooperation might give rise. Try to build momentum. Hostility has gained a lot of momentum over the last generation of Western insults, threats, and aggression. Reversing course won’t happen overnight; it will take commitment to build a cooperative relationship with Iran, to persuade Israel to become a good neighbor to those in its crowded neighborhood, and to create a regional security regime acceptable to rational moderates in both Iran and Israel. Iran took the first small step by allowing inspection of Arak. Iran took the second small step by allowing expanded inspections of Natanz. Iran took the third small step by slowing the rate of low-level uranium refinement. Iran took the fourth small step by announcing that it will present a plan for talks with the West. The White House is losing the initiative by remaining silent.

Confusion Paves the Road to War

As one disastrous war founded on falsehoods winds down, it is even more important now than a decade ago to ensure that another war—this time between Israel and Iran and a war in which Israel would most likely use nuclear weapons to commit aggression for the first time in human history—does not break out…again on the basis of falsehoods. Unfortunately, people are remembering unproven allegations and forgetting the details of the historical record.

Unless you truly have a private agenda entailing the provocation of nuclear war between Iran and Israel, you will presumably agree that the world needs to know the truth about what both countries are doing in the nuclear field, specifically including the possibility that Iran is pursuing militarization of nuclear technology and the possibility that Israel intentionally misleads the world about its opponents’ activities as a cover for aggression simply designed to maintain Israel’s military and technological supremacy in the Mideast.

Many examples of forgetfulness and confusion about critical details in the rhetorical war between Iran and Israel could be noted, and it is in fact critically important that they all be compiled and evaluated. A case in point for the former possibility is the inaccuracy of Iranian estimates of Natanz’ rate of production of uranium being enriched to low (i.e., electrical-production) levels. A case in point for the former possibility is the failure of Israel or the U.S. to provide the IAEA with evidence about the alleged Syrian reactor before it was bombed.

Israel’s disputes with its neighbors have been transformed over the past 60 years from local issues, albeit with profound moral implications, to global security issues. The well-being of all of mankind, in an era when Israel’s disputes could easily provoke war of unpredictable scope and nuclear fallout of global scope, depends on knowing the truth.

Israeli/U.S. Failure to Provide Evidence Concerning Alleged Syrian Reactor.

In December 2008, IAEA Spokesperson Melissa Flemming wrote in the Wall Street Journal:

The way the international nonproliferation system is meant to work is as follows: If states, many of which have surveillance capabilities, have any suspicions of clandestine nuclear activity, they should report them to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Armed with this information, the IAEA investigates its veracity. In the case of Syria, instead of providing the IAEA with images of a building alleged to be a reactor, Israel unilaterally bombed the installation. Meanwhile, information was withheld from the IAEA for more than six months, by which time Syria had cleaned away the rubble and built a new facility. This made the agency's verification work difficult and complex.

The results, so far, are inconclusive and the verification process continues. To aid his inspectors, IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei is calling on Syria to provide maximum transparency. He is also calling on other states, including Israel, that have inexplicably withheld critical information on the site, particularly the images from the immediate aftermath, to provide that information to the IAEA.

Israeli Atomic Energy Commission spokesperson Nili Lifshitz responded a few days later with a letter noteworthy not only for its accusatory tone of attack on the IAEA but for its complete avoidance of the issues at hand. Lifshitz made no effort to justify (or deny) Israel’s alleged decision to attack Syria without first calling on the IAEA for an inspection or to justify Israel’s failure to provide photographic evidence of Syria’s alleged transgression.

Iranian Estimates of Natanz LEU Production.

In February 2009, IAEA spokesperson Melissa Flemming stated:

The (IAEA) has no reason at all to believe that the estimates of LEU produced in the (Natanz) facility were an intentional error by Iran. They are inherent in the early commissioning phases of such a facility when it is not known in advance how it will perform in practice.

These details constitute essential lights being shed on the truth of issues at the core of global security. This week the world is trying to sort out the truth of two other issues: the significance of Iran’s sudden permission for the IAEA to inspect the Arak reactor that could one day be producing plutonium and the significance of Iran’s failure to resolve questions that the U.S. and Israel claim to be outstanding on the basis of some alleged intelligence that A.) is several years old and B.) has not been fully shared with the IAEA. The pattern of such details provides the road to both the truth and to global security. The details must not be forgotten.

Trapping American in a Muslim Quagmire

What follows are just some thoughts, designed to provoke more thoughts, about the state of what one might call the Western crusade against Islam. Is it? And who is winning? And, should the West think about other methods, or even other goals?

Despite the change in administrations, Washington continues to fight a war against, if not Islam, then at least the specter of anti-American Islamists, and perhaps against Muslim reformers. Lots of questions follow. For one, is American behavior (aiding Muslim dictatorships, allowing Israel to oppress Palestinians and dominate the region militarily, and using the military as the key weapon against a networked opponent) making the situation worse?

According to Harvard terrorism specialist Jessica Stern:

Bin Laden has described his goal as bringing America into conflict with Muslims along "a large-scale front" which it cannot contain and al Qaeda strategists report that they want to expand what they call the "jihadist current," eroding American power and prestige and separating the United States from its allies.

If that’s the enemy’s goal, it is doing quite well. The U.S. still has a monstrous 300,000-man force in Iraq (half mercenaries more-or-less outside the law, half uniformed soldiers under the legal authority of Congress) and another 120,000 (more than half mercenaries) in Afghanistan (according to the Pentagon).

Afghanistan is clearly the hotspot of the moment, so how are we doing over there, nine years into the war? According to CSIS analyst Anthony Cordesman, who may or may not draw reliable policy conclusions but is the man to go to for the basic analysis of current military realities:

Over the last seven years we have had almost no coherence in our strategy, in our civil-military planning. It took us more than half a decade to begin to seriously resource the war. Most of the aid money has gone outside the country and wasted, or been corrupt. We found ourselves only seriously beginning to create Afghan forces, in terms of actual flows of money, in 2006. Our troop levels have never approached the troop levels we’ve had inside Iraq....We have not provided any transparent or honest reporting on the growth of threat. The closest we have are metrics which came out in a Department of Defense report issued in July, that does not show the expansion of the threat area anywhere in the document. And up till January we were still reporting as if there are only 13 out of 364 districts threatened by the enemy. That was flatly dishonest. It did not reflect any of the maps which showed the penetration of threat influence.

Admiral Mullen recently had some further choice words.

Iraq remains a mess of feuding tough guys. Somalia is a disaster. Palestinians remain in their concentration camp; Washington did not even have the grace to thank Hamas for rooting out an al Qua’ida cell! And Pakistan? Why do I get the impression that the disarray in the Taliban is being taken by Islamabad as an opportunity to sit back and relax?

Then there’s that new front in Yemen…(well, I seem to recall something going on there with Nasser, so not really new). Anyway, the point is that Side A feels mistreated by Side B and, guess what? Washington thinks force is the answer! It’s not being applied by the U.S. or even Ethiopia (as in Somalia) but, this time, by the feared forces of Saudi Arabia.

Meanwhile, Iran has made three moves that could be taken as conciliatory gestures on the nuclear front in the last week (not counting the effort by one official to invite talks that his masters promptly squelched), and the IAEA has just issued a report that seems at first glance quite positive. Is anyone going to take advantage of this opportunity to try to break some ice? Well, no, Netanyahu is on a diplomatic crusade in Europe to freeze the Western stance into a solid glacial front, and the great leaders of the Western world are tripping over themselves to line up behind him, with Obama positively on his knees.

Hastening to open his mouth without doing his homework,

“Based on what we have seen in press reports … it seems clear that Iran continues to not cooperate fully and continues its enrichment activities,” US State Department spokesperson Ian Kelly said, according to Reuters.

Perhaps the State Department spokesperson should read press reports from sources not approved by Israel or even read the IAEA report itself before making public comments. But I do understand. I have read the IAEA report and must confess that, yes, the evidence does confuse the issue. So perhaps the department spokesperson was wise to reach his conclusions without bothering to take the evidence into account.

Be that as it may, based on the evidence considered here (and I did not even mention the brutal tactics of U.S. soldiers that result in a steady stream of innocent deaths or the radicalization of Sunni Lebanon or the convenient pretense that Russian injustice toward Moslems of the Caucasus does not exist, just to cite three further examples), it does appear that bin Laden is moving smartly toward his goal of “bringing America into conflict with Muslims along ‘a large-scale front’ which it cannot contain.”

Listen to Your Enemy

Whoever your enemy, opponent, antagonist, partner may be at the moment, never ignore them. Listen to every word. Americans are so impatient to twist everything Ahmadinejad says that they hardly listen to his actual words. Americans are so quick to trust their presumed “friends” that they don’t listen to them either – taking their “good faith” for granted.

Netanyahu has absolutely no intention of accepting Palestinian liberty. Here are the recent words of Netanyahu to an Israeli audience:

Therefore, our demand for effective demilitarization is a fundamental demand for establishing a real and stable peace with the Palestinians. I use the term effective demilitarization because we desire practical and effective arrangements. We all have experience with ineffective demilitarization. Effective demilitarization means that there will not be a foreign army west of the Jordan. A police force, a counter-terrorism mechanism by all means, but there is no reason for such a force to have tanks, artillery or other types of weapons. The second thing is that we will have control of our airspace. This is vital for ensuring our security.

Read those words, President Obama, and know thine enemy. What separates the vision of a two-state solution from Netanyahu’s idea of a solution is not a gap, it is a Political Grand Canyon. Netanyahu makes crystal clear what he wants: an Israeli state plus a Palestinian Bantustan, disarmed and helpless – “effective demilitarization.” Palestine, facing the most over-militarized (nuclear submarines, nuclear cruise missiles, nuclear bombs, one of the world’s great air forces) and aggressive state on the earth today has no reason to possess “tanks, artillery or other types of weapons”!!! The Palestine Netanyahu envisions will not even be able to defend itself against the kind of settler terrorism that the colonized Palestinians are facing today.

Then there’s that cute little aside about control of airspace. Forgive my cynicism, but today Israel controls the airspace of Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria. After “peace” comes to the Levant, exactly what “airspace” does Netanyahu plan to control?

It is time to face the fact that Netanyahu is personally the enemy…the enemy of American policy, the enemy of a durable Levantine peace (as opposed to a temporary extension of Israeli domination), the enemy of real security for Israel. It is time for Obama to take off the kid gloves, discard the trivial discussions about settlement freezes, and make clear that the U.S. is no longer willing to continue propping up the Netanyahu regime with military and economic support.

The truth is that Hamas is much closer to the political center (which must be defined as the willingness to live and let live) than Netanyahu is. Hamas has been signaling a willingness to accept Israel’s existence for a long time now; the problem is that Americans aren’t listening. And Hamas is not even demanding the demilitarization of Israel. Perhaps it should…and then suggest that the topic might be open to bilateral negotiations.

Obama should point out that Israel is a free country…and so is America. America is free not to support regimes that are hostile to its policies and America is free to speak with anyone it wants to speak to. Obama should unwrap himself from Netanyahu’s little finger and tell Mitchell to take a small delegation (plus a large force of Marines with anti-aircraft missiles) to Gaza to “gather ideas from civil society.”

Iran Factions Agree: Sky Is Falling

Pasdaran political division chief Javani said on August 24:

This is the most critical test of our era. The consequence of being negligent is not that we will fall behind for a year or two, but that the whole government may collapse.

Dissident Grand Ayatollah Montazeri reportedly (I did not see anything on the English version) wrote on his website on August 25:

The biggest oppression is the despotic treatment of the people in the name of Islam. I hope the responsible authorities give up the deviant path they are pursuing and restore the trampled rights of the people. I hope authorities have the courage to announce that this ruling system is neither a Republic nor Islamic, and that nobody has the right to suppress opinion or criticism.

Mr. Can’t Pin Me Down, in his moderate way, came close to the same conclusion, warning about “a very complex conspiracy” allegedly being fomented by Ahmadinejad’s best buddy, recently appointed Presidential Office Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashaii, to “create conflict among the pillars of the establishment,” as Tehran Times put it.

My best guess is that all the accusations of plots are true and that in fact the reality is yet more convoluted.

An Umbrella for Peaceful Nuclear Installations

Iran’s proposal to ban attacks on peaceful nuclear installations, whatever its merits in avoiding fallout or minimizing global tensions, is certainly a fascinating chess move. It makes perfect sense; only a warmonger wanting to keep his options open could reject it. Given what nuclear installations contain, how could anyone want to blow one up, releasing those contents into the air? (Well, some folks do.)

Note, however, that Israel’s Dimona, which most certainly is not for peaceful purposes, would not be covered.

Perhaps all this is just a smooth Iranian attempt to confuse global debate over the West’s latest sanctions threat. Whatever the purpose, Iran’s proposal raises numerous serious questions:

1. If only peaceful nuclear installations are to be protected by this ban, how are they to be defined as “peaceful?” The obvious answer is via IAEA inspections! So, to get your local reactor protected, you have to accept IAEA inspections.
2. Can we get the concept of legal vs illegal nuclear installations accepted as part of international law? At this point, Arak and Dimona, not to mention certain Indian and Pakistani sites, would clearly be “illegal.” Here’s a chance to develop a process for declaring them legal…and a reason why countries would want their sites declared legal.
3. Is there a useful distinction to be made between legal and illegal military nuclear installations?
4. The only country that actual has attacked nuclear facilities is Israel. If Israel were forced to comply, what would the effect be? Should we assume this would amount to licensing every state to develop nuclear technology with impunity or would the distinction between legal peaceful installations and illegal ones (i.e., subject to attack) be workable in practice? Might the clear legal option of, for example, getting Arak certified as immune to attack suffice to persuade Iran to permit unconstrained inspections? Might the knowledge that Iran could go that route persuade Israel to shift from “security through force” to “security through compromise?”
5. Pushing Question 3 a bit further, is there a useful distinction to be made among three categories: for peaceful purposes (i.e., protected from attack), questionable (e.g., Arak), and for military purposes (e.g., Dimona; i.e., open to attack)? This would encourage those with questionable installations to get them verified. It would also answer those who claim that nuclear arms is the path to security: maybe not, if military installations only are open to attack.

Washington should say, “Absolutely. We would love to cooperate with Iran to institute this policy. We propose the following strict inspection process for licensing a nuclear site as “peaceful.” Whether you are a member of the NPT or not, you may name a site, request protection for it, and submit to the inspections (which will be intense, permanent, without notice). If Iran chose not to offer Arak, that would tell the world something. Such an international control regime would also send a message to New Delhi and Islamabad and Pyongyang.

For the West automatically to oppose a good idea just because it came from Iran and might have been suggested for nefarious purposes will simply confirm the impression many already have that “Washington only understands the language of force.” That is the ultimate rationale for weak countries to develop a military nuclear capability; it is exactly the opposite of what Washington wants.

It would behoove the West to behave more professionally, stop the endless threats, and try to figure out a rational global non-proliferation policy.