Rafah: Opening the Gate to Mideast Change

Cairo has just taken the initiative, upping the ante for all those trying to woo her: Rafah will be opened. Now for the devil in the details: let the bidding begin.

Wooing Cairo

Everyone now wants to be friends with Egypt; to put it differently, everyone now wants to push Egypt to remake itself in a way convenient to them: Riyadh and Tel Aviv missing the nice, safe old dictatorship; Tehran searching for entrée into the Mideast community without having to bow down to Washington; Ankara looking to buttress its position as leader of the moderate middle. Meanwhile, Cairo’s face is properly veiled, as she considers her options.*

The Suitors.   Riyadh crassly flashed its wealth, first allegedly threatening economic punishment of Egypt were Egypt to pursue Mubarak and then offering a big ring (economic aid) at a price (“security”) that could be read as an insulting attempt to interfere in Egypt’s delicate domestic affairs, where the issue is not security but liberty. Riyadh also allowed Mubarak to make a speech on Saudi TV that widely irritated Egyptian reformers; Cairo’s investigation of a Saudi billionaire’s land deals in Egypt suggested a lack of proper deference to the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.

Tel Aviv’s influence over Cairo remains palpable, but a cautious Cairo has slightly softened its own blockade of Gaza (which still buttresses that of Israel), and a Cairo-sponsored Hamas-Fatah deal that leaves Tel Aviv out of the loop is breaking news. With the collapse of the Hamas-Israel ceasefire, it seems unlikely that Cairo can continue to keep the Gaza issue on the back burner. A newly free Egyptian populace demonstrated against Israel’s attack on Gaza on April 8 and again on April 12, and the newly independent Egyptian daily Al Ahram reported the events. Indeed, an Egyptian diplomat has reportedly stated that changes in Egyptian rules governing the Rafah border crossing, now that long-time critic of Mubarak’s Gaza policy--Nabil El-Arabi--is the new Egyptian foreign minister, are imminent. Tel Aviv needs a zero-based foreign policy rethink.

The tone of ties with Tehran has already improved, with the passage of Iranian warships through the Suez Canal in February and Foreign Minister El-Arabi’s recent public advocacy of the reestablishment of official relations. But Ankara has already traveled this path with Tehran, obtaining few Iranian concessions in return. Tehran needs to decide if it wants inclusion in a new Mideast that may be less dependent on Washington but still hardly “on Tehran’s side” or whether it prefers the status of remaining outsider and troublemaker.

Ankara faces both an opportunity and a trap. As Davutoglu’s discussions with the new Egyptian civilian leadership on April 10 illustrate, Turkey and Egypt can cooperate to resolve a host of regional problems, with Gaza perhaps the key test, assuming they can avoid falling into the trap of competing for leadership of a moderate bloc at the expense of substantive accomplishments.

Cairo’s Calculus. Egypt now has the opportunity to step into the limelight, with all those suitors precisely when Washington, having overplayed its regional hand, is nursing its wounds, struggling with the effects of mismanaged imperialist adventures and a mismanaged domestic economy. Whatever Egypt may lack in terms of money, oil, or military power, Egypt now has pride, stands center-stage with de facto leadership of the emerging bloc of post-dictator states, and has more flexibility than any other regional state: Cairo’s moment has arrived.

The mere hesitation of Cairo to commit herself creates a new regional fluidity: where diplomacy in the old Mideast tended to be zero-sum, it can now be positive-sum. Done carefully, Cairo can have her cake (independence) and eat it too (cooperation with Iran and Turkey, continued U.S. aid, peace with Israel, pride, status, and regional influence). Extremists, from Zionist expansionists to Salafi jihadists, won’t find such an outcome to be “positive-sum,” but all regional societies eventually will.

Ankara needs help making the case for a policy of good neighborliness to replace the old confrontationalism. Tehran needs the security guarantee of friendly ties with a major Sunni state to break the Arab-Israeli-U.S. front that has been opposing it. Saudi Arabia may find that it too has needs – the support of an independent regional power, rather than just a handful of sheikdom clients. Washington needs the cooperation of a Sunni power that is moderate, democratic, popular, and successful: what better antidote to jihadi terror could one imagine?

Storm Clouds.

So the storybook romance, in this case, is that the beautiful girl should marry no one, date everyone! But storm clouds darken the horizon:

Gaza. Israel has been playing Nazi Germany to Gaza’s Warsaw Ghetto. That approach is not working. Gaza, both literally as an incubator of extremism and figuratively as a global symbol of oppression, is a terrorism factory. If a new Egypt actually does emerge (not yet certain), Gaza will be an intolerable contradiction with an obvious “solution:” opening the Rafah border crossing. Can Cairo manage the instability that might result?

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Positive-Sum Vision on Palestine

"With this united Palestinian [government] Israel can negotiate for real, can carry through the implementation of UN Resolution 181 of 1947 which called for an Israeli and a Palestinian state"

[Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabeel Arabi, Israeli National News.]

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Zero-Sum Israeli Policy

"My sense is that if Israel continues to ignore international calls for achieving peace on a just basis, and allowing the Palestinians to establish their state, there will be more and more bitter and negative feelings towards Israel, and the difference now, after January 25 [when the uprising began], is that no government in Egypt will be able to ignore those feelings'' [Hossam Zaki, senior advisor to Egyptian foreign minister]

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The Egyptian Economy. If Egypt’s revolution produces a democracy without economic progress, the democracy will quickly give way to chaos, zenophobia, fundamentalism, chauvinism or some other process of desperation. Total GNP and corporate profits are not the issue; payoff for the population is.

Egypt’s Governance. Notwithstanding all the bravery by Egyptian democracy protesters over the last five months, the prospects of Egypt achieving responsible governance remain dim. With military aid pouring in from Washington and economic aid pouring in from Riyadh, the temptation on the part of the “temporary” military dictatorship to hold onto political power will be hard to resist.

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Start With the Military Council

"You want a revolution in Egypt? You can't have one with Tantawi as the leader.  An Egyptian revolution would require the removal of the Egyptian military council which serves by order of the US/Israel.  You want to remove all appointees of Mubarak?  Don't start with the Ministry of Agriculture.  You will get there later. Start with the Military Council."  [As'ad AbuKhalil, Angry Arab News Service.]

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The Army is Fooling the People

Tahrir Square protests are starting up again, amid rising condemnation of Egypt's self-appointed military dictatorship. According to a protester, "The army is fooling the people." [Heba Fahmy, Daily News Egypt.]

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Iran’s Neo-Cons. What highly factionalized Tehran really wants remains unclear. Although working with Ankara and Cairo might be a deal attractive to Tehran national security types, it would also come at a domestic political cost to the anti-Saddam war generation of “Iranian neo-cons,” a political clique exploiting Palestine’s plight to pad their own resumes. An Ankara-Tehran-Cairo partnership could trim Israel’s sails, but such a partnership would require Tehran to make hard choices.

Bahrain. Repression of dissent in Bahrain will empower hard-line Iranians, making more likely sectarian violence and an Iranian-Saudi military clash. Riyadh’s Bahraini chickens will come home to roost, undermining efforts to promote regional compromise.

Revenge of the Fanatics. Fanatics, extremists, those who believe that only those who obey are “friends,” will seek to punish Cairo for moderation; Egypt will need to get its own house in order quickly in order to keep its balance.

Yemen. Yemen is a disaster unfolding before our eyes and a potential trap that could once again entangle a reactionary Riyadh with a progressive Cairo. Alternatively, a post-Saleh Yemen could conceivably join Egypt and Tunisia in a new progressive bloc that, given well managed coordination with Turkey, could revolutionize Mideast politics.

Cairo’s Tipping Point.

Washington can play a critical supporting role by guiding rather than opposing change. It should stake out a position in support of Bahraini democracy that will offer Bahraini dissenters an alternative to putting themselves in the hands of Iran. Washington needs to demonstrate that ties with the U.S. can translate into a better life for a mistreated population and, specifically, for a Shi’i majority. Equally urgent is a solution for Gaza that would remove Israel from the equation, accept Hamas as the political party currently in charge, and provide Hamas with the means to govern well in return for mutual security along the Gaza-Israel border. Washington’s standards for interacting with Damascus and Sana’a also need to be brought into sync.

Whether Washington helps or hinders, Cairo now finds herself at a tipping point. She can try to hand victory back to the counter-revolution, thereby encouraging empire-builders and advocates of the Zionist garrison state while empowering both Iranian rejectionists and militant Sunnis to whom many embittered moderates will feel forced to turn. The rising frustration of Tahrir Square activists at the self-appointed Cairo military government’s agonizing crawl toward democracy, Cairo’s endless toying with a pro-Palestinian policy regarding its joint border with Gaza, and Cairo’s acceptance of a massive economic aid package with God knows what secret strings attached from arch-conservative Riyadh all illustrate the obstacles facing Egyptians who advocate change. Clearly, the danger of Egypt tipping back into dictatorship remains very real.

Alternatively, Cairo can make Egypt the center of a new moderate, democratizing movement to offer the Mideast a positive-sum vision of progress for all of Egyptian society and for the whole Mideast. Cairo can tip toward a combination of domestic democratization and foreign policy independence based on Arab nationalism.

May she choose wisely.

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*My thanks to Media With Conscience for publishing a shorter version of this article.

Readings

Barak Barfi argues that Cairo has no choice, financially, but to bow down to Riyadh.

Ramzy Baroud argues that Cairo is still treating Gazans at Rafah like "animals."

Question of the Day: Who Is the Real Friend of Americans?

Listen carefully the next time "your representatives" open their mouths...

Hard-core conservative McConnell defended his vote to keep giving $2B in federal welfare to Big Oil in a quarter when Big Oil profits hit $36B, with 20 million Americans unemployed, by saying it would defend the US from Chavez! I kid you not; some people actually believe this stuff.

Considering that Chavez is the guy who keeps faithfully selling oil to us and who gave discounted or free gasoline to the American poor a couple years back, while Tony Hayward was CEO of BP when BP poisoned the Gulf of Mexico, the question for the day is:

Who is a better friend of the US – Chavez or Tony Hayward?

Israeli Hidden Agenda On Iran

For examples of Israeli hidden agendas regarding Iran, see Trita Parsi's new article, which also discusses the cost of having hidden agendas. Sometimes, they can box you in. I discussed hidden agendas in theoretical terms here. Parsi also exposes inter alia how servile the U.S. media can be.

Parsi notes:

the huffing and puffing ensured that the American military option remained on the table; that Washington would not deviate from the Israeli red line of rejecting uranium enrichment on Iranian soil; and that the Iranian nuclear program was kept at the top of the international community's agenda.  

He also notes:

Inflating the Iranian threat served several purposes domestically. It provided Israeli Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres a rationale to push for peace with the Palestinians in the 1990s, while more recently Benjamin Netanyahu has used it to resist pressure from Washington to do just that. But the domestic benefits came at the price of limiting Israel's options and flexibility vis-à-vis Iran. As Israeli politicians built up the Iranian threat and established a near-consensus that Tehran constituted an existential threat, it became increasingly difficult for any Israeli politician to walk back the threat depiction without losing critical political capital at home. As a result, there was a steady escalation of the threat depiction from Iran and no clear ways to de-escalate.

Inter alia, one can also see something that is extremely important to Americans but denied by virtually all its politicians - the danger to U.S. national security of having an alliance with a country like Israel. It is one thing that Israeli politicians would play dangerous games with hidden agendas risking their own country's security and threatening an adversary, but this game tricked a lot of naive U.S. politicians and thus harmed U.S. security as well, and Israel is supposed to be a friend of the U.S.

Hidden Agendas

When politicians talk up tensions between two states, these tensions may be a game to satisfy hidden agendas or a reality artificially created by the irresponsible players. The citizens of the two sides, the ones paying the price, should open their eyes and reserve judgement.

State A and State B have long been at each other’s throats, both regularly engaging in insulting rhetoric and hostile maneuvers at every opportunity. Both societies suffer from governments that perform badly in terms of economic management and the protection of civil liberties at home. Each state sports a leader addicted to an aggressive international posture. Both states are theocracies, though both make obeisance to the modern god Democracy. Both states make laughable claims to exceptionalism. But there is a difference. State A is small, with few natural attributes of leadership but with an outsized military its leaders cannot resist using, regardless of whether it offers a long-term solution or not. State B is large, a natural power, but with a weak military, yet to reach its potential. The two states share no border and indeed have no obvious reason to pay any particular attention to each other.

One of the first distinctions one might notice about these two states is strategic: State A, with ample territory, a large population, and resources, seems destined, if it can get its house in order, to a bright future. It needs time, however, and could thus logically be expected to seek a stable and cooperative international environment. State B, with no obvious prospects over the long run for leadership but momentarily on a roll with a vastly greater relative superiority in strength than it could imaginably sustain, in fact has a brief chance to do what it wants but logically could be expected to foresee its inevitable loss of relative power in the midterm and therefore also be looking for a stable, cooperative environment that would facilitate the construction of lasting relationships. Nevertheless, the two cooperate only to the degree that they are, hand-in-hand, courting disaster. What is going on? How can one explain such mutually self-defeating behavior? What are the dynamics of this relationship?

Strategically, State A needs time to gather its strength, import advanced technology, achieve domestic political stability, develop its economy, and gain international support. Its forward-leaning foreign policy and egregiously hostile rhetoric appear ill-timed. Nevertheless, it has a logically defensible hidden agenda. State A appears strong and clearly is in the process of gaining strength, yet it presumably knows its own weakness and may well be acting tough on the basis of the perfectly defensible hidden strategic agenda of covering up its own weakness. In this dangerous game the slightest miscalculation may provoke precisely the attack it is attempting by bluffing to avoid. State A’s long history of suffering aggression from global powers combined with State B’s pattern of aggression against a variety of neighbors provide a persuasive body of evidence arguing in favor of bluffing rather than trying to accommodate State B. Clinching the case in the minds of many of State A’s national security thinkers may be a powerful pair of additional facts: the tight alliance between State B and the world’s only superpower and that superpower’s recent proclivity for attacking State A’s neighbors. When you really are being surrounded, it is easy to jump to the conclusion that you are under threat. State A’s behavior seems to be a dangerous miscalculation strategically but is explicable as a calculated risk to conceal a position of genuine weakness.

State B’s behavior also makes some sense strategically…but only as a risk-taking, short-term maximizing strategy. State B is, after all, in a temporary position of strength; it has a strategic opportunity that can be expected to dissipate, so the argument can be made that this is an historic opportunity to consolidate its position by seizing territory and retarding the development of potential adversaries. The strategic risk is that such a policy is also likely to maximize the hostility of its adversary. Given that its adversary is likely to gain strength relative to State B over the long run, a policy that stimulates hostility is logically questionable from a national security perspective. Defense of this strategy as a rational approach requires belief in the assumption that everyone else will always be hostile, a self-fulfilling prophesy of doom that is irrational by definition.

Both states, then, are pursuing what appear to be illogical and self-defeating policies of raising tensions and needlessly taking a real risk of provoking war of incalculable cost, yet each state actually can make a somewhat logical, if highly dangerous, case that it is pursuing a strategically valid policy. This conclusion is important because it portrays the respective decision-makers as carefully calculating risk-takers rather than the crazy militants they sometimes appear to be. Fighting to the death may be the only workable response to crazy militants who worship force; other, much cheaper solutions are available to persuade rational, calculating risk-takers that a particular risk may be too great.

This conclusion is also important because it suggests that national security thinkers in each state may well support these policies for a long time, regardless of how dangerous they are for the respective states as well as the rest of the world. No one can safely assume that either regime is suddenly likely to “wake up” and become risk-averse, renounce the use of force, and transform itself into a “good neighbor.” Like driving a sports car at top speed, a policy of force has momentum. This means the world needs to take very seriously the danger that this strategic competition might spin out of control; rather than just watching, or, as some are wont to do, cheering on one’s favorite side, the rest of the world needs to recognize that these two states are going through a period of extreme danger, like speed-crazed drivers entering a curvy section of highway but unwilling to slow down, and this highway is crowded. The period of danger will last as long as:

1. State A remains too weak to feel confident that it can protect itself without frightening its adversary;
2. State B remains convinced that it has a unique moment of power that it must exploit before it is too late.

It is thus in the interest of the rest of the world to consider how they might dissuade each side from these perceptions.

It may be concluded, then, that strategic claims are at least to some degree sincere and thus must be taken into account by analysts attempting to understand the curious behavior of these two states. That said, strategic considerations are clearly far from the whole story. More than one layer of hidden agenda lies inside the policy onions of these two states.

If a government is a group that gropes its way toward some (often least) common denominator called a policy, it is also a collection of individuals focused like a laser on their own personal careers. The behavior of States A and B cannot be understood without appreciating the degree to which the leaders of each benefits from, indeed survives politically as the result of, the garden of international tension which he so assiduously waters.

The leaders of States A and B would no doubt both be highly insulted were they informed of the degree to which they present mirror images of each other. Each has exacerbated domestic discord with ominous long-term implications for the stability of his society in order to form a winning coalition to enhance his own hold on power. Each has exploited and exacerbated international tensions to cover up his own failings as a leader. Each justifies his own failed leadership by then claiming to be defending his own country against the very hostility he himself has done so much to provoke. As obvious as this personal hidden agenda may be, the respective supporters of each seem utterly oblivious to it.

More, on each side, some of the supporters simply do not care; they themselves benefit too much to care. Superpower politicians share the hidden agenda of State B’s leader, exploiting the tensions they so loudly deride between State A and State B to pad their own resumes. Other enemies of State B are more than happy to profit from the tensions to gain the support of State A. Tensions, just short of war, offer many opportunities for profit. More technically, balancing on the fine edge of chaos maximizes performance (as long as it lasts).

International relations is described by the players in fine patriotic words. The reality is an onion of hidden agendas that make almost impossible rational policy-making.

The dynamics propelling behavior in this two-state system are complex. Expanding the analytical perspective to include domestic politics and external patron states makes the system dynamics almost defy comprehension.

The first dynamic is a vicious cycle of hostile behavior by one side provoking hostile behavior by the other side, which in turn provokes more hostile behavior…This cycle is real enough. The pursuit of a weapons system by one side provokes the pursuit of a weapons system by the other side.

A second dynamic is not “real” but “perception,” though its effects may be just as real. Each side interprets all defensive moves by the opponent as demonstrating offensive intent. Misperceptions can cause war as easily as real threats.

A third dynamic is a hidden state agenda to exploit tensions for national profit. A weak state can stride the international stage by providing cheap rhetorical support for an insurgency. A client state can manipulate a patron into providing an unneeded flow of aid. Foreign tensions serve as a marvelous cloaking device for regimes wishing to win votes or repress dissent at home. The leaders of both states exploit tensions for domestic partisan purposes, but both they and the voters misperceive that exploitation as sincere so tensions rise. Tensions also rise because the politicians talk themselves into believing their self-serving propaganda (cognitive dissonance).

A fourth dynamic is a hidden personal agenda to exploit tensions for personal profit. Waving the bloody flag is a tried and tested road to a brilliant political career. It is also the road to massive corporate profit. Who dares complain about the cost of “supporting our boys in uniform?”

These obvious points only deserve mention for two reasons:

1. Obvious or not, politicians get away with this nonsense every day, causing incalculable harm to society;


2. Even if all the individual points are obvious to a particularly aware individual, humans are poorly wired to “connect the dots” when the dots occur in a dynamic relationship, i.e., when interacting feedbacks generate exponential change and tipping points that suddenly reverse dominance (e.g., from intensifying patriotic fervor to sudden disenchantment with a crooked politician). Thus, we almost never understand the danger that results from these different dynamics when they interact.

The above account is a model. No pair of states in human history has ever precisely matched this model. Indeed, this model, as specified above, has no specificity. You must provide the specificity when you apply it to a real-world case, e.g., by determining the rate at which these various dynamics operate (all different from each other and all susceptible to variation depending on the context). Be that as it may, if the model seems to shed light on the behavior of any real pair of contending states, then it may provide a somewhat more useful starting point than screaming accusations of “insanity,” “fundamentalism,” “being the New Hitler,” “deserving to be wiped off the face of the earth,” or “representing evil incarnate.”

Hubris in Tehran?

A Tehran diplomatic blunder threatens to undermine its rising regional influence.

Gen. Hasan Firouzabadi, Chairman of the Iranian military joint chiefs of staff since 1989, said on May 1:

Unfair and unIslamic (sic) moves will hurt the honor of Muslims in Saudi Arabia, and it will threaten the security of Saudi Arabia.

This is a hard statement to disagree with. Saudi Arabia’s blatantly sectarian move to suppress Shi’i Muslims in favor of Sunni Muslims certainly does seem to be both “unfair” and “un-Islamic.” The subsequent attacks on medical personnel are just one example of behavior that will “hurt the honor of Muslims in Saudi Arabia.” Whether Iran in any way threatens the security of Saudi Arabia as a result or not, others surely will. It seems impossible to imagine that Riyadh can escape negative consequences to its legitimacy and its stability.

One way or another, it seems almost certain that Washington, now standing almost silent on the sidelines, will see its valuable ally destabilized and its comfortable petroleum partnership with the Saudi kleptocracy impaired. Firouzabadi may be privately delighted to see the Saudis harm their own security while simultaneously empowering Iranian hard-liners or he may be genuinely outraged at the Saudi-Bahraini repression of Shi’i demanding justice…or both. But the bottom line is that Riyadh has undermined its long-term security, Iran looks good by comparison and has probably gained significant popularity in Iraq, and the chasm between the national security interests of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia has just widened.

Firouzabadi  continued:

The Arab dictatorial regimes in the Persian Gulf are unable to contain the popular uprisings. The dictators should relinquish power, end their savage crimes and let the people determine their own future instead of ... opening an unworkable front against Iran.

Again, the general seems on solid analytical ground. Riyadh has seized the regional hardline position, while both Iran and Israel suddenly find themselves in the background, looking relatively peaceful. Iran in particular is finding its rhetoric confirmed, its international stance justified, its influence probably enhanced.

But the general went further, noting that “The Persian Gulf has always, is and shall always belong to Iran,” a remark that can be taken as a threat to Saudi Arabia and the other Arab countries that share its shoreline. If a cautious Iran can benefit from Riyadh’s clumsy counter-revolutionary campaign, the blatantly one-sided claim that Iran “owns” the international waterway seems a blunder that can only undermine its prestige. It cannot credibly both claim to be supporting justice in the Arab world and “ownership” of an international waterway that belongs as much not just to Saudi Arabia but also to Bahrain and its new friend Iraq as it does to Iran. Indeed, given the bitter half-century competition between Iran and Iraq over access to the Persian Gulf, the last thing an Iranian decision-maker hoping for influence in Iraq would want to do is claim that Iran “owns” the Gulf. How much one should read into this remark is unclear, but to make it in the midst of the Arab revolt at a minimum demonstrates poor judgment. One wonders how many Iraqis noticed this blunder and how much it might offset the rise in Iran’s image due to its defense of repressed Bahraini Shi’a.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1989, Firouzabadi called on Arab military commanders in February to defend their countries and “support popular movements.” He can feel somewhat satisfied that in Egypt and Tunisia they did; in Yemen, the military has split. But his remark about the Persian Gulf tarnishes his “democratic image.” He also warned Washington in 2010 against attacking Iran in no uncertain terms and lauded the anti-Zionist attitude of the Arab revolt in April.

The regional influence of Iran today is rising by itself; Iran’s adversaries are so busy dropping stones on their own feet that Iran looks better and better every minute that it does nothing. Insensitive remarks by senior military officials that effectively confirm imperialist intent on the part of Tehran risk alienating precisely the rising generation of young nationalist Arabs that Iran is currently applauding. His remark constitutes evidence that the normally cautious Iranian foreign policy may shift to a more risk-taking stance as Tehran’s star continues rising and its leaders begin to calculate that they no longer need be so patient.

Over the last decade, Iran saw a superpower adventure eradicate its main enemy and open the door to Iranian influence over Iraq, its main regional ally fight Israel to a draw without any overt Iranian intervention, the development of  broad diplomatic and economic cooperation with rising regional power Turkey, and then a wave of popular revolts that destabilized all its Arab opponents and opened the door to renewed ties with an emergent Egypt. But Iran remains a weak country, imperiled by domestic dissent, economic mismanagement, and regional distrust. It would be ironic if Tehran’s good fortune from the hubris of others came to naught because all that good fortune led to hubris on the part of Iran.

Dealing with Denial

Let's imagine that a decision-maker admits that he might be in denial but denies that it is intentional. How might he or she crawl out of the mental box?

Take the contentious issues of the degree to which Saudi Arabia and Israel may share strategic interests with the U.S. How might one move beyond fruitless argument? The simplest step that occurs to me would be to list the ways in which strategic interests coincide and the ways in which they clash.

Shared & Conflicting Strategic Interests: US-Israel & US-Saudi Arabia

Imagine! Merely to admit that such a list could be created would constitute a foreign policy revolution...or is it revelation(???)...in Washington. An initial version of such a list is provided as a target. I will be the first to attack it for not distinguishing between the "strategic interests" of the elite and the "strategic interests" of the societies. Making a simple list is not quite as simple as one might think!

More seriously, the obvious point is that the relative merits of an alliance are not really so obvious when one thinks about it. When you reach the (almost inevitable) conclusion that this is a less-than-satisfying approach, try Venn diagrams. But that's a tale for another day...

Saudi-American Clash of Strategic Interests

In order to calculate U.S. self-interest, Washington decision-makers need to escape from denial about the alleged "common strategic interests" between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

Denial is self-defeating: aspire to whatever goal you choose, but do yourself the favor of recognizing the potholes before you break an axle. Much blood is being spilled and much treasure wasted because of Washington’s proclivity to indulge in dangerous groupthink, its tendency to be in a state of denial about obvious dangers imperiling U.S. national security. Few examples are more egregious than the pretense that Saudi Arabia is a “friend.”

Yes, technically, the Saudis are “allies,” but that word simply means that at the moment, the Saudi elite finds cooperation with the U.S. to be beneficial. Of course it has beneficial aspects along with some that are highly injurious, but to call Saudi Arabia an "ally" implies nothing about the future, not does it in any way imply the absence of all manner of counterplot. When a secular, status-quo democracy is “befriended” by a repressive kleptocracy that rests its legitimacy on a deal that gives violence-prone fundamentalist crusaders control over domestic education and “morals” police plus a carte blanche for running an extremist sectarian international crusade, then that secular democracy should begin to worry.

Yet, respectable and recognized experts can make statements such as this blithely optimistic opening remark by Anthony Cordesman in a new summary of U.S.-Saudi ties:

Saudi Arabia and the United States may not share the same political system and culture, but they do share broad strategic interests.

Without citing the missing evidence of fundamental conflicts of strategic interest between the Saudi sectarian religious dictatorship and the U.S., Cordesman’s statement amounts to blind denial of the threat to U.S. national security posed by Saudi Arabia. The stunningly rapid collapse of the Shah, whose hoard of modern U.S. weapons proved useless in maintaining his dictatorship over an angry population, should have taught Washington that piling weapons designed for a world war against traditional Soviet-style forces into the lap of a pre-modern dictator just sets the U.S. up for future problems. Arming the house of cards and encouraging Saudi kleptocracy is the first level on which U.S.-Saudi cooperation endangers U.S. interests.

The second level is the sectarian implications of the Saudi elite campaign not just to repress Shi’a but to promote a hard-line version of Sunni beliefs. One of the core pillars of Saudi foreign policy is the encouragement of a militant version of Islam that has already led directly to al Qua’ida and is provoking sectarian conflict in Bahrain by converting popular aspirations for democracy into repression of the majority not because it wants freedom but because it happens to be Shi’i. This policy only provokes Tehran sectarian hard-liners to take an even harder line and empowers them by demonstrating that they really are under attack. Provoking sectarian conflict in the Mideast is a great cover for Saudi kleptocracy (not to mention Israeli expansion), but it is not in the interests of a weakened U.S. that desperately needs a breathing space to escape from regional misadventures and get its own rotting house back in order. Leading Saudi analyst Madawi al-Rasheed notes the dilemma for Washington:

The fusion of oil interests and Wahhabi Islam became a form of blackmail of the west, extracting from it an eternal silence over the regime’s abuse of human rights.

When Riyadh’s sectarian chickens come home, many will roost on the U.S., and this is definitely not in the interest of U.S. national security.

The third level of strategic clash of interests between Riyadh and the U.S. is the counter-revolutionary policy of the Saudis, whose insistence on standing in the path of Arab socio-political history risks alienating the rising generation of leaders throughout the Arab world from a U.S. that claims to support democratization. In this context, Cordesman’s statement that “in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the United States agree that Yemeni stability and reform are critical in limiting Iran’s influence” is simply beyond belief. From both Riyadh’s vicious campaign against Bahraini democracy advocates [thanks to Augustus Norton for bring attention to the Saudi-Bahraini war against doctors] and the public terms of the deal it is advocating in Yemen, which would leave the structure of the Saleh dictatorship entirely intact, it seems clear that Riyadh is in fact utterly dedicated to preventing reform in Yemen, and that it wants “stability” only in the narrowest, most short-term (and short-sighted) sense of clamping the lid on as tight as possible. The socio-political fire, fed by Arab revolt, is roaring hot; fuel, delivered daily by Saleh’s murderous security goons, is plentiful. What happens to a pressure cooker with the heat on full, lots of fuel, and the lid screwed tight? “Stability” is not the word that comes to mind.

Surely, cooperation with the Saudis offers certain enticements, but they are just a part of the whole meal, most of which will prove indigestible. Policy-makers can of course weigh the potential advantages and disadvantages of eating with the Saudis, but pretending a mixture of sweet desserts and rotten meat constitutes a royal banquet will only get them an upset stomach. Half the truth is that short-term interests in common with the Saudis are mixed with serious conflicts of interest; the other half of the truth is that U.S. antagonism toward Iran (which comes at a given when you buy into the myth that Saudi Arabia and the U.S. share common strategic interests) is so much of a knee-jerk reaction that it prevents recognition of the host of interests in common between the U.S. and Iran. Put honestly, neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia is a “friend” of the U.S.; neither should be labeled an “ally.” Each, like the U.S., works in its own interests; each, like the U.S., follows numerous policies that serve only the interests of narrow elite factions. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have goals that the U.S. should view with a jaundiced eye, but on specific issues, cooperation with each on an issue-by-issue basis could be highly beneficial. Americans will remain blind to all that, however, as long as they remain trapped in a state of denial.

The New Mideast...Simplified

Are you confused about the Mideast? Are you an overworked decision-maker, too busy running the world to figure out what is going on? Stay calm. Just a bit of political science theory can actually make your life easier. Try it!

The Mideast has irrevocably changed—at the fundamental social level, just as the Soviet Bloc irrevocably changed after Prague Spring, although, again like the Soviet Bloc, it may take some time for these changes to impact the visible political structure. Given the change, new policy is necessary, but given the undeniable complexity of current events, how is one to simplify the picture—or, perhaps to put it better, how is one to perceive the real currents and topography of the New Mideast beneath the whitecaps of the stormy sea of daily events?

Decision-makers are clearly confused, yet if one focuses correctly, one can perceive a relatively simple underlying political system that, while surely only one view of a vastly more complex reality, nevertheless sufficiently exposes the core attributes of the new political Mideast to serve as a practical foundation for effective policy-making.

This perspective sets to the side all discussion of the personalities of individual leaders, whose “friendship” or “hostility” is discounted as so much fluff on a wind-swept sea. Professional decision-makers do not base national security on the “loyalty” of foreign leaders (they do not say, as politician Reagan did, that Marcos is my “friend,” as though that were a responsible basis for determining interstate relations). This perspective sets to the side the national distinctions among the two dozen or so regional states. This perspective also sets to the side the particular goals of this or that political faction.

The core attributes of the new Mideast are a simple combination of four actors and the dynamics that link them. “Simple” is obviously a relative term, since a system of four actors linked by multiple dynamics working at cross-purposes and according to different time-scales would not really be “simple” even if we knew exactly what the dynamics were. Unfortunately for those readers hoping to have the Mideast “explained,” even naming those dynamics correctly will, upon reflection, be seen to be perhaps just a bit beyond anyone’s capacity, and determining how they interact certainly will be. Nevertheless, a perspective that focuses on core attributes offers some hope:

1. Only four actors;
2. A goal of identifying a minimal set of dynamics;
3. Two further goals of estimating A) the direction and B) the relative power of those dynamics.

I propose that the essential list of Mideast actors decision-makers need to consider is simply this:

Actors.

Actor 1. The Population. This is a new actor, a group we all knew existed but have always pretended, without many negative consequences, did not exist. Decision-makers wishing to avoid the charge of being in a state of “terminal denial” must now avoid that pretense. All populations of all states should now be assumed to be: politically aware and willing to fight for the hope of a better life. Take their interests into account or earn their enmity and pay the price.

Actor 2. The Elites. Elites want privilege: Arabs, Americans, Christians, Jews, Muslims, fundamentalists, secularists…it does not matter. Based on the first premise, elites all cut deals, but the existence of Actor 1 means that deals with Actor 2 come at a new price.

Actor 3. The Boss. It is still a unipolar world, and it is still U.S.-centric. Much that occurs will be in reaction to the behavior of the boss. The first thing Washington needs to understand about the Mideast is the impact of what Washington does; for the Boss, nothing can ever come out of the blue; sorry, Boss, that excuse just won’t fly.

Actor 4. The Pretender. A pretender to the throne will always exist. The big secret that the Boss never understands is that eliminating the pretender will only create an environmental niche for a new pretender, perhaps one better adapted to succeed. The hidden message in this secret is that the influence of the pretender is usually more a function of the behavior of the Boss than a result of anything the Pretender can do. The barbarians did not destroy Rome; Rome, through the unbelievable stupidity of corruption and financial mismanagement, destroyed itself. Revolution usually is the fault of the Boss not the revolutionaries. In the Mideast, there is really only one serious pretender – Iran.

Dynamics.

Dynamic 1. Control provokes resistance. Dynamics are much harder to identify, but one is both easy (at least for those in charge) to ignore and utterly predictable: control provokes resistance. The harder the boss tries to control, the greater will be the resistance: micromanagement is counterproductive. Much of politics at every level is attributable to the irony that the only actor incapable of seeing the idiocy of micromanagement is the micromanager.

Dynamic 2. Power corrupts. No matter how much wealth or power an elite accumulates, it tries to get more, even to the point of destroying the goose that lays the golden egg. Henry Ford made an exception when he advocated paying his workers enough so they could afford to buy the cars he was selling.

Dynamic 3. People are self-organizing. This is a new one, more-or-less. Any reader of Dickens (Tale of Two Cities) or Hugo (Ninety-Three) will know that the people have always had the theoretical ability to self-organize, but in today’s tightly connected world, self-organization is moving from the exception to the norm.

The New Mideast

Ignoring, for the moment, the admittedly important issue of whether or not the above list of dynamics is sufficiently all-inclusive, this vastly simplified model of the political disputes raging across the Mideast today already contains some key lessons:

• The traditional practice of indulging in deals with corrupt leaders will henceforth come at a price; cutting the masses in for a share might have a better pay-off since failure to do so can easily provoke their self-organization and lead quickly to the needless empowerment of the Pretender.
• Relying on elites is naïve; rather, the Boss should anticipate that they will betray their own people and prepare to deal with the trouble that these short-sighted elites will cause. Like Henry Ford, give the people the means to be productive supporters because opposition to your plans is now a very live alternative.
• Rather than trying to eliminate the Pretender, consider how his pretense can be exposed. What is it that the people think the Pretender can provide that you cannot? The chances are that you could perfectly well afford to offer more than enough to satisfy them.

Most of all, decision-makers need to appreciate the degree to which this is a system in flux (hence the metaphor of the storm-swept sea). A bit too much acquisitiveness on the part of a domestic elite can generate a huge amount of hostile popular self-organization and vastly inflate the influence of an otherwise hapless pretender. Once a tipping point is reached (say, an unknown worker burns himself in public protest or the idiot thugs employed by a careless dictator abuse a bunch of kids), the time-frame over which a dynamic plays out can shrink far faster than a distant decision-maker can react. Read that sentence again: dynamics are…dynamic! They not only cause behavior to change but are themselves capable of pushing faster or slower. If reaction is ineffective because always behind the curve, then planning ahead—which increasingly will mean offering a better deal to one’s adversaries than “appears” necessary—becomes the better part of valor.

As for what to do with the simplified perspective on the new Mideast, it's not quite as obvious as you may think. More later...

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Disclaimer: If you are thinking about this, then all the above probably strikes you as rather obvious. Great. You passed your test and are appointed “Decision-Maker-in-Chief.” If, conversely, you find yourself tensing up and feeling insulted, then you may be terminally in denial. In the new, fast-moving World in Flux, good luck, buddy. Emotion really is not a cost-effective approach to decision-making.

Selling Tehran's Rejectionist Stance

Having tossed out a poorly explained assertion that Tehran has little attractive ideology to offer the world in its campaign to lead a challenge to the U.S.-centric world political system, I would like to underscore the distinction between an "ideology" and a "policy position." An ideology, I would argue, is a broad construct, much more substantive than a simple policy position. Ideologies include capitalism, communism, socialism, and Khomenei's version of Shi'i clerical dictatorship. I would maintain that this ideology offers little attraction to the rest of the world, even its mistreated Shi'a. Be they Pakistani, Iraqi, Lebanese, Bahraini, or Saudi, Shi'a in general do not appear to find the idea of submitting to Khomenei's particular vision as very attractive. (Comments from those who have more expertise on this issue would be more than welcome.)

Policy is another matter, and Tehran offers the disadvantaged of the world some (potentially) very attractive policies. In a unipolar world, the big guy of course gets blamed for everything that goes wrong, and indeed when you strive to be Numero Uno, you deserve it. Tehran is the world's most open critic of the U.S.-centric global political system. Tehran may not have a very inspirational ideology, but it does offer a clear policy: replace unipolarity with...whatever. More specifically, it has a policy of rejecting Israeli military dominance over the Mideast and Israeli exceptionalism (e.g., only Israel is allowed nuclear arms, only Israel is allowed to maintain occupation forces outside its legally recognized borders).

Tehran becomes a significant player for free simply because it is essentially has a monopoly on that policy line of "resistance." This position is "free" because it does not actually have to do anything except assert the policy position and accrue the benefit of being the only actor in the world with the guts to "say no."

What Washington needs to understand is that this puts Tehran in a fundamentally passive position - its dissident stance is significant only to the degree that Washington takes such a hard-line counter-position as to make Tehran look like Robin Hood to Washington's King John. If King John had been just a bit more generous with the poor and had been a bit more willing to share power with the nobles, he could have pulled the rug out from under his opponents and been a popular king. An Obama calling for Arab democracy and insisting on the rights of Palestinians leaves Tehran rejectionists out in the cold, talking to themselves. An Obama protecting individual Arab dictators against the interests of the Arab people or kowtowing to an extremist and expansionist Israeli faction, however, hands to Tehran rejectionists a degree of global political influence they could never obtain for themselves. Tehran's future is in the hands of Washington, and so far Washington is giving Tehran exactly what it wants: an easy target.