Question of the Day: Preventive War

If the leadership of a nuclear power declares a policy of preventive war and threatens an opponent, does that give the opponent the moral right to attack first in self-defense?

More specifically,

1) Does that give the opponent the moral right to kill the leaders who made the threats?
2) Does that give the opponent the moral right to commit genocide by, e.g., launching a nuclear attack?

And finally, if human society were civilized, would the mere verbal declaration of policy of preventive war in the absence of a direct and immediate threat be considered a war crime?

_______________

Readings:

• The Bush doctrine of preventive war
• Illegal War
• The Ultimate Crime
• The Next War

Statements by Politicians:

McCain: "it depends"

Retired Israeli General Oded Tira: "As an American air strike in Iran is essential for our existence....The Americans must act. If they don't, we'll do it ourselves..."

Netanyahu: "There is still time. All ways must be considered. We can't let this thing happen,"

Attacking Iran: Would Victory Be Worth It?

I recently posed several questions that I think need to be answered by any who advocate a nuclear attack against Iran. War is like blowing up a dam; the water goes where it will. The one aspect to be said for a war of choice is that timing is up to the aggressor, so there is no excuse whatsoever for not thinking things through before it is too late.

If you are considering voting for a politician in the war camp, you may wish to take a look at what happened the first time the U.S. used nuclear weapons.

Even if no one plans actually to start a war, making threats can be dangerous. Threats repeated often and loudly enough can take on a life of their own creating an infernal reality beyond our control (because we get ourselves too angry to think clearly, because we persuade the opponent that he must strike first for self-preservation, or because a third party takes advantage of the tension to provoke a fight neither of the combatants really wants). So even without actually starting a war, just advocating it can risk the nation's future.

Beyond those two general dangers posed by an aggressive foreign policy stance come the many specific concerns related to the idea of a U.S. war of choice against Iran. The first question I posed was:

Why should we endanger our national security by provoking a war when there is no current threat to us?

War entails several areas of uncertainty: victory is uncertain; the impact of victory on one’s own society is uncertain; even if victorious, the thoroughness of the opponent’s defeat is uncertain; the implications of partial or total defeat of the opponent are uncertain. Indeed, those implications are so uncertain that it is not even clear that one should want complete victory: who cleans up the mess?

All this is by way of an introduction to what is truly as difficult to analyze as any question facing human society, so the point here is not to resolve the issue but just to push folks to replace the pathetically emotional and irresponsibly dangerous rhetoric with a little actual thinking.

In this post, then, let’s limit the discussion to the best possible outcome: total victory. The likelihood of such a scenario and possible alternative outcomes can be considered later. So the question here amounts to the following:

if total victory could be guaranteed in advance, would that be a good deal?

Even total victory entails costs. Having won a total victory, you are the only one left to clean up the mess. In the modern world, simply sneering and going home is not an option. Nuclear fallout, depression resulting from oil price rise, global terrorist campaign by those sympathetic to the loser, destablizing refugee flows, and epidemics are among the key dangers on the list of messes the victor will have to deal with. Then, there's the unwanted influences on the victor itself.

Effects on the aggressor of aggression that works:

• denial of one’s own immorality weakens ability to see and avoid future acts of immorality, pushing one further down that pathseeing the first act of aggression persuades others to defend themselves, acts that will be misinterpreted as new threats;
• these new threats could, just like the perceived “threat” of a weak but independent Iran, be dealt with in any number of ways, but force will be all the more tempting, having once been used;
• war becomes a habit;
• populace salutes the flag and supports whatever charlatan happens to be in office, believing whatever lies are told, and ends up with a government prone to exploit fearmongering in order to maintain its hold on power;
• those who see the truth tend to be steamrolled; moreover, those whose power in office is based on lies tend, logically, to feel insecure and therefore constantly to be looking under the bed for more enemies – the two conditions together rapidly undermine civil rights.
  

Victory in a war of choice can be a very dangerous thing. The way of life the aggressor claims to be defending by starting a war may be destroyed even by victory. In a future post, some of the implications of an outcome that falls short of the mythical "total" victory will be explored.

Iraq: The Actors Speak for Themselves. Pt. 4

General Petraeus:

"I think it's very important to recognise that the Sadr trend, as a political movement, has every reason to be engaged in the political
spectrum, in the political arena, in Iraq."

"It represents an important constituency in the citzenry of Iraq."

So...let's send some more U.S. troops into Sadr City to see what sort of reaction we can provoke!

*********************

PM Maliki:

"What Sahwa ? The role of the Sahwa is over. The only leadership is
that of the government."

This is Arabic, I suppose, for "Welcome to our new united front government, my dear Sunni brothers."

Neo-Con Mission in Iraq Accomplished? You Bet!

To understand whether or not the Neo-Con mission in Iraq was accomplished, it is necessary to understand what their self-appointed mission was and what they accomplished.

1) Iraq has been destroyed as an independent country capable of challenging Israeli or U.S. regional dominance.

2) Iraq has been destroyed as an independent country capable of controlling its own oil export business.

3) Washington has established a series of some 14 huge, city-like military bases in Iraq that can serve as launch platforms for whatever regional military adventure it may desire.

Mission accomplished? You bet it was!

If you thought the Iraq war was about destroying a WMD industrial capacity that the U.S. had been attacking and degrading ever since the 1991 Iraq War, wake up. If you thought the Iraq War was about democracy, take a look at the vicious slaughter Washington is now conducting in Sadr City. And, by the way, democracy does not come at the point of 14 huge, offensive military bases, nor does it require a 100-acre fortress-embassy.

The Neo-Con offensive in the Mideast has always had two themes: imperialist power politics and extremist religious fundamentalism. These two themes are fundamentally contradictory since the former is about establishing a position of power, the latter about destroying mankind in an orgy of slaughter to hasten the arrival of the savior (if you are confused about the distinction between fundamentalist Protestant rapture and fundamentalist twelver Shi’ite return of the Mahdi, you should be). Nevertheless, a political link of the crassest expediency (i.e., two groups with fundamentally divergent goals making a short-term agreement) was formed.

The imperialist goals were essentially to:

• place the Mideast in the hands of militant, right-wing Israeli politicians who, over the last three decades (see Trita Parsi’s Treacherous Alliance) developed Israel’s security-through-offense foreign policy;
• to cement U.S. dominance by controlling global oil.

But neither half of that vision could be realized by “stopping with Iraq, which even by Mideast standards is not a large country and was very much in decline by 2003 as a result of 12 years of U.S. attack.” Tehran is no more willing to kowtow to Israel or Washington than Baghdad was after 1990, when Saddam Frankenstein asserted his independence. The "mission" accomplished in Baghdad was never more than a pitstop on the road to Tehran.

Bad as that is, it is still not the whole story. Accomplishing the mission in Iraq also accomplished something else that, perhaps, was not part of that mission: it empowered al Qua’ida, both directly by effectively given bin Laden a pass while Washington focused on the wholly unrelated issue of destroying secular dictator Saddam, and indirectly by the nature of the long, brutal U.S. occupation that became a cause celebre for jihadis worldwide.

As I wrote in an earlier discussion of the impact of the Iraqi War:

Five years of war have produced a shattered society, a destroyed economy, and a mirage of a state: fertile soil indeed for cultivating a new jihadist movement that truly will be a threat to the U.S. …the longer American air war against Iraqi cities continues, the more likely it becomes. The longer groups that have formed to fill the power vacuum are prevented from participating as equals in the political process (be they Sunni Awakening forces or Moqtada al Sadr’s militia or others), the more likely it becomes. The longer the Iraqi oil industry remains structured for the benefit of the international oil industry rather than for Iraq’s benefit, the more likely it becomes. The longer U.S. military bases remain in Iraq, the more likely it becomes.

Al Qua’ida itself...benefits in a far more significant manner: as long as American troops and bases remain in Iraq, they serve as a convenient target for al Qua’ida and represent an incredibly powerful motivational issue to aid in the recruitment of new members. For this reason, the termination of U.S. military operations in Iraq would constitute an immediate and very significant loss for al Qua’ida. The U.S. invasion of Iraq was a gift to al Qua’ida, eliminating an Arab Sunni enemy, creating a convenient battleground, enhancing al Qua’ida’s reputation, and distracting attention from the shattered al Qua’ida headquarters organization. Five years later, al Qua’ida itself has gained time to reorganize, and the chaos flowing out of the U.S. occupation of Iraq has given the al Qua’ida message of global Sunni jihad a huge boost. That the U.S. succeeds in eliminating al Qua’ida from Iraq should come to Americans as little solace: such a victory would only return the situation to what it was after 9/11; Washington invites them into Iraq and then kicks them out. Iraq has been a sideshow for al Qua’ida, but one that brought al Qua’ida much profit.

So, yes, Bush accomplished his mission. The question is, was this America’s mission?

Iraq: The Actors Speak for Themselves. Pt.3

Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, a Kurd:


1. The law of the land says no militias. So any movement that has militias will be disqualified (from elections).

2. The Sadr movement is an indigenous, major political movement of this country. Attempts at isolating them or excluding them will not serve Iraq's stability and prosperity. It is in our interest to have the Sadr movement as an integral part of the political process. --source

Does anyone see a contradiction here?

Note also that, contrary to media reports, Maliki’s campaign has not been against “militias,” which are everywhere in Iraq, but specifically against al Sadr, which raises another question: is Salih indicating reservations about Maliki’s campaign? Salih’s comment comes just after a multi-party demonstration against the attack on Sadr City and new Sunni calls for an end to the violence and killings of civilians (reported and translated by Badger on his Arab Links blog). We may be seeing the beginning of the breakdown of Maliki’s brand new anti-Sadr political coalition.

Questions About A Nuclear Attack on Iran

To the Politicians Advocating the Legitimacy of a Nuclear War of Aggression Against Iran:

Leaving aside all issues related to the morality of committing mass murder in the absence of a clear and present danger and giving you a very generous benefit of the doubt by assuming for the moment that you truly do care about your country and are mentally stable, I have a few questions for you:

1. Why should we endanger our national security by provoking a war when there is no current threat to us?
2. Why should we start a war when we have, to date, refused to explore alternative options, such as, if you will pardon my language, talking?
3. Why should we start a war against Iran on behalf of an extreme right-wing militarist faction in a foreign country when that country (Israel) is a nuclear superpower probably 50 years ahead of Iran in terms of military technology?
4. Do you truly think that a country that would attempt to talk us into starting a nuclear war can be considered a friend of the U.S.?
5. If your answer is “yes,” why do you think a nuclear war near that country would actually enhance the quality of life and security of that country’s people?
6. Given the fact that Iran has no prospects whatsoever of catching up to Israel in nuclear weapons capabilities in our lifetimes, why does the issue of a nuclear attack on Iran even arise?
7. Given the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran has not ever invaded another country (unlike Israel) and has no colonies (unlike Israel), what is the evidence for asserting that it would be likely to commit a suicidal act of aggression?
8. Given that the most recent U.S. government/academic model of the environmental impact of a regional nuclear war determined that the global “nuclear winter” and skin cancer effects would be even worse than previous models had indicated, what makes you feel that these risks are worth taking? Include, in your answer, an estimate of the number of American civilians who would die from the fallout produced by an attack on Iran and the economic costs to agriculture from the resulting "nuclear winter" impact for: a) an attack that eliminated all of Iran's nuclear industrial sites, b) an attack that destroyed the Iranian regime, c) an attack that "obliterated" the Iranian population.
9. How many U.S. soldiers in Iraq do you estimate would die from radioactive poisoning or cancer as a result of the fallout from a nuclear attack on Iran for each of the three above scenarios?
10. How many U.S. soldiers in Iraq do you estimate would die from the resultant fighting and attacks on long U.S. supply lines in Iraq for each of the three above scenarios?
11. In light of the still unfolding long-term implications of a) the U.S. invasion of Iraq, b) the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, c) the two major Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1982 and 2006, d) the U.S. “Blackhawk down” episode in Somalia, and e) the 2006 intervention in Somalia by the U.S.-backed Ethiopians, what is your estimate of the situation that would result in the Mideast six months and six years after a nuclear attack on Iran? What justification do you feel there is for claiming to be able to make any reasonable calculation of the results?
12. What is your estimate of the global political changes that might result from an unprovoked attack on Iran? In formulating your answer, please consider: a) the attitude of nuclear power Russia, which has offered Iran certain nuclear security guarantees; b) the attitude of nuclear power Pakistan, which prides itself on having the world’s first Moslem nuclear bomb; c) the possible changes in behavior of all nuclear powers toward their own enemies, once a precedent is established that it is acceptable to launch a nuclear attack on a non-nuclear power in the absence of an immediate and existential threat to one’s homeland; d)Israel’s attitude toward all the rest of the Mideast; e) India’s attitude toward Pakistan; f) China’s attitude toward Taiwan; g) the attitude of North Korea, now mulling the possibility of terminating its nuclear weapons program; h) the attitude of industrial powers worldwide (e.g., Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Mexico, Turkey, Egypt) on the issue of becoming nuclear weapons states for their own security.
13. What do you think the risk is that a U.S. attack on Iran might provoke a global military alliance against the U.S., led by Russia and China but with the support of most other countries, out of pure fear of further U.S. aggression? In formulating your answer, please address whatever justifications you may have for viewing such a possibility with equanimity.
14. If the U.S. were to launch a nuclear attack on Iran, which poses no significant or immediate threat to the U.S., on the justification that any potential future threat to a U.S. ally constitutes sufficient justification for a U.S. attack, what U.S. response would be reserved for a true threat or an actual attack?
15. Should the U.S. have the option of employing calibrated responses to different types of attack (e.g., attacks on U.S. interests vs. attacks on the U.S. homeland, localized attacks intended to warn vs. full-scale attacks intended to destroy the U.S., non-nuclear vs. nuclear attacks)?
16. What would your response be if an unidentified source (possibly al Qua’ida, seeking to trap the U.S. in another Mideast quagmire) exploded a nuclear weapon to provoke the U.S. into attacking Iran?
17. Do you recognize any risk that an implacably hostile and rhetorically belligerent policy toward Iran might make the U.S. vulnerable to such a trick by a third party?
18. If you are one of the folks who brought us the Iraq War, then why should we listen to you at all?
    

Please provide answers on paper, with your signature. You will be held responsible for the results of your actions.

The Cost of Imperial Israel

Paul Craig Roberts, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury under Reagan, has written yet another excellent essay on U.S. foreign policy, entitled “What the Iraq War Is About.” Roberts argues, as the quotes below show, that Iraq is all about imperial Israel. I suspect he would argue that U.S. hostility toward Iran is about exactly the same thing.

My position is slightly different in that, as I have said before, I believe there are two primary reasons for Washington’s hostility toward an independent stance on the part of either Iraq or Iran: Israel and oil (feel free to substitute the word “power” for “oil”). Independent of a desire to ensure the ability of Israeli militarists to continue their expansion, oil (upon which power rests) and a broader concern with power itself still seem to me to explain a good deal of the enthusiasm for war. I admit that this costly war was illogical as a means of obtaining oil: Iraq and Iran under all their various regimes are always happy to sell us their oil. But that just shows the Administration couldn’t do its arithmetic.

As for the possible additional reason--that war was correctly seen as a highly profitable corporate business, I would encourage others to offer evidence about how significant that reason might be.

All that being said, Roberts’ logical argument about the centrality of supporting Israeli regional dominance is well and concisely stated. Quotes follow, but the whole article is strongly recommended. What is missing from the argument is evidence. Perhaps some of us will live long enough to see that in official U.S. records to be released in 30 years or so (assuming our democracy still lives). In the meantime, readers are cordially invited to offer whatever evidence, confirmatory or disconfirmatory, they may have.

Roberts’ key points:


If the U.S. invaded Iraq for any of the succession of reasons the Bush regime has given, why would the U.S. have spent $750 million on a fortress "embassy" with anti-missile systems and its own electricity and water systems spread over 104 acres? No one has ever seen or heard of such an embassy before. Clearly, this "embassy" is constructed as the headquarters of an occupying colonial ruler.
The fact is that Bush invaded Iraq with the intent of turning Iraq into an American colony....

If colonial rule were not the intent, the U.S. would not be going out of its way to force Sadr's 60,000-man militia into a fight. Sadr is a Shi'ite who is a real Iraqi leader, perhaps the only Iraqi who could end the sectarian conflict and restore some unity to Iraq. As such he is regarded by the Bush regime as a danger to the American puppet Maliki. Unless the U.S. is able to purchase or rig the upcoming Iraqi election, Sadr is likely to emerge as the dominant figure. This would be a highly unfavorable development for the Bush regime's hopes of establishing its colonial rule behind the facade of a Maliki fake democracy. Rather than work with Sadr in order to extract themselves from a quagmire, the Americans will be doing everything possible to assassinate Sadr.

Why does the Bush regime want to rule Iraq? Some speculate that it is a matter of "peak oil."…This explanation is problematic….

The more likely explanation for the U.S. invasion of Iraq is the neoconservative Bush regime's commitment to the defense of Israeli territorial expansion. There is no such thing as a neoconservative who is not allied with Israel. Israel hopes to steal all of the West Bank and southern Lebanon for its territorial expansion. An American colonial regime in Iraq not only buttresses Israel from attack, but also can pressure Syria and Iran not to support the Palestinians and Lebanese. The Iraqi war is a war for Israeli territorial expansion. Americans are dying and bleeding to death financially for Israel. Bush's "war on terror" is a hoax that serves to cover U.S. intervention in the Middle East on behalf of "greater Israel."

Note that nothing in the above in any way questions the right of Israel to exist as one among many Mideast states within its legally recognized international borders. The issue here concerns only whether or not Israel will be supported in its drive to expand beyond those borders to occupy Palestinian and Lebanese land and whether or not Israel's policy, in effect since the 1980s, of reliance on overwhelming military force to dominate the whole region will be supported.

Dealing with Nuclear War: Test for a Mature Democracy

Saudi Arabia and Iran, according to a storyline that militarist circles in the U.S. like to promote, are engaged in a fundamental struggle for survival. In that context, the following remarks from an editorial in the Saudi paper Arab News on Hillary's threat to "obliterate" Iran are noteworthy:

Editorial: Clinton’s Threat to Iran

24 April 2008

If there were any doubt that if she made it to the Oval Office, Hillary Clinton’s term would be George Bush Mark III, the lady made it plain on the eve of Tuesday’s Pennsylvania primary....
Monday night, Clinton drove home her “toughness” by threatening to “obliterate” Iran if it launched an attack on Israel. Given the kind of foreign policy advisers she has (the same as those who paved the way for Iraq war), she may not wait for Iran to “attack” Israel. It can be a pre-emptive “obliteration.”
This is the foreign politics of the madhouse. It demonstrates the same doltish ignorance that has distinguished Bush’s foreign relations. It offers only violence where there should be negotiations and war where there could be peace. At a stroke, Clinton demonstrated to everyone in this region that if she were the next occupant of the White House, Iraq-like death and destruction would be the order of the day.

Even the Republican candidate, John McCain, has not been so war-like in his views of Iran. This experienced politician has at least had the good sense to leave open as many options as possible. And there is now a strong sense that if he were president, Barack Obama’s inclination would be to try to pick up some of the many opportunities for negotiation and peace-making that have been discarded by the belligerent Bush administration....

There is little or no consideration of how simplistic Washington analysts actually plunged the region into chaos in the first place. America’s world outlook remains disturbingly black and white. Hillary Clinton has demonstrated that even if she knows better, she is prepared to ride and exploit this mulish ignorance.

The threat to “obliterate” Iran is dangerous folly. What though has this woman given to the implicit threat Israel makes to the rest of the region with its own nuclear arsenal? How does she imagine that such talk will play to those Iranians who want rapprochement with Washington?

Questions critical to the future of all of us...the kind of questions a mature democracy would be debating in an election season.

Iraqi Maneuverings

The decision officially made by Iraqi Prime Minister al Maliki, though perhaps with more than a little urging from behind the scenes, to corner Moqtada al Sadr seems to have been designed at a minimum to persuade Moqtada to give up his estimated 60,000-man militia and become just a weak factional leader in a political system where power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Instead--Surprise! Surprise!—it risks pushing him in the opposition direction, toward setting up his own competing political system.

Al Sadr has, over the past year, been taught several lessons:

• Unilaterally declaring a ceasefire does not protect you from being attacked;
• Participating in the political process does not protect you from being attacked;
• Allowing Tehran to broker a ceasefire in Basra does not protect you from being attacked in Baghdad;
• If you have a political perspective (unified state, rapid U.S. troop withdrawal) that puts you at odds with other power centers, you are at risk.

Given these lessons, one would indeed think it would be difficult to make the decision to give up a 60,000-man army and put one’s faith in the generosity of one’s political opponents. This is the context behind the comment of Mohan Abedin, director of research at St. Andrew’s Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, who said that "Muqtada has shown a great deal of patience not calling for an all-out war yet with so much pressure on him.” Indeed, one of al Sadr’s political supporters was anonymously quoted as saying that his “emphasis is now on weapons and fighting, not politics.”

While this is a serious indication of the direction in which al Sadr may be moving, it is nevertheless clear that he continues to play politics, as indicated by his nuanced refocusing of last week’s threat to fight if Maliki and the U.S. do not stop attacking his forces. Focusing on “open warfare against the Americans,” he is now stressing the importance of Iraqis avoiding killing each other.

Still calling on his own forces to avoid fighting, he is maintaining his threat of open warfare, but focusing it on occupation forces, saying "When we threatened 'open war' we meant a war against the occupier, not a war against our Iraqi brothers.” Nevertheless, war against Iraqi brothers continues, as this good background piece describes.

Meanwhile, al Sadr is calling on other Arab states to give political support to Iraqi efforts toward independence. The temporizing of Arab leaders at this week’s Kuwait “neighbor’s summit” suggests they may be listening to him.

And now, only a month after the Battle of Basra, the former prime minister Jaafari is rumored to be moving toward alliance with al Sadr, which would crack the wall of isolation that has been thrown around al Sadr in recent weeks.

Given the relatively restrained resistance of Moqtada's JAM in Basra, it seems fair to wonder if all the rhetoric about open war is anything more than bravado. It may be, as is being argued by some, that Basra has been not only an utter defeat for Moqtada but one popular with the people of Basra.

But the hypothesis that Moqtada chose to limit his resistance does fit with Moqtada’s historical behavior of avoiding open showdowns when offered an alternative. It also fits with his efforts to portray himself as a patriot and maneuver Maliki out of a complete break. Finally, it seems the better part of valor, for it could be argued that time is on Moqtada’s side. One could hypothesize that the longer he resists, the more he trumpets his independence from Iran (a claim al Hakim cannot easily make), the louder he calls on Iraqis to unite against the invader, and the more the Baghdad poor are subjected to collective punishment, the better Moqtada’s political position. Given the likelihood of American troop withdrawal, time may well be on his side militarily as well.

The opposite argument would be that time is on Maliki’s side because the longer he carries on the offensive, the more desperate Moqtada’s poor supporters will become and the longer Moqtada keeps retreating, the more he will look like a paper tiger.

For all the talk of who has military power, the issue may in the end be decided by two political issues:

1. the skill with which Maliki rewards all his new coalition partners, the Kurds salivating over Kirkuk and the Sunnis demanding control of ministries and access to the military;
2. the degree to which Moqtada’s religious and ethnic excesses have alienated him from the Iraqi people.

Maliki and his supporters want to create that “single center of power” that would so greatly simplify the Iraqi political system. He now appears to have made progress toward that goal in both Basra and Baghdad. Time will tell if he is really succeeding or if the “process of energizing” the political system will instead provoke the emergence of new and unanticipated dynamics.

Israel-Iranian Relations: A View From Israel

Although U.S. politicians and the mainstream American media seem to feel that honest analysis of the issue of Israeli security is virtually taboo, Israelis, not surprisingly, take this issue extremely seriously and frequently consider its implications thoughtfully. A recent article from the Jerusalem Post, from which excerpts are given below, is a good example of the kind of analysis that America's self-proclaimed "friends of Israel" should engage in.

Washington Watch: On Iran - also try diplomacy

By DOUGLAS M. BLOOMFIELD

As George W. Bush prepares to leave town, one of the many pieces of unfinished business is his vow to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions. Instead, Teheran is far closer today to having a nuclear weapon than when he came to office.


His refusal to engage in any substantive dialogue with the Iranians unless they first accepted his terms may explain why all three presidential contenders have promised greater emphasis on diplomacy....


IRAN'S DANGER is more than a nuclear weapon that may be years away. It is its financing, training, weapons and diplomatic cover for a terror network that targets Israel. Teheran is also spreading its influence across the Middle East - with a U.S.-provided foothold in previous enemy Iraq - that threatens not only Israel but also American's traditional friends in the Arab world.

A nuclear weapon will be a potent instrument of blackmail for Iran and an umbrella for its terrorist allies.

The threat to Israel should not be underestimated, but Iran has much more reason to worry.

Iran's nuclear weapon is still theoretical; Israel's is not. Israel is widely believed to have several hundred nuclear warheads, and its delivery systems are far more advanced, accurate and diverse than Iran's.


Iran is developing ballistic missiles, with North Korean help, and they are believed capable of hitting Israel. Israeli long range Jericho missiles are accurate and reliable. Iran has nothing to match Israel's batteries of the Arrow anti-missile missiles.

Iran's air force is barely functional; Israel's is one of the best in the world.

Israel's German-built Dolphin submarines, according to some reports, may be equipped with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, giving Israel a nuclear triad: airplanes, missiles and submarines.


That gives Israel a powerful deterrent: a second strike capability, a Cold War concept indicating the ability to launch nuclear missiles even after a country has absorbed a heavy first blow.

Israeli military officials have said they don't have the number of planes, missiles, aerial tankers and other systems needed to go after all of Iran's nuclear installations - which are widely scattered and deeply buried - even if they knew where to find them. But they do have the capacity to wreak enormous damage on the country's energy infrastructure and other assets.

THE AYATOLLAHS are perfectly willing to send thousands of children to die in a war with Iraq or suicide bombers to Israel, but you won't see any of them strapping on explosive belts themselves. They are not suicidal; their goal is not to die for the Islamic republic but to let others do the dying while they spread the Shiite revolution to the Sunni Arabs. They know that a nuclear attack on Israel will bring the kind massive retaliation that will leave their revolution in cinders.

For Israel, war against a nation state like Iran means no targets are off limits - unlike going after terror groups hiding among the civilian population in Lebanon or Gaza. Israel would have no compunction about visiting shock and awe on Iran, unfettered by delusions of converting it to democracy.

Iranian leaders seem to compete with each other in threatening to obliterate Israel, but when Israelis respond with their own bravado, the Iranians run crying to the UN, filing formal protests.

Every recent Israeli prime minister has considered Iran the one enemy which can pose an existential threat, and they have focused much of their diplomacy on trying to get the international community to take Iranian nuclear ambitions seriously as a global threat and not just as an Israeli problem.


The next American president clearly understands that, but also that the Bush administration's "no diplomacy" policy only made a bad situation worse.


And polls show the American Jewish community feels the same way.