Gaza Border Reopened...for Casualties

The Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt has been reopened...but this time by Egypt to admit victims of Israel's military onslaught in need of hospitalization rather than by Hamas bulldozers.

As Yossi Sarid put it in Haaretz:

Stop! Will the government have the courage to stop before calamity
hits? Those who sowed this wind of ongoing, not-necessarily-targeted strikes, of
locking the gates and suffocating Gaza on all sides, are now reaping the
whirlwind....The decision on war was made without realizing it, and the cabinet still does not know that this was the decision, exactly as happened in the summer of 2006....There is no choice but to talk to Hamas, indirectly or directly, and without preconditions.

In 2006 when Hamas peacefully participated in and won election as the new governing party of all Palestine, its ability to govern was undermined by U.S./Israeli economic warfare. Following Palestinian infighting partially provoked by Israel and the U.S., Palestine ended up divided, with Hamas governing Gaza and Fatah governing the West Bank, an obviously unstable situation likely to tempt all sides to engage in high-risk behavior. In January 2008, Hamas came up with the ingenious bulldozer diplomacy tactic to break out of the Gaza prison, but its opponents refused to compromise and slammed the door shut again, predictably generating the current fighting. Each time Hamas tests the political waters to see if a policy of peace and compromise might float, its enemies immediately sink it, ensuring the continuation of a needless war. When the world's attention turns from asking who pulled the trigger to asking who benefits from the carnage, then we will have taken the first step toward peace.

Israel Kills 19 Palestinian Children

Israeli onslaught kills "many civilians" in Gaza and "targets" Gaza government headquarters, according to Israeli media, provoking its al Fatah "ally" to break off talks.

Israel Air Force aircraft targeted Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail
Haniyeh's Gaza headquarters early Sunday, firing three missiles at the compound.
Palestinian witnesses say the building completely collapsed, reporting wounded
militants. Earlier, IAF planes struck a Hamas weapon warehouse in northern Gaza.


On Saturday, two Israeli soldiers and 63 Palestinians, many
of them civilians, were killed in an Israeli military operation in northern Gaza
City. The operation is expected to continue for several days. --Haaretz

Israel was responding to a rocket barrage from Hamas, sent in revenge for the earlier killing of several Hamas personnel. Beyond this tactical reason, Hamas was also acting to achieve strategic defense. As Amos Harel put it in Haaretz, "Hamas has been trying for some time to create a balance of deterrence with Israel in the Gaza Strip."

Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas said, "We tell the world to see with its own eyes and judge for itself what is happening and who is carrying out international terrorism."

For a description of how the highly skilled Israeli IDF soldiers killed some of the reported 19 children killed, see this story.

Speaking on behalf of the people who once faced a holocaust themselves, Israeli deputy defense minister callously threatened the people of Gaza with a "holocaust."

The Islamic Political Fault Line & the Complexity of Pakistan

Daily media reportage of events make it easy to conclude that an Islamic political fault line, implying a socio-political cleavage consistent in its origins and centered around attitudes toward Islam, is emerging across the Islamic world. One alternative view might be that societies with Moslem majorities just happen to have a lot of different political issues to resolve at the moment. In reality, both hypotheses have validity and are interconnected…which means that even if a particular Moslem country has a unique socio-political dispute unrelated to anything in other Moslem countries, it is likely to be misperceived as part of a titanic “clash of civilizations” or to be exploited as such by those who are trying to invent a clash of civilizations. The result of this process is precisely the emergence of an Islamic political fault line.

If an Islamic political fault line is emerging as a single, unified issue the whole world will have to deal with, it is obviously of critical importance to everyone’s future. The exact nature of the dynamics of such an emergent phenomenon and the degree to which it is a function of voluntary behavior that could be altered, rather than a function of contextual conditions that, over the short-term, cannot be altered, are questions that deserve the closest attention.

To the degree that developmental issues, for example, are misinterpreted as examples of civilizational conflict, we will all pay a heavy price unnecessarily. If a dispute over, say, the price of grain (currently a serious issue in some Moslem societies) happens to be seen as the result of exploitation by non-Moslems, it can get mixed up with a debate over the proper nature of Islamic behavior. Once the price of grain is confused with “us vs. them” emotions, resolving the issue becomes much more difficult – actors trying to provoke cultural discord or actors who may be honestly suspicious inhibit simple technical solutions (recall, for example, the resistance in Islamic regions of Nigeria to polio vaccinations).

The fluidity of Pakistani society and the openness in Pakistani media of the political debate resulting, in part from the way the recent election has shaken up everyone’s expectations make Pakistan an excellent case for studying how local issues and global Islamic issues become intertwined.

Although the dynamics are complex, one conclusion comes through quite clearly from a glance at Pakistani conditions: the Pakistani situation is at present by no means a simple black and white case of a fault line with everyone lined up on one bank of the political crevice or the other. Islamic militants use violence but also offer peace. Tribal leaders move back and forth between militants and the government searching for compromise. Secular political parties propose a wide range of alternative approaches. The stance of Islamic political parties varies unpredictably across the political landscape. Among the militants themselves tactical and perhaps strategic distinctions are visible. So in this one society, maybe an Islamic political fault line is emerging, but if so, the process certainly is not steady and while the fault may be widening by some measures, bridges are nevertheless continually being thrown across it. All this suggests that the process is by no means inevitable; on the contrary, it seems very sensitive indeed to everyone’s behavior.

Fault Lines in Complex Adaptive Systems
The above conclusion that the Pakistani political situation is highly fluid, which was based on reading English-language Pakistani newspapers, fits well with the view that the Pakistani political system (like virtually all political systems except when under extreme totalitarian control or in utter chaos) is a complex adaptive system. Complexity theory would lead one to anticipate a constant evolutionary process in which the process of splitting a system by an emerging fault line would be highly nonlinear and ambiguous because dependent upon numerous underlying, interacting, dynamical processes. If the system is dynamical and interactive and adaptive, then co-evolution of the parts can be anticipated. Thus, the two components separated by a fault line will nevertheless still have linkages, still affect each other: rather than immutable forces in contention, they will change each other. Each side will also constitute a subsystem of components that are also coevolving in an almost infinitely complex process, all colored in tones of gray.

You may counter, “But wait! The question is just how complex the system actually is!” This is a valid point. It is easy to observe that the modern, connected world is more complex all the time, but unfortunately we have no scale to measure the degree of social complexity. A forward-looking foundation might consider sponsoring research along these lines.

A forward-looking foundation might consider sponsoring research to develop a
scale for measuring the degree of social complexity in a given society.

Observations from readers about how the processes discussed here actually work in practice will be warmly welcomed.

Pakistani Media on Washington's Attitude

Pakistani media comment sees Washington's attitude toward Pakistan since its recent parliamentary election, in which both Islamic militants and military dictatorship were rejected, as a "huge mistake" that threatens to "deepen the divide" between the Bush Administration and the Pakistani people.

...election results are being viewed as a turning point in Pakistan’s chequered history….The US, however, appears to have failed to appreciate the significance of the forces thrown up in the wake of Musharraf’s mauling of the Constitution and repeated assaults on state institutions, all of which helped breed defiance in civil society. Sadly, Washington remained a prisoner of its own past and thus unable to look beyond the narrow confines of the war on terror, the pursuit of which, in its view, has become synonymous with the person of Musharraf. This is a huge mistake though, if the past is any guide, it is very much in keeping with earlier American errors.

Admittedly, the US has powerful interests in Pakistan, given the country’s geopolitical importance and its pivotal role in the global war on terror. Over the past years, it has used Pakistan’s territory and military resources not only to pursue the war on terror, but also to prevent proliferation of nuclear and missile weapons, material or technology to extremists or non-state actors. Moreover, NATO’s widening presence in Afghanistan and its growing operations in the border areas are added reasons to secure Pakistan’s cooperation. But having worked under an arrangement, the details of which have not been shared with the political leadership, the Bush administration is loath to have to now deal with a democratic dispensation, which by its very nature, will seek a more balanced and equitable relationship with the US.

The ability of authoritarian regimes to offer ‘concessions’ to foreign
powers is not available to elected representatives. It was therefore no surprise
that the US would look with horror to this cozy relationship being disturbed and
that too by people viewed as too ‘nationalist’. The US feels that these objectives can be better achieved by ensuring that Musharraf retain control over the levers of power and thus its current emphasis on a ‘hybrid’ government in Pakistan. This also explains Washington’s inability to begin distancing itself from Musharraf. Bush has phoned Musharraf to reiterate his support for him, while Secretary Rice has come out with a strong endorsement, calling Musharraf the man the US has been dealing with and wants to continue doing so. She added that loss of parliamentary support should not necessarily weaken Musharraf, an embarrassing evidence of her ignorance of the Pakistani political landscape. The likely Republican presidential candidate, Sen John McCain, too, has rejected calls for Musharraf’s resignation calling him ‘a legitimately elected President’. Some Democrats also endorsed this view.

It would also appear that Washington is either ignorant of or oblivious
to the real meaning of the elections. This is evident from Bush claiming that
the election results are a ‘part of the victory in the war on terror’. Nothing
could be further from the truth as evident from polls carried out by credible
international organisations, such as the Pew Project and the International
Republican Institute, which showed that 70 per cent of Pakistanis want Musharraf to immediately resign, another 89 per cent disapprove of the US war on terror and nearly an equal number are opposed to allowing the US or NATO forces to operate in Pakistan.

The US may continue to see Musharraf as the ‘bond’ that holds Pakistan
together, but the country’s overwhelming majority see him as the cause of
polarisation and a source of instability. Thus, there is a major chasm between the Bush administration and the Pakistani public and recent statements from Washington threaten to deepen this divide.

While it is true that no democratic government in Pakistan can provide
a carte blanche to the US in the manner and to the extent that Musharraf has,
mainstream parties are opposed to terrorism and their leadership consists of
modern, moderate and progressive politicians. They are however convinced that
military option is not the answer to the problem and may even be counter-productive. Instead, they advocate a more nuanced approach, in which the military effort would be complemented with economic development, social benefits and political dialogue. Incidentally, this is the approach being now advocated by Sen Biden, who wants the US to triple its non-military aid, sustain it for ten years and focus on schools, health care and roads. In other words, more diplomacy and resources and less force and violence.

Washington needs to recognise the folly of having crafted a policy around the person of Musharraf, ignoring the interests of the people of Pakistan. If Washington has a genuine preference for democracy, it needs to cut itself off from its attachment to Musharraf. President Bush needs to recall the wisdom contained in one of his speeches, when he stated that “if people are permitted to choose their own destiny…then the extremists will be marginalised and the flow of violent radicalism to the rest of the world will slow and eventually end.”

How true and the US can make it happen in Pakistan. If the US wants
peace and stability in Pakistan and a genuine ally, it should place its trust in
the people of the country and step in with a strong and unequivocal support for
the restoration of a democratic dispensation. This will not only enhance its
moral standing, but also become a powerful message to other Muslim
countries.—Dawn, Feb 28





The words by the two frontrunners for Democratic
Party candidature, give an indication of the way Pakistan is looked at in the
United States. For people in Pakistan, however, the words are ominous. For one,
they suggest that the Democratic Party too sees a strong US role as essential in
Pakistan. Neither of the candidates appears to realize that it is these
perceptions regarding US intervention in Pakistan that is contributing to the
extremist problem within it, and indeed to the rise in terrorism.

A more sagacious and far-looking approach may bring dividends. Now that
Pakistan's people have given a verdict, it is important to allow the forces
voted in by them to take forward the war on militancy — by building a consensus
with the people of Pakistan, and particularly those based in tribal areas. Given
the degree of mistrust that exists for the US across Pakistan, and the
perception is that it is determining actions within the country will only
complicate an already complex problem. What it is important for US leaders to
realize is that Pakistan itself must be seen as combating terror on its own. To
do this, the hearts of people must be won over —through persuasion, and by
granting them more in terms of education, health and welfare. It is in these
areas that US support can come in handy. Otherwise threats and harsh words will
only aggravate the issue that currently most threatens stability in Pakistan and
poses a threat to all its citizens.—The News,Feb
29

In Their Own Words: U.S. Presidential Candidates on Iraq & al Qua'ida

If you don't want to repeat it, history matters.

Turkish Model of Moderate Islamism Threatened by Incursion into Iraq

Can Turkey construct a model of moderate, inclusive Islamic politics even as it launches major military operations against Kurdish rebels?

Protests are spreading in Kurdish Turkey against the current Turkish incursion into Kurdish Iraq. What Istanbul has portrayed as an anti-terrorist operation is already, less than a week after Turkey’s recent military action commenced, starting to blow back, provoking ethnic unrest within Turkey. Do Turks realize how dangerous their little military solution is becoming…to them?

Ethnic Kurds in Turkey Protest Incursion

Large protests in support of the PKK turned violent in the town of Diyabakir on Monday as protesters clashed with police.

Al Jazeera's Hoda Abdel Hamid said the situation in the town was tense and that reports of similar small clashes in other Turkish towns reflected the growing frustration of Turkey's Kurdish minority. She said that there was also growing anger on the Turkish side as the number of coffins of soldiers returning home continued to mount. There are fears for increased instability as local Peshmerga forces could engage Turkish troops.

Under the moderate Islamic party Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice & Development Party / AKP) now “ruling” Turkey (within the space it can carve out of a political system dominated by the military), a model of a third way for Moslem states—in addition to secular dictatorships and Islamic radicalism—is emerging. The PKK, which seems to be the most popular party in Kurdish as well as Turkish ethnic regions of Turkey, is arguably leading the way toward a modern, post-ethnic Turkish nationalism inclusive of the Kurds. Whether or not Turkey can manage to teach the PKK a lesson without inflaming old ethnic tensions within Turkey to the degree that will derail this long-overdue process is a critical question, not only for Turkey and its neighbors and their own large Kurdish minorities but more broadly for Pakistan, Israel, Indonesia, India, Iran, Somalia, and Lebanon—all of which face the same challenge of figuring out a route to modernization that will offer civil liberties, economic development, and mutual respect among minorities while avoiding the Scylla of dictatorship and the Charybdis of repressive Islamic fundamentalism. A tough stance against proponents of violence combined with a compassionate stance toward domestic minorities plus serious efforts to pull the standard of living in minority regions closer to that of the nation as a whole is in theory the right approach to achieve this goal. But the dynamics in which a tough stance against militants plays out typically tend to weaken the other two legs of such a policy. If Turkey can indeed manage to implement such a three-legged policy, then Turkey would constitute a major obstacle to the emergence of the Islamic political fault line so ardently being sought after by extremists.

Milestones to watch for that would indicate the worsening of this new crisis include:

• Kurds citing Kosovo independence as a precedent.
• Civilian Iraqi Kurdish deaths.
• Turkish troops firing on Turkish protests.
• Fighting between Turkish invasion forces and Iraqi Kurdish soldiers (the peshmerga).
• The PKK carrying out its threatened attacks in Turkish cities.
• Rise in popularity of the PKK within Turkey.
• Turkish repression against peaceful political action by Turkish Kurds.
  
  

U.S.-Iranian Relations: The Bottom Line

Noam Chomsky summarizes U.S.-Iranian relations in this video on Real News.

What constitutes "interference":

suppose it was true that Iran is helping insurgents in Iraq. I mean, wasn’t
the United States helping insurgents when the Russians invaded Afghanistan? Did
we think there was anything wrong with that? I mean, Iraq's a country that was
invaded and is under military occupation. You can't have a serious discussion
about whether someone else is interfering in it. The basic assumption underlying
the discussion is that we own the world. So if we invade and occupy another
country, then it's a criminal act for anyone to interfere with it. What about
the nuclear weapons? I mean, are there countries with nuclear weapons in the
region? Israel has a couple of hundred nuclear weapons. The United States gives
more support to it than any other country in the world. The Bush administration
is trying very hard to push through an agreement that not only authorizes
India's illegal acquisition of nuclear weapons but assists it. That's what the
U.S.-Indo Nuclear Pact is about.

The real reason for Washington's hostility toward Tehran :

The real reasons for the attack on Iran, the sanctions, and so on…Iran is out of control. You know, it's supposed to be a U.S.-client state, as it was under the Shah, and it's refusing to play that role.

If it were desired to prevent solving a problem, the easiest way would be to prevent the problem from being understood.

Recognizing Kosovo Independence: Dangerous Precedent

For an analysis of the implications for global stability of the recent Kosovo declaration of independence, see this five-minute video by Stephen Zunes on the important independent source of global affairs developments Real News:

Well, this is a very dangerous precedent, because if it's ignoring the UN
Security Council resolution, makes it an irreversible fact, what is the point of
UN Security Council resolutions? That it is back to the old-fashioned kind of
power politics. My interpretation of 1244 is that it does not include
independence as an option within that same work. And indeed it seemed to make a
lot more sense for Kosovo to enjoy the status of the Iraqi Kurds or the
Taiwanese, who even for those of us who believe that morally they have a right
to independence, recognize that they essentially had that already, and by making
a formal declaration as such and having this kind of recognition by foreign
powers can destabilize the region and create a very dangerous precedent, which
would very likely cause far more problems than a compromise, a solution might
have done.

It is of course difficult to determine whether the short-term implications of failing completely to satisfy the aspirations for independence of a particular group outweigh the long-term implications doing so. If decision makers make a sincere attempt to weigh short-term against long-term implications and explain their thinking, then they have at least minimally done their jobs. In the case of Kosovo, it would not have been hard to anticipate how the precedent of declaaration of total independence despite the unclear wording of the relevant U.N. resolution might be used by other oppressed groups aspiring to attain freedom.

One of the keys to foreseeing the future is thinking about how the long-term implications of behavior may differ from the short-term implications; another is thinking about how the implications for the group involved may differ from the implications for other groups that may take some event as a precedent. To fail to consider such complications in advance is to throw away valuable tools for the protection of our security.


Further Reading...

* Opportunities for Blowback

Exposing Israeli Repression

UN expert: Palestinian terror 'inevitable' result of occupation
By The Associated Press, as reported in Haaretz.

A new report commissioned by the United Nations and written by a South African campaigner against apartheid "suggests that Palestinian terrorism is the inevitable consequence of Israeli occupation and laws that resemble South African apartheid."

According to the author...."common sense ... dictates that a distinction must be drawn between acts of mindless terror, such as acts committed by Al-Qaida, and acts committed in the course of a war of national liberation against colonialism, apartheid or military occupation....While Palestinian terrorist acts are to be deplored, they must be understood as being a painful but inevitable consequence of colonialism, apartheid or occupation," writes Dugard, whose 25-page report accuses the Israel of acts and policies consistent with all three. He cited checkpoints and roadblocks restricting Palestinian movement to house demolitions and what he terms the Judaization of Jerusalem. "As long as there is occupation, there will be terrorism," he argues. "Acts of terror against military occupation must be seen in historical context," Dugard says. "This is why every effort should be made to bring the occupation to a speedy end. Until this is done, peace cannot be expected, and violence will continue."

Map of Illegal Israeli Settlements in Occupied West Bank

Map of Israeli Wall

Dividing & Conquering Moslem Societies: A Complex Peril

Is Washington intentionally provoking Sunni-Shi'ite civil war in the Mideast? Would such a policy be likely to work - Sunni radicals and Shi'ite radicals canceling each other out, leaving pro-U.S. Arabs in control? The pattern in Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq is clear enough to take seriously. Complexity theory suggests that the result will come as a nasty surprise.

According to this video of a CNN interview of investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia jointly funded Sunni extremists in Lebanon as part of a broader U.S. policy of fomenting Sunni-Shi'ite civil war as a means of undermining Shi'ite radicals by strengthening Sunni radicals (i.e., al Qua'ida's base). Washington and Tel Aviv supported Fatah against the legally elected Hamas government in Palestine, as well. In Iraq, Washington's shifting of support from the Shi'ite groups that dominate Washington's Iraqi colonial government toward the Sunnis defeated by Washington's invasion could also be interpreted as an effort to strengthen Sunnis for the purpose of weakening the Shi'a (rather than simply as a belated attempt to separate Baathists from al Qua'ida).

Describing the then-new U.S. policy toward Iraqi Sunnis in Feb. 2007, Cliff Montgomery observed:

Perhaps precisely because of its hopeless blunders in Iraq, Iran has become
the Bush Administration's "Public Enemy Number One", against which its Middle
East strategy is increasingly focused, according to some leading experts on the
Gulf region. That strategy appears aimed at forging an informal alliance between
Bush, Sunni-led Arab states and Israel. The alliance seems designed to challenge
and roll back perceived Iranian influence in the region, according to Gary Sick,
a Columbia University professor who served as former President Jimmy Carter's
chief advisor on Iran."The organizing principle of the new strategy is
confrontation with and containment of Shia influence--and specifically Iranian
influence--wherever it appears in the region," says Sick.

How the new U.S. policy of funding Sunni militias, the "Awakenings," (as long as they combat al Qua'ida) fits in remains to be answered. Is it primarily an effort to unite moderate Iraqis against (mostly foreign) Wahhabi fundamentalists, or is it the first step in a new stage of the Iraqi civil war between Shi'ite and Sunni Iraqis? That is at least two questions:

1) What is the policy actually accomplishing?
2) What is Washington's intent?

The answers are not yet clear, but according to a new study from the Center for American Progress, what has been extolled as a central “success” of the surge has also exacerbated existing political divisions and fomented new political cleavages in an already fractured and fragile Iraqi body politic. Newly empowered sahwa leaders are challenging each other, traditional Sunni Arab political parties, and the Iraqi government.

The assumption that Shi'ite radicalism is potentially as dangerous to the U.S. as their mutual enemy, al Qua'ida, is somewhat far-fetched since al Qua'ida has been attacking the U.S. directly. The three main Shi'ite forces are Iran, which is not attacking the U.S. and has frequently offered to negotiate; Hezballah, which is focused on defending its Lebanese homeland; and the Shi'ite parties in the Iraqi government under U.S. control. (This is of course not to say that an aggressive U.S. policy might not transform one or more Shi’ite group into an implacable enemy.) But even if we somehow could make a logical case that Shi'ite radicalism was bound to become a greater threat than the Sunni groups we have supposedly been fighting ever since the African embassy bombings, the Cole, 9/11, the London subway attack, and the Spanish train attack, is fomenting an Islamic civil war a logical road to U.S. security? (Many glib and uninformed analogies have been made between Islam and the Nazis; a more interesting analogy would be between the al Qua’ida-neocon struggle and the Nazi-Soviet use of the Spanish Civil War as a proxy test for WWII.)

As Alastair Crooke concluded in a study of how to pacify an armed political movement,

...any effort to marginalize the plurality ethnic group in Lebanon -- the
Shia -- [is] fated to fail....A consensual outcome in Lebanon would need to begin
by defining Lebanese national security objectives in ways that address the
vulnerabilities of the respective confessional groups rather than defining
external threats. It would require the agreement, at minimum, of the four
principal confessional groups (the Shia, the Sunnah, the Druze and the
Christians) to new security structures and forces. The new forces would have to
be disengaged from their earlier sectional attachments and histories; and their
operational policies and conduct would have to be overseen by a monitoring body
that is viewed as representative of the community. To achieve such agreement in
any divided society is ambitious; but to achieve it at a time when the West and
other Arab actors are polarizing the politics of Lebanon in pursuit of their own
strategic agendas, may prove impossible. Finally, what needs to be done
eventually and inevitably...must needs be done in Lebanon: the international
community must abandon the ideal and adopt the real. Hezbollah will not disarm
in the face of its enemies... But Hezbollah...will engage in a political process
that is transparent and honest, and that holds out the hope that, at its
conclusion, its existence as a political movement will be guaranteed and that
the sacrifices of its cadre will be recognized and rewarded.

What historical record in any human culture would support the contention that civil war brings out moderation? Al Qua'ida rose from the ashes of U.S.-Saudi support for Islamic extremists in Afghanistan. Moqtada al Sadr and the whole Iraqi insurgency rose from the ashes of Bush's invasion of Iraq. Hezballah rose from the ashes of the Lebanese civil war, with considerable help from Israel's 1982 invasion. The split of Palestine into two feuding camps rose as the result of U.S. military and diplomatic support for Fatah at the expense of the legally elected Hamas government. And now we are to believe that Hezballah will be reined in and replaced by moderate, pro-U.S. feeling as a result of a new civil war, with considerable help from Washington?

There is no law prohibiting politicians from ignoring history, but missing a pattern this obvious cannot but make one wonder if there just might possibly be an alternative explanation. Rather than concluding that Washington is run by people so naive as to think that we can defeat Islamic radicalism by provoking even more radicalism, might it be that the almost inevitable chaos that will result from such an inflamatory policy is in itself the goal?

As long as chaos exists in the Islamic world, the neo-cons (both in Washington and Tel Aviv) can make the argument that they are right, there really is a war between civilizations, and their brand of fundamentalist/expansionist extremism is the West's only hope of survival. The argument may be ridiculous, it may turn reality on its head, but chaos will enable them to convince the many voters filled with righteous indignation but utterly ignorant about the world.

THE NEW WORLD OF COMPLEXITY.
Perhaps one should not be surprised that the traditional policy of divide and conquer would be used by Washington. Empires have, after all, been successfully implementing this policy as long as historical records have existed. Rome was past master at the technique, Stalin used it in Central Asia, the British empire used it in Iraq in the 1930's.

However, near universal education, modern communications, and the extraordinary danger today of asymmetric warfare that effectively empowers the marginalized in a unique way have changed the world. The modern world is significantly more complex - more integrated, more difficult to divide up into local situations that an external power can manipulate one by one. Where a historical policy of divide and conquer left an isolated group disempowered and defeated (e.g., the majority Shi'a in Iraq in the 1930's or a Central Asian ethnic minority intentionally placed in a Soviet Republic dominated by a different ethnic group), today these groups are quick to see the parallels between their local situation and other situations. For example, Bush had hardly left the Mideast when a pro-government Saudi paper, the Arab News, termed Bush's policy of forming an anti-Iranian front composed of the U.S. plus its Sunni allies "madness in search of war." All can see the pattern of Shi'a in Lebanon being frozen out of the Lebanese political system and Shi'a Iran being frozen out of the Mideast/South Asian political system.

Aggravating conflict between extremist Shi’ite and Sunni groups will radicalize and energize both. The more they fight, they more radical each will become. Moreover, the more they fight, the more harm will come to the 1.5 billion Moslems of the world – most of whom (e.g., anti-mullah electoral outcome in Pakistan; e.g., declining popularity of Ahmadinejad in Iran; e.g., peaceful behavior of the half million residents of Gaza who spilled out of their Israeli prison last month, calming went shopping, and voluntarily returned home) just want to go about their lives. That harm (“collateral damage”) will, as in Iraq, provoke them to take sides and/or blame the U.S.

The new, more complex world of today facilitates the formation of new alliances that enable oppressed, ostracized groups to survive long enough to learn how to adapt. Once the process of adaptation gets rolling, it becomes increasingly difficult for the external aggressor to keep up with the evolution of the adapting opponent: the oppressed group not only can gain strength but evolve rapidly, creating new organizational structure, new behavior, and perhaps new goals, none of which will be predicted by the external aggressor. "Divide and conquer" today is a policy that sets up the aggressor for a nasty surprise: in a complex world, it is no longer logical policy.